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
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Absence of precision in the formularies



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THE ABSENCE OF PRECISION IN THE  
FORMULARIES OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND,  
SCRIPTURAL. AND SUITABLE TO A STATE  
OF PROBATION.

## IN EIGHT SERMONS,

PREACHED BEFORE

THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD,

IN THE YEAR M.DCCC.LV.

AT THE LECTURE FOUNDED BY

THE LATE REV. JOHN BAMPTON, M.A.

CANON OF SALISBURY.

---

BY

JOHN ERNEST BODE, M. A.

RECTOR OF WESTWELL, AND LATE STUDENT OF CHRIST CHURCH,  
OXFORD.

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Conjungar illis, Domine, in te, et delecter cum eis in te, qui veritate tua  
pascuntur in latitudine charitatis.—*S. August. Confess.* lib. XII. c. xxiii.

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EXTRACT  
FROM  
THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT  
OF THE  
REV. JOHN BAMPTON,  
CANON OF SALISBURY.

---

— “ I give and bequeath my Lands and Estates to  
“ the Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars of the University  
“ of Oxford for ever, to have and to hold all and sin-  
“ gular the said Lands or Estates upon trust, and to the  
“ intents and purposes hereinafter mentioned ; that is to  
“ say, I will and appoint that the Vice-Chancellor of the  
“ University of Oxford for the time being shall take and  
“ receive all the rents, issues, and profits thereof, and  
“ (after all taxes, reparations, and necessary deductions  
“ made) that he pay all the remainder to the endowment  
“ of eight Divinity Lecture Sermons, to be established for  
“ ever in the said University, and to be performed in the  
“ manner following :

“ I direct and appoint, that, upon the first Tuesday in  
“ Easter Term, a Lecturer be yearly chosen by the Heads  
“ of Colleges only, and by no others, in the room ad-  
“ joining to the Printing-House, between the hours of ten  
“ in the morning and two in the afternoon, to preach  
“ eight Divinity Lecture Sermons, the year following, at  
“ St. Mary’s in Oxford, between the commencement of the

“ last month in Lent Term, and the end of the third week  
“ in Act Term.

“ Also I direct and appoint, that the eight Divinity  
“ Lecture Sermons shall be preached upon either of the  
“ following Subjects—to confirm and establish the Christ-  
“ ian Faith, and to confute all heretics and schismatics  
“ —upon the divine authority of the holy Scriptures—  
“ upon the authority of the writings of the primitive Fa-  
“ thers, as to the faith and practice of the primitive Church  
“ —upon the Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus  
“ Christ—upon the Divinity of the Holy Ghost—upon the  
“ Articles of the Christian Faith, as comprehended in the  
“ Apostles’ and Nicene Creeds.

“ Also I direct, that thirty copies of the eight Divinity  
“ Lecture Sermons shall be always printed, within two  
“ months after they are preached, and one copy shall be  
“ given to the Chancellor of the University, and one copy  
“ to the Head of every College, and one copy to the Mayor  
“ of the city of Oxford, and one copy to be put into the  
“ Bodleian Library; and the expense of printing them shall  
“ be paid out of the revenue of the Land or Estates given  
“ for establishing the Divinity Lecture Sermons; and the  
“ Preacher shall not be paid, nor be entitled to the revenue,  
“ before they are printed.

“ Also I direct and appoint, that no person shall be  
“ qualified to preach the Divinity Lecture Sermons, un-  
“ less he hath taken the degree of Master of Arts at least,  
“ in one of the two Universities of Oxford or Cambridge;  
“ and that the same person shall never preach the Divinity  
“ Lecture Sermons twice.”



## P R E F A C E.

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IT has been so usual for persons, wishing to preach the Bampton Lecture, to choose for their subject some one point of Theology, that an impression, I believe, prevails, that to do otherwise is to depart in some degree from the Founder's intention. It should be remembered therefore that the will mentions among the subjects from which choice is to be made, "To confirm and establish the Christian faith, and to confute all heretics and schismatics." And it appears to me to be no useless contribution towards the former of these ends to shew what is the "Christian faith," and what human additions to it, and so at once to display it in its proper colours to those who may have misconceived it, and to confirm and comfort in their simpler and more scriptural belief those who may have been awed by the extravagant pretensions of theological dogmatists, or disturbed

and distracted by the din of religious dissensions. And to do this, not in the abstract, but by defending the freedom and breadth of our own Formularies, seemed at once the humbler and the more practical method. I have wished to say thus much on the *generality* of my subject, though the fact of its having been approved by those, whose office it is to elect a Bampton Lecturer, is perhaps a better apology.

There is a point connected with the *style* of these Lectures on which I may be allowed to say a word. They may be thought too rhetorical in parts for discourses supposed to be argumentative. Of this offence, if it be one, I can only say that it has been committed with the utmost deliberation. I have thought it a duty to attempt to render my Lectures interesting to the younger members of my important congregation, to whom a dry argument, unrelieved by appeals and addresses, is apt to be distasteful. And I have done so the more in treating this particular subject, because I hoped that some of these hearers might perhaps unconsciously imbibe something of that more liberal and comprehensive feeling with regard to Theological questions, which it has been my especial aim to inculcate; enough at least to put them on their guard against the audacious pretensions of confident dogmatists and partisans, and so to

enable them to give time and thought to the formation of their Theological opinions.

As to the treatment of the subjects discussed, I wish only to meet an objection which may be brought to the frequent appeal to the Homilies, which are often regarded as only popular addresses, on the expressions of which no argument should be founded. To me their popular character appears somewhat misunderstood. It is their merit frequently to combine a popular method with very exact Theological statement, and, what is better, with a thorough appreciation of the difficulties of the subjects discussed, and a deep as well as bold treatment of them. They reflect something of the searchingness and *reality* of the times in which they were written. However it will be seen that they are *not* used for the purpose of independent proof, but of confirmation of other proof grounded on the Articles, except in three cases.

One is the use of the word *regenerate*. But here it should be noticed, that the particular point maintained is a freer use of this term, an application of it to a practical realization of spiritual privileges, and not the impropriety or slight importance of its primitive technical use. And to prove such a more liberal use I cannot conceive any document more suitable than a sermon sanctioned by authority, which natu-

rally takes a more practical view of a Theological question than would be suitable in a Confession of faith.

The third case, which is similar to the first, is the use of the term *elect*; but to this I do not expect much objection will be raised, as the double use of this term is allowed, as I have observed in the Lectures, by Calvin himself. It may be also argued to be that of the Church Catechism.

The second case is the meaning of *Faith*, which is more than a verbal question; but the reference to the Homily of Salvation made in the Eleventh Article, will I hope place the propriety of this appeal of mine beyond dispute. Nor can it be said to be inconsistent with these references to object to the expression “under the form of bread and wine” in the title of the Homily on the Sacrament given at the end of the First Book, not only because a title is something different from a line of argument, nor only because the title was afterwards altered<sup>a</sup>, (as I have noticed,) but because it is a matter of history that the subject of the Sacramental presence is one on which our leading Reformers became

<sup>a</sup> This is of course the strongest technical argument, and, I think, conclusive against attaching much importance to these words.

more decided *against* the notion suggested by these words.

There is one sentence or clause of a sentence towards the close of the second Sermon (p. 66) which I could wish altered, as I do not think it clearly expresses my meaning. It is that in which I object to the notion that such passages as "I lay down my life for the sheep," and "My sheep hear my voice," "tell us *anything* as to how or why these sheep are chosen." A Calvinist might rejoin "This is exactly what we say; the choice is *absolute*." Now, to say this *does* affirm something about the choice, viz. that it is *not* guided by the principles of having respect to man's use of grace, or his acceptance of the offer of salvation, which is, I think, pressing *these* passages; but I should have expressed my exact meaning better if I had said "have anything in them suggestive of absolute *rejection*." Many other improvements in expression might no doubt be made; but this having especially occurred to me I have thought it worth while to mention it.

The particular subject I will add is one on which, more perhaps than any other, calm and friendly mutual explanation leads forcibly to the conclusion that there cannot be much practical difference among earnest Christians. May it not be said also of the long-controverted question of

Baptismal Regeneration, that if we are all agreed that no one can “believe” or “do” aright without God’s “special grace” which must be sought “by diligent *prayer*,” it can be of no practical importance whether we believe a child to have received in Baptism a special gift, or to have been placed in a state in which he has a covenant claim upon God for an answer to his “diligent prayer.” For the direction to “pray” involves, as I have argued in my Fourth Lecture, some “preventive grace;” and who does not teach his children to pray?

WESTWELL RECTORY,  
JULY 17, 1855.

# CONTENTS.

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## LECTURE I.

1 COR. xiii. part of v. 12.

*Now I know in part ; but then shall I know even as also  
I am known* .....P. 1

## LECTURE II.

1 COR. xv. part of v. 51.

*Behold, I show you a mystery* ..... 31

## LECTURE III.

JOHN i. 18.

*No man hath seen God at any time ; the only-begotten  
Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared  
him* ..... 70

## LECTURE IV.

1 THESS. v. 23.

*The very God of peace sanctify you wholly ; and I pray  
God your whole spirit and soul and body be preserved  
blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. ...* 104

## LECTURE V.

GAL. iv. 19.

*My little children, of whom I travail in birth again until Christ be formed in you. ....* 136

## LECTURE VI.

2 THESS. iii. 5.

*The Lord direct your hearts into the love of God. ....* 165

## LECTURE VII.

1 JOHN iii. 20. 21.

*For if our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things. Beloved, if our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence toward God. ...* 207

## LECTURE VIII.

PSALM cvii. 43.

*Whoso is wise, and will observe these things, even they shall understand the loving-kindness of the Lord.....* 235



## LECTURE I.

---

1 COR. xiii. part of v. 12.

*Now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also  
I am known.*

THIS frank and humble confession of present imperfection, this infinite promise for the future may be said, without presumption, to enlighten us a little as to the final cause of that desire of knowledge which seems to be implanted in the human mind. It teaches us that it is given, not only as a help and a comfort for the present, nor only as a preparation for the future, but as a perpetual reminder that in that future alone all that is good in the present can have its consummation. And, taking an abstract view of this desire of knowledge, we are at first surprised to find, side by side with it, a tendency to accept as such that which the seeker has been enabled to attain. But the complex phenomenon may perhaps be thus accounted for. Combined with the restlessness arising from the former desire, there is a constant longing for repose, which is apt to anticipate its gratification. There is moreover a wish in most men's hearts, not only to have,

but first to reflect upon, and then to exhibit, their new possession. And so men are often tempted, after a few irregular efforts, either to adopt a crude eccentricity, resting on its own authority; or, (which is more common,) to subside into a dull acquiescence in conventional opinions. Thus indolence and vanity clip as it were the wings of lofty aspirations. And, even when the former is absent, how often does the latter take the form of a proud consciousness of comparative power; and the tendency to premature conclusions with a view to dogmatic assertion, though elevated, remains unaltered. And of this impatience, from whatever cause arising, there are three distinguishable phases. There is the impatience of one period of life, attempting to forestall the acquirements of another; and the impatience of one age, antedating another's discoveries; and lastly, there is the impatience of time, forecasting the revelations of eternity. It is of the first and third alone that I propose to speak, for the second has only a slight and indirect bearing on Theology. And it is to the third that I shall especially call your attention, inasmuch as it affects the Theology of Churches, considered as such, as well as that of individuals. At the same time whatever may be said of churches, or of the individuals which compose them, taken at their best, will apply with still greater force to the young in age and to the youthful, so far as regards this high subject, in intellect or in information.

When then we proceed to consider the effect

which the impatience of which I have been speaking exercises, or has exercised, on Theology, we find, as might be expected, the natural tendencies already mentioned existing, though in a different form. There is the desire of knowledge, and of doing justice to what we know, purified and raised by its object, but still not without alloy. For what is that unwillingness to endure suspense, which is so striking a feature in all false religion, and which in the true has created the fatalist, and the sacramentalist, and the solifidian, and the inventors and abettors of priestcraft (I speak of the excesses of things which have, or may have, a holy and healthy subsistence)—what is this, I say, but a kind of religious indolence? And what is dogmatism but Theological vanity, claiming to see further than is usual into the secrets of the unseen world, and either creating a like curiosity in others, or perhaps responding to it? for teachers and taught are often both responsible for yielding to this natural temptation, the one professing, and the other demanding, a solution of all doubts, and a supply of something clear, decided, definite, systematic,—far beyond what the state of the case allows, or Scripture leads us to expect. And the one error paves the way for the other. Men do not like to acquiesce in the conditions of their lot, and so they are obliged to those who profess to be able to emancipate them. And this, infidelity undertakes to do without the Bible, and dogmatism with it. There is indeed a vast difference between the two; and do not for a moment

suppose that I am putting them on the same footing ; what I say is, that they both attempt the same impossibility, and so they play into each other's hands. Infidelity says, " We know nothing, and need not therefore trouble ourselves about the matter ;" or, if a blank nothing be but a sorry proffer, " Here," she says, " O ye seekers after knowledge, are my speculations on the subject, which you will find ingenious and amusing, not interfering with any other phænomena which may exist in the soul, still less with moral conduct, except with a view to contemplation, and affording as good a diversion to the mind as anything else can in this scene of nothingness." Dogmatism, on the other side, professing to represent the Bible, holds in her hands a departmental map of Christianity, with all the rivers and all the creeks, and all the mountains, of the unknown as well as of the known land, marked out with painful exactness, and tracing as it were beneath the ocean that divides this from the other world, the course of that branch of the River of God which comes in the heart of the faithful, he knows not how, though he does know from whom, as " a well of water springing up unto everlasting life."

Is there any difficulty about God's counsels? hear how she decides it by the voice of one of her prophets. A man has been reading the ninth verse of the third chapter of St. Peter's second Epistle, which tells us that God is " not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance," and is perhaps inclined to bless God for the comfort,

and to go about his work in hope. But curiosity suggests a question, and dogmatism has a ready answer. "But<sup>a</sup> here it may be asked," (and truly there is no foolish question which cannot be asked,) "if God is not willing that any should perish, why do so many perish? I answer that the apostle is not speaking here of that secret counsel of God by which the reprobate are predestined to their proper destruction, but only of His will which is made known to us in the Gospel<sup>b</sup>."

So here is dogmatism in the person of Calvin, installed in the clouds of heaven, dispensing esoteric doctrine above the Gospel.

Does any one suggest the possibility of self-deceit on the part of man judging of his own condition, and the propriety of some degree of restraint in his statements on the subject? Here is the answer of another pious and learned dogmatist (I use both expressions in perfect seriousness) which in the early part of the seventeenth century was set forth to the members of the Church in the sister University.—"True faith is an infallible mark of election, assuring the believer as certainly of his salvation as if he were

<sup>a</sup> Calvin on 2 Pet. iii. 9, quoted in Tholuck on the Romans, ix. 11, Vol. ii. p. 223 Eng. Tr. The strong anti-Calvinism of Tholuck does not affect the question of this passage being, as I think it is, a fair specimen of Calvin's views.

<sup>b</sup> "Sed hic quæri potest, si neminem Deus perire velit, cur tam multi pereunt? Respondeo, non de arcano Dei consilio hic fieri mentionem *quo destinati sunt reprobi in suum exitium*, sed tantum de voluntate quæ nobis in Evangelio patefit."

already gathered up to his fathers ; or as if he had a special revelation<sup>c</sup>.”

Should any one again in speaking of the nature of Sacraments, suggest that a change of relation, if not a complete, is, at least in the case of baptism, an admissible theory, in a case of so great obscurity? Here is the answer of a learned writer of our own time, who has lately left our communion for the more congenial dogmatism of Rome.—“That those outward means which we call Sacraments are truly attended by an inward effect<sup>d</sup>,” (this may be granted readily,) “that what is done on earth in holy mysteries, effects a real change in *the whole nature* of those who are acted upon, is known to us by the *distinct* declarations of God’s word ;”—and, to support this view, a sermon of Leo is quoted, in which he says “He that is received by Christ, and that receives Christ, is not the same after the laver of baptism as he was before it,” (here again there is nothing yet to stagger us,) “because” (for dogmatism must tell us *how*, as well

<sup>c</sup> Dr. Thomas Taylor’s Commentary on Titus, c. i. v. 1. p. 14. Quarto Ed. 1619. I cannot refer to this book without repeating my high admiration of its learning and piety.—But it is Ultra-Calvinistic.—There is a passage (p. 61) which indicates the check which these opinions were then beginning to receive, after their development in Elizabeth’s reign, to the exclusion of the more moderate views of the original Reformers.—“When we see the world hating us, the earth expelling us, bonds and prisons receiving us, *our country scarce acknowledging us*—.” The work was first published in 1612.

<sup>d</sup> Wilberforce, Doctrine of the Incarnation, pp. 409, 410. Third Ed.

as *that*, it is so) “*the body of the regenerate person becomes the flesh of the Crucified One.*” And this language is distinctly quoted as argument, not as the allowable rhetoric of devotion.

Such are some of the assertions of dogmatism ; and though they were made by individuals, they must, I think, be allowed to be fair specimens of the Theology of the Geneva of Calvin, of the Synod of Dort and the Lambeth Articles, and, lastly, of the contrast between the doctrine of our own Articles and that which is substituted for it (I do not mean in form, but practically) by the more decided supporters of the Sacramental system.

But further, my brethren, what shall we say of those, who have lately shocked the rest of Christendom, by taking upon themselves to shift one of God’s miracles a generation back<sup>e</sup>, because forsooth they could not understand how God could “bring a clean thing out of an unclean,” and would not allow their own inability to manage all His wondrous mysteries ? What shall we say of the Infallibility which allowed this necessary doctrine to remain concealed, not indeed in itself, but *as* a necessary doctrine, from whole legions of inspired councillors and Infallible Popes ? or of the intense infatuation of dogmatism which has now ventured to propound it ?

What shall we say again of the parcelling out and labelling, as it were, of the impalpable elements of

<sup>e</sup> The allusion, I need scarcely say, is to the recent promulgation by the Pope of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin, as a doctrine necessary to salvation.

grace, which has ever distinguished scholasticism? grace, of which we know not now, (and shall, I suppose, never know until the apostle's glorious "then,") whether it be an imparted gift, or a subjection to Spiritual influence, or the indwelling of a Divine Being—in other words, whether it be an effluence or an influence, or an effectual mode of the Omnipresence of God.

To those who believe that these triumphs of dogmatism are subversive of true Theology, and endanger the holy truths which underlie these exaggerations, or rather impede man's reception of them, it is a matter of thankfulness to read the words of my text, which enforce the intellectual lesson of our state of probation, and give the Apostolic sanction to the application of modesty and common sense to matters of religion. It is a matter of thankfulness, not because (as their opponents would say) they do not care to know more, but because, as it is a fact that they do not know more, and cannot know more now, they rejoice that the Apostle has stamped that fact as a condition of human nature, to which we are all liable, and from which even he was not exempt.

For if an uninspired writer had ventured to assert of the Apostle that which he here admits of himself, probable as the remark would have been, I do not believe he would have escaped the charge of broaching either a dangerous crotchet or a barren truism.—“Who is this,” it would have been said by those to whom the former view presented itself, “who ven-



tures to cast reflections on the Author of the Christian Revelation, as having sent forth apostles inadequately furnished themselves (for is not, they would reason, what is *partial, inadequate?*) with that knowledge which they were to communicate to others?" For is it not quite as strange that Revelation should not wholly enlighten, as that grace should not wholly oblige? and we know that the latter position has been condemned as impious and absurd by writers of no mean pretensions. Those, on the other hand, who saw the fallacy of this objection, as touching, not the principle of Revelation, but another principle of human nature, which Revelation does not supersede, would have attacked the assertion as superfluous. "What is the use, they would have exclaimed, of this pompous enunciation of that which is *of course* allowed to be a condition of all human thought, and therefore (as self-deceit goes on to say) a tacit accompaniment of all human assertions?" Thus the one side sensitively excepting Theological knowledge from the influence of human imperfection, and the other haughtily assuming its subjection to that influence, as a point of no distinctive importance, would have made short work with the text, the one condemning its principle, the other undervaluing it. And, to shew you that this is no fanciful hypothesis, made up to strengthen my case, I wish to call your attention to the fact, that though Inspiration has prevented the text from being otherwise than received, it has not saved its statement from contradiction. "The Reformers under Henry VIII

(writes the able and zealous author<sup>g</sup> of numerous religious tracts, which have an immense circulation, though they may be little thought of here) “were in a state of spiritual childhood. They saw many points in religion through a glass darkly. It was not till the days of Edward VI that they put away childish things.” Being “in a state of spiritual childhood,” and “seeing through a glass darkly,” are treated, we see, as convertible terms, as both belonging to a transitional period of man’s knowledge; and we should conclude from this application, that the Reformers in the time of Edward VI, who are said to have put away childish things, had also bur-nished up this misty glass, and saw clearly through it. But the words “I see through a glass darkly” strike a chord in our memory; we know where they are to be found. They come just before the text; they are part of St. Paul’s description of the state of the Corinthian Christians, who “came behind in no gift,” “who were enriched in all knowledge,” aye, and of his own state also, *his* state the most favoured, we may, I think, say of all the favoured apostles, his state who was “caught up into the third heaven.” He says of himself “now,” that is, not to-day or to-morrow, but in this present life, “now I see through a glass darkly.” The spiritual childhood was over, but the imperfect vision remained. The first belonged to a period of life, the second to life itself. And without wishing to limit the application of

<sup>g</sup> The Rev. J. C. Ryle, M. A., “The Bishop, the Pastor, the Preacher,” p. 76.

Scripture phraseology, where to apply it loosely does not inculcate error, I would ask whether such is not eminently the case here ; whether the lesson of the text is not obscured and perverted, and the notion suggested, that the knowledge of an enlightened Christian is far more clear and immediate than the apostle himself represents it. But a contradiction, proper and direct, of the apostle's assertion, if considered, as I think it must be, as meant to apply to himself, is not wanting. The learned author of a recent work on the Incarnation, to one of whose statements I have already alluded, tells us in express terms, that the apostles had "a complete insight<sup>h</sup> into the unseen world, which enabled them to comprehend the relations of things as fully as their individual nature." "Now I see through a glass darkly," says the apostle. "Nay but he had a complete insight," says his commentator. "Now I know in part,"—and yet we are to believe that he was enabled to comprehend "the relations of things unseen, as fully as their individual nature." Now that St. Paul's comprehension of the nature of things unseen extended also to their relations, and that it was not only different in the method of conveyance, being revealed instead of acquired by learning, from that of Athanasius or Augustine, (for Clement and Ignatius lived, we are told, in the infancy of Christianity, as opposed to its maturity, when, though the Doctrine of the Trinity was firmly held, the *name* Trinity had

<sup>h</sup> P. 119.

not yet been invented,)—not only do I believe this, but I feel assured that St. Paul's knowledge was far more extensive than that of these fathers, who we have no reason whatever to suppose enjoyed those higher revelations, the results of which, if Ignatius is to be credited, (and why should we wish to disbelieve him?) he did inherit from the apostles<sup>i</sup>.—But St. Paul's knowledge was nevertheless partial; and it is a point of some importance to maintain that it was so, against those expansive Theologians<sup>k</sup>, who, what with the monopoly of secret tradition which they enjoy, and the master key of Scripture interpretation which they claim to possess, can never be at a loss either to insert or extract some new fact in religion. And the field of their operations is of course infinitely extended, if the knowledge of any man, even an inspired apostle, is allowed to be perfect,—any man, I mean, who is but man on earth, for if there be saints in glory already, they may already “know even as they are known;” and One we know there is, both here and everywhere by his Spirit, though as man in heaven, “in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.”

But while we affirm with the text that St. Paul's knowledge was partial, we are not bound to go on to say with Locke<sup>l</sup> that it was “superficial” or “defective,” or to use an expression, which I before sup-

<sup>i</sup> Ep. ad Trall. in Jacobson's “*Patres Apostol.*” p. 332.

<sup>k</sup> This is not meant to refer to Mr. Wilberforce, (who does not, in his book, apply the principle,) but to the Church of Rome.

<sup>l</sup> Commentary on 1 Cor. xiii. 12, p. 127, Quarto Ed. 1742.

posed to be used by an objector, that it was inadequate. That the knowledge of the writer of the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans did not go below the surface, (to give “superficial” its least offensive signification,) is I think a monstrous supposition: and so would it be to imagine that there was any *relative* defect or inadequacy in the knowledge of Him who “declared” to His disciples “*the whole counsel of God*<sup>m</sup>.” But it is one thing to be superficial, and another not fully to comprehend the nature and relation of things unseen, and it is one thing to be fully instructed in everything which “for this present time it is convenient for us to know<sup>n</sup>,” and another really to have fathomed the depths of God’s Omniscience. The subject is an intensely difficult one; and in making a few remarks on it, I do not propose to lay before you, either any theory of inspiration or any minute speculations as to *how* the apostle’s knowledge, enlightened as he was, was still partial. But I should wish to observe, that if the effect of revelation be (as has been described) “to bring the mind into the same immediate contact with things unseen, which we have with things visible, through the organs of the body<sup>o</sup>,” it does not therefore follow that the subject of a revelation has a comprehension of the *nature* of anything unseen; and if not of the nature, not of the relations, that is, the essential relations. For the organs of the body certainly *do not* supply us with the

<sup>m</sup> Acts xx. 27.  
Oxford Ed. 1840.

<sup>n</sup> Hom. on “Holy Scripture,” p. 2,  
<sup>o</sup> Wilberforce Doct. of Inc. p. 119.

knowledge of the real nature of many, if of any, objects. So that if inspiration did not more than this, it would not, I apprehend, convey any insight into the nature of the things of the unseen world. Nor does Ignatius, in what he says on the subject of the traditions which he had received, profess to speak of the *nature* of things “seen and unseen,” nor of the essential relations of the angelic hosts,—but rather of their dignity and office. But we may perhaps, without extravagance, suppose that the inspired apostles were enlightened in some degree as to the conditions, though not the causes, of spiritual phenomena, that they knew the reason of the assertions which they were inspired to make, that they supported them with arguments of the force of which they were conscious, and did not handle them as mechanical transmitters of divine truth, and even that they had a far deeper knowledge than we can possess of the “*quomodo*,” and the “*unde*,” to use the expressions of Origen<sup>p</sup>, of heavenly things,—though neither of these, we must add, in absolute perfection.—Finally, we know for certain that St. Paul heard some “unspeakable words, which it was not lawful (or “possible”) for man to utter<sup>q</sup>.”

These may have been, in the main, the advantages which the apostles enjoyed above other Christians in respect of knowledge, added to that perfection of spiritual guidance which preserved them from error,

<sup>p</sup> De Principiis i. præf. § 3. (Quoted by Geiseler, Ecc. Hist. vol. i. p. 137 Engl. Transl.)

<sup>q</sup> 2 Cor. xii. 4.

and which was to St. Paul and St. John, at times at least, immediate from our blessed Lord himself, and to them and all the apostles sensible, unmistakeable, and abiding. Such knowledge I cannot call inadequate or defective, though it was not perfect. Nor can the knowledge which we may ourselves derive from the sacred volume be rightly called inadequate. "There is no truth nor doctrine necessary for our justification and everlasting salvation but that is or may be drawn out of that fountain and well of truth<sup>r</sup>." The deepest mysteries, viewed in this relation, shall be explained to us by the Spirit. And of all necessary truths, so far as they are necessary, it may, I firmly believe, be said with truth, "Whatever is necessary is clear<sup>s</sup>;" or in the negative form in which we find it in Augustine<sup>t</sup>, "That which is not clear would have been clear if it had been indispensable to salvation." They are clear, I repeat, so far as they are necessary; for this makes all the difference. In this is contained the reason of the imperfection of human theology,—an imperfection which belongs to man and not to God, for the things which we shall know perfectly, and see "face to face" hereafter, will be the same which we "know in part," and "see through a glass" here. It is we who shall (thank God) be changed; they remain unchangeable.

<sup>r</sup> Hom. on Holy Scripture, p. 2.

<sup>s</sup> Παντὰ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δῆλα. Chrys. Quoted in the Parker Society's Edition of Cranmer's "Confutation of Unwritten Verities." p. 26.

<sup>t</sup> De Pecchè. Mer. et Remiss. II. c. 36. Quoted ib. p. 31. This is a free translation of the end of the passage quoted.

When then we say that the necessary truths of the Gospel are clear, *so far as they are necessary*, what is meant by the assertion? This may perhaps be best seen if we consider what are the checks by which we are met in our thoughts on these subjects. Are they not then somewhat of the following nature? That when we would fain speak of *essence* we are soon compelled to fall back upon *existence*; that when we would inquire into *mode* we are constrained to be content with *fact*; that when we wish to speak *particularly* we are obliged to speak *generally*; and finally, that, when we wish to speak *certainly*, *probability* only turns out to be within our reach.

So that in the first case our knowledge or belief exists rather as admiration, in the second as opinion or conjecture, in the third it is assurance, but the assurance of *faith*, while in the last it is knowledge of an historical rather than a doctrinal character.

Thus we are met by the fact that there is a vast difference between the real state of the case, and our knowledge of it; or, to state the same logically, between that which is, and that which we are able to predicate. If it should then turn out to be the case that what we are able to predicate is what we are called upon or obliged to predicate, or accept when predicated, we have an answer to our proposed question. For there is no difficulty in believing in the existence of God, or of our own souls; or of certain relations which subsist in each, and between both, and which are manifested by certain phæno-



mena; nor in believing that God has counselled and willed certain things, and will infallibly accomplish them, such as the redemption of man, and the salvation of his elect; nor that he has appointed certain ordinances, as sacraments; nor that, as a matter of fact, the dispensation of the Gospel was committed to certain persons, who in turn chose other "faithful men<sup>t</sup>," and commanded them to choose others for the same purpose. The only question is, is this belief sufficient for salvation? And this is a point which must ultimately be decided by Scripture.

What then is the character and what the extent of the revelation of God which has been vouchsafed to us through Jesus Christ? Does it explain to us his essential nature, or inform us of his particular decrees? Does it make known to us the method of those spiritual operations to which so important an office is assigned in the new creation, or does it unfold to us the constitution of our own souls, which are the objects of those operations? And, as a subordinate branch of the inquiry, does it define with precision the position which human agency or which ritual observances are to occupy in the Christian dispensation? assigning to each its normal value in consideration of a certain efficacious influence on the soul, thenceforth to be inseparably attached to it? Are, I repeat, these points, all or any of them, definitely revealed to us in the Gospel, as contained either in the words of our Lord Jesus Christ, or in those of any, or all, of his inspired apostles? It is

<sup>t</sup> 1 Tim. xi. 2.

my intention to attempt to give some answer to these questions in the course of these Lectures, with due humility, I hope, and yet with that freedom which alone can make such a discussion in the least degree valuable, and which the suggestive and untechnical character of what I shall have to offer will, I trust, excuse and explain. For I shall enter on this inquiry with no desire whatever either to limit the sphere of theological investigation, or to throw discredit on dogmatic teaching in general, (as opposed to dogmatism,) or on the labours of any who, with much greater ability and learning, have spoken from this place in a more precise manner on the subjects which will be brought forward ; but solely with a view to concentrate attention on those points which appear to be treated in Scripture (which is our guide) as matters of primary importance ; and in doing so, not to defend merely or apologize for, but to exhibit to admiration, or at least approval, that mingled reverence and common sense, the former so much better than superstition, the latter than logical subtilty, which distinguish the formularies of our Church on these subjects ; and which, so far from being admired or even tolerated, are often decried as indecision or branded as rationalism. Occupying a middle place indeed, but yet neither a negative nor a shallow one, between that positivism which declines to admit any thing but what is sensibly experienced, and that dogmatism which rushes undaunted into definitions of the undefinable, they reflect the character and purpose of the religion which they profess to delineate and subserve, not

ignoring either the possession of the "heavenly treasure" or "the earthen vessels" in which it is contained, not forgetting that while we only "know in part," we still really know something, and that something the "wisdom unto salvation;" or, on the other hand, that while we have "deep things of God" revealed to us, they are still only revealed to us "in part;" and that we must realize both these points, both the existence and the imperfection of our present knowledge, in order to be able indeed to look forward in hope to knowing "even as also we are known."

I have indicated in these remarks the character of the answer which, I think, ought to be given to the questions which were suggested, as to the character and extent of the Gospel revelation; and I have also assumed that an answer of this description is to be found in the formularies of the Church of England. I propose in the next Lecture to consider generally the difficulties which the language of Scripture presents to the adoption of more precise views than these on the more controverted and less essential subjects. After which I shall examine some of these disputed points in detail with the same object. It will be my duty to show, in accordance with what has been already adverted to, that Scripture itself does not obviate, and that the Church of England recognises the fact, that in all objective views of Christianity, as held by imperfect beings, there is some danger of unreality, and in all subjective views of self-deceit. And, at the same

time, that Scripture teaches, and the Church of England recognises, the necessity of right, though not full or clear notions with regard to God's nature, the grand doctrines of certainty and dependence in connection with God's eternal decrees and Christ's holy institutions ; and the obligation of all decent and orderly ceremonies on all rational Christians.

Such, briefly stated, will be the subject of the ensuing Lectures, which I have chosen because there seemed to exist at the present time both an adequate reason and a fitting opportunity for calling especial attention to the too often despised philosophy of toleration. On the one hand, the practical tendency of the age, and especially one of its peculiar features, the number of special combinations for religious as well as other purposes, has given to the differences belonging to the religious revivals, which distinguished the close of the last century and the second quarter of the present—a character of exclusiveness and partisanship which it is impossible not to regret. Party differences have been of late brought out into a sharper and more aggressive prominence than ever. A question<sup>n</sup>, open since the Reformation, as is easily demonstrable, was attempted not long since to be decided in a precise manner with a view to practical exclusion<sup>x</sup>. And though no exact parallel is to be found in the proceedings of the opposite party, (for I suppose the

<sup>n</sup> That of Baptismal Regeneration.

<sup>x</sup> In the case of the bishop of Exeter and the Rev. G. C. Gorham.

doctrine of the XXIXth Article has never been an open question<sup>y</sup>,) yet are there many indications of just the same spirit, aiming at the same exclusiveness. But, on the other hand, I am quite sure that it may be truly said, that side by side with the exclusiveness which has been allowed to mingle with the genuine efforts of earnest and conscientious men to do good in their generation, there has been growing up of late a milder and more thoughtful spirit, yearning for a mutual understanding, stretching out the hand for reconciliation. Characterized by a deeper reverence, by more vital religion, and, to use a homely but expressive phrase, by more *heart* than in former days, (when moderation wore so chill an aspect as to seem indifferent and latitudinarian,) this spirit of peace and good-will, which bears the impress of its birthplace, may be destined, through God's grace, to do much to allay the present differences and unite the divided, often (as I well know) because misunderstood, upholders of Gospel truth as represented by the Church of our country.

To advance this more reflective and judicial spirit a single step, to be God's instrument, I say, in doing this, would be indeed a blessing. For there is great reason to pray that it may grow and prevail. For there is no doubt a struggle going on, even if it is not deepening, between ourselves, by which I mean our Church, as the representatives of a rational reve-

<sup>y</sup> This alludes to the proceedings of the Rev. Joseph Ditcher against the Ven. G. A. Denison for contravening the doctrine of this Article.

rence, and the votaries of superstitious dogmatism and of senseless infidelity or a morbid spiritualism, for which it would be well if we could combine in spirit, and, if possible, in a more visible union, the steady and regular columns of humble and unconscious obedience, happy in their quiet devotion, and the brilliant skirmishers of experimental religion, eager with the enthusiasm of conviction. I shall not enlarge upon the danger. The sarcasms, calculated<sup>z</sup>, as they were perhaps meant, to goad into disaffection the impatient and unreflective, which attempted to burlesque our Church's toleration on the subject of baptismal regeneration—the more loving complaints of some of her wavering children—the despairing language which has bewailed the narrow limits in which she is content to allow necessary doctrine to be confined—the taunting appeals of the sceptic or the man of the world to the inconsistency and indecision (as they are called) of our formularies, as a good reason for turning away from the dreary and hopeless discussion, and “caring for none of these things”—these are still ringing in our ears—and the vacant places of those who not long ago defended, in this place, the doctrines of the Church of England against Romanism and dissent (as well as against every form of impiety), speak in mournful tones to many of our hearts.

And yet we do not learn the lesson which these things ought to teach; we do not draw nearer to

<sup>z</sup> The first allusion is to Cardinal Wiseman's manifesto, the second to a letter of Mr. Maskell, which appeared at the same time.

each other, but persist in dwelling on extremes which almost justify the notion that the Theology of our Church is really unsubstantial, and that the mean, on which we were wont to pride ourselves, has no real existence. And this, I think, arises from a want of appreciation of the simple and yet deep principle which St. Paul declares in the text—a principle which consists in a thorough acceptance by man of his own position, in a patient acquiescence, as in a condition of our lot, in the existence of irreconcilable discrepancies in incomprehensible subjects, and in a resolution not to let these interfere with our holding that substratum of truth which we can see and value. For there is no greater error than to suppose that the absence of precision renders religious belief meagre and unsubstantial. It does not even limit its sphere. On the contrary, it rather enlarges it. It allows a man to take into his heart all that is really valuable in *any* system, without rejecting those safeguards and qualifications, which the votaries of the system itself make it a point of honour to ignore.

I know it will be said by many that the defence of theological moderation is always a hopeless enterprise. I know that it will be said by others in accents of contempt—

Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis  
Tempus eget. —

The man of the world, it will be said, will still ask for something plain and practical and easy of apprehension, though the subject be such as often neces-

sitates abiding difficulties, and from its very comprehensiveness requires a balanced expression of opinion. The keen and subtle logician will exact precision, and not be satisfied without, but will despise the halting statement which only dares to affirm what Scripture has revealed, keeping a modest silence on the dark secrets of eternity. The sceptic will only lay aside his unresolved doubts in the presence of an authority which at least claims to be infallible. Perhaps it may be so—perhaps it is only lost labour to endeavour to recommend reflection to those who prefer decision, and would rather see half a truth, in bold and coarse relief, than all the truth in those more delicate lines in which it appears in Scripture, especially in our Lord's own wisest and discreetest teaching, and as it is enshrined in the unsystematic system of the Church of England. But to labour in such a cause, though it should be vain, is still a privilege, and a labour of love to one who feels daily more and more the value of the principles he is defending. But I will not, at the outset of the inquiry, believe that it will be entered into in vain. Sanctioned by the Apostle's authority, founded on the most valuable portion of the philosophical teaching in this place, imbedded in the comprehensive theology of our Homilies, (a single page of many of which is worth many volumes of modern divinity,) I will not believe that it will not find an echo in the hearts and understandings of some here, whose opinions are not yet formed, and who have not yet imbibed the pernicious



cious error that it is a duty or an object to form them soon. Form soon, my younger brethren, and pray to God to form soon within you, habits of self-denial, holiness, piety. Form soon a resolution to give your souls and bodies to Christ, who asks for them, and who bought them with His precious blood. Form soon a contempt for worldly pleasures, for frivolous amusements, and unsatisfying vanities. Form soon a holy amity with him who calls you His friends if you keep his Commandments. Give, without delay, and without reserve, the freshness of your hearts to God. These are plain Christian graces. Oh! ever pray to God through Jesus Christ, that these may be formed within you soon, that He himself, to use St. Paul's words, may be "formed in you." But precise views on the manner of your Saviour's presence, or on the effect of Christian sacraments, or on the necessity of apostolical succession, or on the metaphysical subsistence of grace, or on the manner of our blessed Lord's conception, or on the personality of the Holy Trinity—these are not necessary for you "in this present time" to have, nay, they may be even dangerous to seek, as they are indeed impossible to acquire. It is to you that I now address myself, beseeching you to let no one beguile you into the notion that an absence of precision on these points can only consist with a cold or meagre or irreverent form of religion. Those who use such language must have been too proud to study the unphilosophic philosophy of the Church of England. For God is not less "with us" because

we do not see him with our eyes, or speak of him as if we understood his nature ; nor less “in us” because we do not prescribe the date or the mode of his indwelling ; nor less the author of our spiritual life, because we do not venture to set our finger on the moment when that life begins ; nor less our pardoning Saviour, because we wait to hear, with certainty and beyond recall, the cheering sentence of our pardon. So far from this, I hold it to be certain that those are most likely to value aright the glory and the beauty of the land of promise, the scene of the true fruition both of the intellect and the heart, who are content not to expect to find it in the wilderness of their present existence. But even in the wilderness God is with his people. And a true member of the Church of England, if he only knows his blessings, may say with David, “The lot is fallen unto me in a fair ground ; yea, I have a goodly heritage.”

Object, it may be, of a particular decree of the Almighty, fixing from eternity that glorious lot, the beginnings of which seem feeble and afflicted, and the issue not wholly certain,—but redeemed assuredly by a Saviour’s love, and watched undoubtedly by the sleepless care of a Father, without whom no sparrow falls to the ground,—having an everliving Intercessor who may, for all we know, impress at times on the Omnipresence of God, the characteristic (whatever it be) of his own personality, but who surely makes continual intercession for us in heaven,—guarded, it may be, by angel sentinels, as children’s

piety prays, communicating perhaps, as of old to Jesus, some strengthening influence from on high to the new creature within us, with whose essence we are not acquainted, and of whose secret sympathies we are in part unconscious, but knowing certainly that such things have been, and shall be again in our behalf, who are the heirs of salvation—made in part, (and who shall measure these things?) by objective sacraments, in part by subjective faith,—but made by God, who alone can bless the one or give the other,—made by God a member of a holy company, which is called in Scripture, and therefore must be in some high sense, the “body of Christ,”—gifted, it may be, with a divine element of life, derived to the soul from Him, with whom, if we are “joined<sup>y</sup>,” we are “one spirit,” but aided certainly by the Spirit’s viewless power, acting on man’s nature according to Christ’s promise,—furnished, it may be, by divine appointment, but at least by reverent imitation, with those, who in their degree, may count as “prophets, evangelists, pastors and teachers,” that each may be built up in his proper place in the Temple of God, by the Spirit,—changed, it may be, already into the image of our sinless Example, so as to be in truth, though we dare not affirm it, beyond the power of the evil one,—but at least enlightened fully as to those commandments, which need never be grievous to those whose Christian prayers have the sure promise of a heart to love, and a power to keep them to the end—these are the colours, and these the features, from which the Church to which

<sup>y</sup> 1 Cor. vi. 17. He that is joined to the Lord is one spirit.

we belong, allows her members to compose, each for himself, a scriptural portrait of a Christian. It is not a negative, but an alternative, or a comparative view, which she offers.—And those, who with due attention, and without haste, drink in the spirit of her formularies, (which, whether they speak or whether they are silent, have God's word for their guide,) who draw out, from seeming inconsistencies, the substance of her thoughtful Creed, will be able to see, in the suggestive picture, the blended elements of ardent love and reverent humility, of privileges highly valued, and unworthiness deeply felt, of "happy trustings<sup>z</sup>," and tremulous misgivings, trust in God, and distrust of himself, which make up the character, (though dogmatists and enthusiasts would have it otherwise,) not of a worldly hero, but of a Christian Saint. And though even these will not always see the same picture, perhaps from idiosyncrasy, perhaps from circumstances, from the position in which each happens to be standing and looking at the truth,—and though when the Christian artist is unskilful or inexperienced, the variety of ingredients may lead at times to inharmonious blending and jarring combinations, and that which really is complex may wear an heterogeneous aspect,—and though what, in awkward hands, is ill-appointed, a dash or two of clever malice may always make grotesque,—still, even in humble and unskilful hands, there will be nothing low, nothing worldly, in the portrait; no vapouring mists of proud Pelagianism, dimming the derived effulgence,—no Romish colours,

<sup>z</sup> Hom. of the Sacrament, p. 399. Oxf. Ed. 1840.

of mere earthly mixing, marring the lineaments of Christ,—no sweeping wash of vapid spiritualism, turning the halo into a daub,—but all the tints, and all the lines, and all the light, yea and the shade also, will be truly eloquent of God.

And who that believes these things, and believing teaches them, need be ashamed to own that he cannot, or afraid to own that he will not attempt to, formalize them, or exchange a thoughtful meditation on these lofty subjects for the stilted technicality, or the exaggerated simplicity, which too often pass current in the world, under the lofty and imposing name of “decided opinions.” Mutilated and cramped in a Procrustean bed of human system, their individual prominence lost, and their action on the mind impeded, who would recognise here the living truths of the Gospel? or how can a single truth, enthroned in the isolation of an unnatural despotism, represent the grand aristocracy of coordinate doctrines, which Scripture presents to us? “The king’s daughter” is, or may be, there,—but where are “the virgins that be her fellows,” which should “bear her company?”

And as to decision itself, let us follow the advice of St. Augustine, which was once written (whatever it may be now) over the doors of the Church of England, that “where Scripture is not plain and express, the pride of human reason should stay itself, nothing leaning to either part<sup>a</sup>.”—And let us not

<sup>a</sup> Ubi de re obscurissima disputatur non adjuvantibus divinarum scripturarum certis clarisque documentis, cohibere se debet

be ashamed to make our own the confession of a great Reformer, at the end of his stormy, but useful, life,—“ I am an old doctor of divinitie,” said he, (many of us, my brethren, are but youthful learners,) “ yet to this daie I am not come out of the children’s learning: that is, the ten commandments, the creed, and the Lord’s praier. I confess seriously, that as yet I understand them not so well as I should<sup>b</sup>.” He did not understand them *as yet*; the words remind us of the “now” in the text, and the *now* reminds us of the “then” which the apostle has sanctified, and taught to speak the language, no longer of worldly regret, but of Christian hope. *Then* when the Lord shall come, our light, our life, our glory, *then* shall we “no longer know in part, but even as also we are known.”

Then, in the morning of our perfect regeneration, we shall see things as they are, and magnify the justice and mercy of God, who has used the same conditions, as a test of stubborn unbelief, and as a motive to trusting devotion.

humana præsumptio nihil faciens in alteram partem declinando.—  
De pecc. mer. et rem. lib. ii. c. 36. (Quoted in Cranmer’s Un-  
written Verities, p. 31. ed. Park. Soc.)

<sup>b</sup> Martin Luther, Colloquia Mensalia, p. 6. (Quoted in Bur-  
net’s Lives, by Jebb, p. 178.)

## LECTURE II.

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1 COR. xv. part of v. 51.

*Behold, I show you a mystery.*

WE considered in the last Lecture the restraints which are imposed on all human theology by the nature of the case ; by the fact that the Christian revelation, though fully adequate to its avowed object, God's glory and men's salvation, is nevertheless, when viewed absolutely, partial and preparatory. We did not, however, enter into this solemn discussion as *a priori* reasoners or independent critics ; but accepting the fact on the authority of the great apostle, we treated it as a condition of our present lot, which it is not possible to evade, nor pious nor prudent to ignore.

That the impatience of man's will and the pride of man's reason were nevertheless perpetually engaged in these fruitless and unbecoming efforts, was set before you in a few striking cases, which were contrasted afterwards with the modesty and common sense, the thoughtful, patient, humble spirit of our own Church, less ostentatiously logical indeed, yet far more truly philosophical, in which Theology

ever appears in her true colours, not as an abstract science, full of unintelligible entities, but as the handmaid of religion, engaged in bringing souls to Christ; teaching her children from holy Scripture “what they ought to do, what to eschew, and what to look for at God’s hands at length<sup>a</sup>,” telling them that there they will “find the Father, from whom, the Son by whom, and the Holy Ghost in whom, all things have their being and keeping up: and these three Persons to be but one God and one substance”—that there we “may learn to know ourselves how vile and miserable we be, and also to know God, how good he is of himself, and how he maketh us and all creatures partakers of his goodness.” Not learn (we may observe) our own or God’s nature, but our own qualities and his attributes—and that we may “learn also in these books to know God’s will and pleasure as much as for this present time is convenient for us to know; and that, as the great clerk and godly preacher, St. John Chrysostom, saith, whatsoever is required to salvation of man is fully contained in the Scripture of God<sup>b</sup>.”

What then, I asked, is fully contained in these Scriptures? Do they, besides teaching us these things, explain to us the essential nature of God? Do they inform us of his particular decrees? Do they make known to us the method of spiritual operations? or unfold to us the constitution of our own souls, which are the objects of them? And,

<sup>a</sup> Hom. of Holy Scripture, p. 2.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid.



finally, do they define with precision the position which human agency and ritual observances are to occupy in the Christian dispensation? I stated it to be the object of these Lectures to give an answer to these questions, and an answer of a kind which I believe to be already given in the formularies of the Church of England. I hope to be enabled to show that her absence of precision on these difficult points, of many of which it may be said with truth that we “neither can know them, nor are bound to know them<sup>a</sup>,” is, for that reason, not only excusable but admirable, being in accordance with the general language of the inspired volume, as well as suitable to a state of probation.

I shall not detain you by enlarging on the latter point, both because I have already set before you (so far as is necessary for our present purpose) the conditions which attach to such a state, and because, in the course of our discussion, we shall be continually met by checks and difficulties arising from these conditions. I shall therefore invite your attention, in the present Lecture, to the important and, though well known, too often forgotten fact, that in the Holy Scripture, so plain on necessary points, there are, as Jeremy Taylor observes<sup>b</sup>, a great many places, “containing in them great mysteries, but yet either so inwrapped with a cloud, or so darkened with umbrages or heightened with expressions, or so covered with allegories and garments of rhetoric, so profound in the matter, or so altered or made intricate in

<sup>a</sup> “quæ nec scire possumus, nec scire jubemur.” Erasmus.

<sup>b</sup> Liberty of Prophesying, vol. v. p. 410. ed. Eden.

the manner, in the clothing, and in the dressing, that God may seem to have left them as trials of our industry, and arguments of our imperfections, and incentives to the longings after heaven, and the clearest revelations of eternity, and as occasions and opportunities of our mutual charity and toleration of each other and humility in ourselves, rather than the repositories of faith, and furniture of Creeds and Articles of belief." The difficulties of the subject, we see, are not only reflected in the language, but often increased by it. And so, to the principle which was laid down in the last Lecture (which belongs to a state of probation), that there is a difference between that which is and that which we are able to predicate, we must add another, borrowed from St. Augustine<sup>c</sup>, that there is or may be a difference between our interpretation of Scripture, and the mind of the sacred writer. What we say may be true, but it may not be what the writer meant—or, in other words, it may be not contrary to the mind of Christ, but yet not the mind of Christ. And as, when the first difference is proved to exist, we ought to say sometimes nothing, and sometimes nothing positively, so where the second exists we ought to say nothing exclusively. Keeping in mind these two principles of limitation, while at the same time we do justice to the knowledge which we possess, we may raise, without fear or scruple, the goodly edifice of a tolerant church, which, though it does not profess to build "a city and a tower, whose top may reach to heaven," may perhaps, for

<sup>c</sup> Confess. XII. c. 22, &c.

that very reason, be a fitter “habitation of God by the Spirit,” and be less likely to be visited with confusion than those who think that nothing ought to “be restrained from them which they have imagined to do<sup>d</sup>.”

But the passage of Jeremy Taylor, which I just quoted, rightly calls the difficulties of Scripture “trials of our industry,” as well as “arguments of our imperfection.” The nature of the case causes the latter, the language of Scripture presents the former; but we may add, without presumption, sometimes the former only. For let us not shrink from industry if that can do any thing to remove our present imperfection. If it be true that any thing was decided hastily, or has not been revised sufficiently; if modern criticism has any thing to offer which former ages did not enjoy, then, though it may not be worth while, or it may not be safe, or it may not be possible, to make a formal alteration at a given time, it would be against the principles of our Church to reject the proffered aid; our Church, which rests her cause on all that “*may* be drawn,” if there is any thing which has not been drawn, from the “well of life.”

I do not indeed believe that this will often be the case, but that there will ever be things “hard to be understood<sup>e</sup>,” and that all we can do is to strive and pray that we may be “stable” enough to remain uninfluenced by this abiding difficulty, and “learned” enough to know what there is which cannot be known.

<sup>d</sup> Gen. xi. 6.

<sup>e</sup> 2 Pet. iii. 16.

I propose, in the present Lecture, to consider some of the most remarkable difficulties belonging to the language of Scripture, which beset the adoption of more rigid and dogmatic statements than those of our Church, on the subjects above specified, the essential nature of God and man, the decrees and counsels of God, and the operations of the Spirit, and Christian ordinances ; noting further now, with a view to future application, the remarkable silence of Scripture (regarded as a teacher of doctrine, not a recorder of facts,) on the subjects of Church government and of apostolical succession.

But let me first anticipate an objection which may perhaps be taken to this argument from the language of Scripture, which would resemble that which was, in effect, taken against that which was drawn from the nature of the case. A claim of “complete insight,” for the apostle attempted to cut the nerves of his own confession—“now I know in part”—a claim of despotic authority for the Church may go far, if admitted, to pervert his statement in the text, in which he speaks of “showing us a mystery.” The doctrines of Transubstantiation and Purgatory occur to our minds, as cases in which mysteries have been dealt with, the one defining a change which is undefinable, the other assuming a defect in God’s judicial faculty, and graciously supplementing a remedy—or, in other words, pretending to account for what is a difficulty to us, but must be a matter of course to Him. And there can be no doubt that a despotic church would at once discountenance, if

not proscribe, our whole proceeding. "Save me," it would say, in its mildest mood, "from such irreverent affection. It is not you that should prescribe to me, but I to you, what is to be found in Scripture. And to attempt to justify my title on such weak grounds, is in reality to undermine my authority. Never tell me 'it is written' *thus*, or, 'it is written' *there*; but hear from me rather this statement, which should stop your mouth—'What I have written, I have written.'" And so the false title is allowed to remain, though in this case it will condemn, not the remonstrants with the writer, but the writer only.

Such would be fitting language for a church, such as that of whose earthly head we are told that it used to be disputed, (perhaps it is so now,) "Whether he can annul any decree of apostolic Scripture? Whether he can ordain any thing repugnant to evangelic doctrine? Whether he can build up a new article in the Creed of the faith? Whether he has greater power than Peter, or but equal? Whether he can give his orders to the angels? Whether he can altogether do away with purgatory? Whether he is only a man or a kind of God? Whether he shares both natures with Christ? Whether he of all the world is alone infallible<sup>e</sup>?

<sup>e</sup> "An possit abrogare quod scriptis apostolicis decretum est? An possit aliquid statuere quod pugnet cum doctrina evangelica? An possit novum articulum condere in fidei symbolo? Utrum majorem habeat potestatem quam Petrus an parem? An possit præcipere angelis? An possit universum purgatorium quod vo-

But the Church to which we belong is (thank God) a constitutional monarch, and does not scorn her children's willing homage, even when they descend on the rational liberty which bounds her own authority. Nor can I see, in any of her statements, that she even "assumes that men suppose that her judgment of truth is entitled to their confidence<sup>f</sup>." On the contrary, she refers them to Scripture to see whether it is so. Even in that one of her Articles<sup>g</sup>, in which it is said, "The Church hath authority in controversies of faith," criticism is not only not forbidden, but even invited. Those who drew up the article did not scruple to constitute themselves, and if themselves us also, judges of the duty of their Church. "It is not lawful," they say, "for the Church to ordain any thing that is contrary to God's word written—neither may it so expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another." And the "witness and keeper of holy writ" is reminded of its own duty—"as it ought not to decree any thing against the same, so besides the same ought it not to enforce any thing to be believed for necessity of salvation." Now are these merely gratuitous and therefore insulting limitations, or are they rules for men's consciences? Is it a theatrical flourish against a despot, or a sober assertion of liberty and

*cant tollere? Utrum simplex homo sit an quasi Deus? An participet utramque naturam cum Christo? An solus omnium non possit errare?*"—Erasmus, *Comment. 1 Tim. i. 13.* vol. vi. p. 927 D. ed. 1705.

<sup>f</sup> Wilberforce, *Doct. of Incarn.* p. 399. 4th ed.

<sup>g</sup> Art. XX.

self-government? The most that can be said is, that it is the Church constituting and the Church judging itself; but for those who sign the Articles and cannot wait for “the collective judgment of the regenerate race<sup>h</sup>,” the question must arise, what is the practical bearing of this? and then, what is the Church? And the truth, I think, is, that though we speak, as men are wont to speak, of the Church as an abstraction, (and for rhetorical purposes, and as a reminder of the duty of union, it is convenient, as it is assuredly scriptural, to do so—) it is not thus that the Church is presented to us in our Articles. It is not as an abstract *entity*, having a separate or separable existence from the individuals living or dead, who, by a kind of Platonic participation or reflection, derive from it their quality<sup>i</sup>, but as an aggregate of faithful men, that our Reformers spoke of the Church<sup>k</sup>. And this is perhaps the reason of what appears a grammatical confusion in the language of the English Article—where it is said, that “as the church of Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch have erred, so also the church of Rome hath erred—not only in *their* living and manner of ceremonies, but also in matters of faith.” Dwelling on the individuals who compose the body, rather than on the body composed of them, *may*, I say, have caused

<sup>h</sup> Wilberforce, Doct. of Incarn.

<sup>i</sup> Why should not the Church be an *entity* as well as “human nature?” It certainly is not an arbitrary creation of man, but a continued work of God.—See Wilb. Doct. of Incarn. p. 37. 4th ed.

<sup>k</sup> Art. XIX. Compare Hom. p. 413, and Nowell’s Catechism, p. 53. Ed. Parker Society.

the translator to write *their*, where *her* would seem to some the better reading.

But not to dwell on this point, let me call your attention to what is, I think, indisputable, that the Articles, Prayer Book, and Homilies all agree in preferring this aggregate language to that of a more abstract nature, which is perhaps more convenient, and certainly more imposing, and which was at that time much more usual. I have shewn that the Article on the Church does this directly. It is also done indirectly in the Article on General Councils, which the authors proceed to analyse and divide, not logically, but numerically, into those persons who are and those persons who are not “governed with the Spirit and Word of God<sup>k</sup> ;” and then they quietly go on to say, that when the latter have been the majority the councils so composed “have erred even in things pertaining unto God<sup>l</sup>.” In the Prayer Book again, in the place where, of all others, the Church might have been expected to speak dictatorially, and in abstract language, in the Preface, I mean, to the Ordination Services, the compilers of that form have, on the contrary, deliberately appealed to individual judgment, instead of obtruding the decision of collective wisdom. “It is evident unto all men, diligently reading the Scriptures and ancient authors, that from the apostles’ time there have been these orders of ministers in Christ’s Church—bishops, priests, and deacons.” So it is not said,

<sup>k</sup> Art. XXI.

<sup>l</sup> This is exactly the argument of Cranmer against the Romanists, in his “Confutation of Unwritten Verities.”



“This is so because I, your spiritual mother, say so,” but “if you, all and each, will diligently read the Scriptures and ancient authors, you will find this to be the case.” In the Homilies again, though the promise of Christ’s presence is spoken of in one case as being given to “his Church,” yet we are told, directly after, that this promise is performed “in that he is not only with us by his grace and tender pity, but also in this, that he speaketh presently unto us in the Holy Scriptures, to the great and endless comfort *of all them that have any feeling of God at all in them*<sup>m</sup>.” And therefore “every man, woman, and child” is exhorted to the study of the Scriptures. And in another Homily the same exhortation is enforced by observing, “What vanity the school-doctrine is mixed with, for that in this word” (that is, the Scriptures) “they sought not the will of God, but rather the will of reason, the trade of custom, the path of the fathers, *the practice of the Church*.” So the authority, which is held sometimes “in terrorem,” over individual judgment, is here recommended to individual censure. “Let us, therefore,” the Homilist goes on to say, “read and revolve the Holy Scripture both day and night, for blessed is he that hath his whole meditation therein. It is that that giveth light to our feet to walk by. It is that which giveth wisdom to the simple and ignorant. In it we may find eternal life.”

And as our Church does not attempt to control our study of the Scriptures from any jealousy of her own authority, so she proclaims her belief that, when

<sup>m</sup> Hom. p. 327. Oxf. ed. 1840.

<sup>n</sup> Ibid. p. 435.

pursued in a proper spirit, such study can never lead to evil. "The humble man may search any truth boldly in the Scripture without any danger of error<sup>o</sup>." And why is this? Not because he is always checking his inquiries by calling to mind what has been determined by the collective society through which he is to derive an infused spirit of perception—this is not the notion of humility set before us—but because "humility will only search to know the truth; it will search, and will bring together one place with another; and where it cannot find out the meaning, it will pray, it will ask of other that know, (individuals, you observe, and *any* individuals—not only 'learned curate or pastor' as elsewhere, but those who know,) and will not presumptuously and rashly define any thing which it knoweth not<sup>p</sup>." And, in another place, we are *all* included in the promise of being "led by the Holy Ghost into all truth;" we are all spoken of in simple and delightful phrase—"as the Holy Ghost's scholars<sup>q</sup>." And we are not only allowed, but exhorted; not only exhorted, but urged, to avail ourselves of his schooling; not to be deterred by difficulties or by fear of error, but to go on in a spirit of diligence and prayer, trusting at last even to have the "dark mysteries" explained to us, as far as is necessary for us, and to have "that universal and absolute knowledge<sup>r</sup>" which St. Paul wished the Ephesians to have, which consists in "comprehending with all saints what is the breadth, length, depth, and height, and to know the love of Christ, which passeth know-

<sup>o</sup> Hom. p. 6.<sup>p</sup> Ibid.<sup>q</sup> Ibid. p. 327.<sup>r</sup> Ibid. p. 436.

ledge, that *we* may be filled with all the fulness of God." In the pursuit of this knowledge, in this spirit, no dangers are apprehended. The motto of our Church on this point is bold and trustful. "Fiat justitia!" She seems to say, "There is no fear of heaven falling." God will take care, as he hath hitherto done, of his own truth; and in the fact that he has done so, we see an additional reason why we should not scruple to search the Scriptures (freely and without reserve), in order to find it out. We know that it is not to such free research, but to curious subtleties and scholastic refinements, that transubstantiation owes its birth—while the new doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin would lead one to the conclusion that its authors had bidden farewell to the Bible. So that, on the whole, with our Bibles in our hands, we neither fear development nor tradition. We do not fear development, because, with Scripture and common sense, we trust, through God's grace, to detect the new principle which must be inserted among the truths of Scripture in order to form a basis for those tortuous operations. We do not fear tradition, because we always say, Bring your tradition forward to the light, and let us test it, as Irenæus<sup>r</sup> long ago unconsciously suggested, by comparison with Scripture. If your traditions are

<sup>r</sup> In the "Fragment of a Letter to Florinus," quoted in Jacobson's *Patres Apostolici*, p. 51. Præf. The words *σύμφωνά ταῖς γραφαῖς* are a quotation from this Letter. Since applying it, I have seen that it was applied by Jer. Taylor in his "Liberty of Prophesying."

σύμφωνα ταῖς γραφαῖς not ἐπανωρθωτικά τῶν γραφῶν, we will treat them with respect, though we will not place them on the same footing with God's Word, for that would be impious, unless we were as sure that they were handed down by the apostles as we are that this was written by them: and we cannot find any new doctrine upon them, because our doctrines are already deduced from those Scriptures with which they coincide.

Such is, I think, a true description of the liberty of Scripture interpretation allowed by the Church of England, a liberty entirely consistent with the sentiment of St. Augustine, which is applied by a learned author to support a far stricter system. "No sober-minded man would willingly in his sentiments contravene reason, no Christian the Scriptures, no peaceable man the Church<sup>s</sup>." For rational liberty is of an essentially peaceful nature, and rational liberty is that which considers the probabilities of error, and the value of concordant testimony, and the weight due to mature wisdom, and to historical facts, and the evils of dissension, and the dangers of anarchy, and all this the more *because* it is free and rational, and acts under no pressure, such as is resented, even when submitted to, by all but benighted slaves.—And mark, I pray you, the difference in St. Augustine's expressions. It is a love of peace which is

<sup>s</sup> "Contra rationem nemo sobrius—contra Scripturam nemo Christianus—contra Ecclesiam nemo pacificus senserit." Aug. de Trin. iv. 10 (vol. viii. p. 817 F. Ed. Benedict.), quoted in Wilberforce's "Doctrine of the Incarnation," p. 399.

mentioned as influencing a man to agree to the judgment of the Church<sup>t</sup>, not common sense or sober-mindedness, still less Christian piety.—A man *may* therefore, in his opinion, without offending against these, differ from the Church's decision, though from love of peace he would not bring forward his objections, unless, we may add, they affected points of essential and vital importance.

But, while he is thus peaceful and inclined to union, thus humble and ready to take counsel with his brethren, he will never attempt to shift his own responsibility from himself to the Church.—He will never abandon the intellectual work of self-government, which he believes to be a condition of his lot.—But, feeling at once its difficulty and its obligation, he will throw himself the more earnestly on God, and pray that He for Christ's sake will guide him by the counsel of his Spirit.

May that Holy Spirit be with us now, and grant that we may “mark, learn, and inwardly digest” the restraining wisdom of the words of the text,—“Behold I shew you a mystery,”—which if we do, we shall have no cause to fear that our liberty may become a snare to us, for we shall ever feel an unseen hand leading us, and an unseen eye watching us, and a spiritual influence searching us; and we shall see an endless vista of hope and glory opening to us, and

<sup>t</sup> Tertullian de Baptism. c. 17, (quoted by Hooker, Ecc. Pol. II. p. 354. ed. Keble) uses like language. “Dandi quidem habet jus summus sacerdos qui est episcopus: dehinc presbyteri et diaconi, non tamen sine episcopi auctoritate, *propter ecclesiæ honorem*. Quo salvo salva pax est. Alioquin etiam laicis jus est.”

we shall hear heavenly voices whispering to us of new revelations, and singing in our ears a song, of which we cannot quite catch the words, though we never quite lose the tune, and we shall be more and more inclined to use our glorious liberty in sitting quiet and uncumbered, and in our sound mind, at the feet of Jesus, (sitting there ever in heart, even when most active in life,) and hearing the chastening Word of Him whose truth has made us free.

“Behold I shew you a mystery,”—and did he then explain the mystery, and make it one no more? Is this the meaning of the passage? The wondrous “change” which has come over the glorified body of our Lord, and which must come over our own, before “flesh and blood<sup>t</sup>” can “inherit eternal life,” has this been made plain to us? Do we know much, do we know anything about it? Does to know that God will give us such a body as it shall please Him<sup>u</sup>, tell us anything about its texture? Is the illustration of seed sown an explanation, or is it, like all illustrations, persuasive rather than didactic? Ἰδοὺ μυστήριον ὑμῖν λέγω, says the apostle,—not “shew,” as it is translated, but *tell*,—not φανερώω, nor ἀποκαλύπτω, nor δείκνυμι, nor even ἐξηγέομαι, but λέγω.—There is no lifting of the veil here, and shewing us under it the transfigured face of a Saint in glory; there is only (or shall we say there *is*, without the “only,”) the apostle’s witness that these things shall be so.—And so it is in the kindred passage in the Ephesians<sup>x</sup>, “This is a great mystery

<sup>t</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 50.

<sup>u</sup> ib. 37, 38.

<sup>x</sup> v. 32.

—but I speak of Christ and the Church.”—Is the union here explained by the illustration, which speaks of the Church as the child-wife of Christ, as Eve was of Adam,—“of his flesh and of his bones,” thus made *of* him,—and “joined to Him,” so as to be “one spirit,”—thus made *for* Him? Is there anything, I say, here *explained*? is the mystery done away with? do we carry anything away but the notion of deep and tender union, arising from dependence, and resulting in love? I cannot but wonder that not only Locke<sup>y</sup>, in his somewhat cold piety, but Jones of Nayland (in his zeal, I suppose, as the prophet of the figurative language of Scripture) has set his seal on the odious notion, that in all cases in which the word “mystery” is used, there is no longer any mystery in the Gospel,—“To speak in a mystery,” he says, “as the phrase is used in the Scripture, is to reveal some sacred and heavenly doctrine under some outward and visible sign of it<sup>z</sup>,”—and this sense, he thinks, is fixed by the use of the word in the Revelations<sup>a</sup>, where the “mystery of the seven stars” is explained, and the seven stars are said to mean “the angels of the seven churches,”—and so with regard to the passage which we have just examined he says, “To teach us the union betwixt Christ and his Church, for the bringing forth

<sup>y</sup> In his Paraphrase on St. Paul’s Epistles. 1 Cor. ii. 7. xii. 2 (notes), 1 Cor. xv. 57 (which is translated “To which let me add, what has not hitherto been discovered,”) and Eph. v. 32.

<sup>z</sup> P. 13. ed. Oxf. and Lond. 1848.

<sup>a</sup> i. 20.

of sons to glory, under the similitude of Adam and Eve united in Paradise, for the multiplying of mankind in earth, is also to speak in a mystery<sup>a</sup>,”—and the upshot is, that the notion of a mystery being something “dark and unintelligible,” is, we are told, “a vulgar acceptance<sup>b</sup>” and application of the term. I do not know, my brethren, what you may think upon this subject, but I shall be content to cast in my lot among the vulgar, and not pretend to understand the union between Christ and the Church, though I hope to feel and profit by it. Let us not be ashamed to use of this high and deep spiritual relation, which so far transcends our imagination, the words which a poet of our own time puts into the mouth of a friend, speaking of a wiser friend, or a wife of a more gifted husband, “I cannot understand, I love<sup>c</sup>.” And let us not shrink from following into darkness, even though it be for long, even if it be for always while we are here, Him who having Light, and being Light, will make our darkness light, not perhaps in respect of our halting understandings, but of our clinging hearts. And it is the heart that is the main scene of the miracles of grace. It is in our “hearts” that “God has shined, to give the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ<sup>d</sup>.” Oh! Plato, Aristotle, it is well that you cannot hear “what this babbler says;” he mixes up the whole matter, and puts knowledge, not in the intellect, but in the heart!—and yet he was an apostle of God, and though he

<sup>a</sup> P. 14. ed. Oxf. and Lond. 1848.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. p. 13.      <sup>c</sup> Tennyson “In Memoriam.      <sup>d</sup> 2 Cor. iv. 6.



knew not all, he knew what he was talking about.—This is therefore a mystery, and the mistake of these writers, who explain the word away, is in supposing that because the word mystery is *sometimes* used for something once concealed but now revealed, or unintelligible but now explained, it therefore never bears any other meaning: and in the words I quoted from Jones of Nayland, “teach” is, I think, used as if it meant “explain,” whereas it really, like the λέγω in the text, only means “tell.”—And this is the mistake which is so often made with regard to parabolic teaching. Men think it was meant to be easy, whereas it was meant to be interesting, to attract *not* gratify curiosity, and moreover was first used, as we all know, as a test, or even a punishment, rather than as a boon or a reward. The illustration brings the mind to the mystery, and causes it to dwell upon it; nay it may even suggest a kindred notion more palpable; but, after all, it is the fact and not the mode which it brings before us; it leaves the mystery mysterious still. And this, which is the case in the passage from the Ephesians, where there is an illustration, is more so in the text where there is none. The change is still “dark and unintelligible,” and so, I suppose, it will be till we experience it,—and see “God as He is,” because “we shall be like Him<sup>e</sup>.”

I have thought it necessary to examine the words of the text because, if wrongly interpreted, they have a tendency to embarrass the discussion, and re-

<sup>e</sup> 1 John iii. 2.

vive the notion of our knowledge being greater than it is, which a due appreciation of the words "Now I know in part" would otherwise perhaps have laid at rest.

Let us now briefly consider how far the mysteries which still remain in the Gospel affect its terminology and its statements. Or rather, I should say, the terms and statements of Theology; for the Gospel, properly so called, we have already seen, is delivered in simple language, which no one need despair of mastering, though the love of Christ will still exceed the knowledge of him who comprehends it best.—But the science of Theology, which would fain speak of the nature of God, and of man's nature, and of reprobation, if in grim hands and iron hearts, or of subjective certainty if handled by enthusiasts, or of objective certainty if dispensed by formalists, or of absolution or apostolical succession if in the hands of those who love to magnify human agency,—the science of Theology, in this less practical aspect, finds, at least these, verbal difficulties interfering with the perfection of her system.—There are in Scripture, from the necessity of the case, many words, and some propositions, which may be well called *transcendental*; which express, or try to express, or to combine, ideas which can scarcely be said to exist at all in our minds, and which, at any rate, we cannot define, nor even describe or illustrate to much purpose. And nothing but the audacious curiosity of Scholasticism would wish to meddle with these obscure words, more than was necessary to guard

those few absolute facts, with regard either to God or our own souls, which are presented to us in Scripture. "God," and "Father," and "begotten of God," and "Son of God," in its exclusive and substantial sense, and "Proceeding," and "Spirit," and perhaps even "flesh," in some passages, and "eternal," and perhaps others, are of this class of words,—which, or the use of which, I have called transcendental, as belonging to things which are above, or out of, our comprehension.—I have ranked among them some which I believe are often counted metaphorical. But I think it wiser and safer and more reverent to separate the meanings of these words, and call the higher use of them transcendental. For though it be true that the human notion of "Father" and "Son" is that which is most prominent in our minds, and which gives us what faint inkling we have of the divine relation, still the divine relation, being prior in time as well as in dignity, may well be regarded as fixing the nomenclature; and our common use of holy things should not be allowed to make us forget that the things are holy. But the difficulties attaching to these words belong to the subject itself, except where they are equivocal, and then we may regard them as separate words, and though to decide the sense in which they are used is often the great problem, still, even so, they would belong to *both* subjects, and therefore I shall leave them to be discussed, as they best may, under each.

The next class of words which invites our attention is that of those which I shall call *twofold*,—by which

I do *not* mean equivocal words, or metaphors, or figurative expressions.—The words I mean are those in which, whether metaphorical or proper, there is in reality only one idea in the language of Theology, though there is what a logician might call a double connotation of time,—or, to speak plainly, they apply both to time and to eternity. Such words are “regeneration,” “putting on Christ,” “adoption,” “justified,” “saved,” and one sense of the word “life,” and some others. And these are especially stamped with the characters of a state of probation.—They express something begun here to be continued hereafter.—And so men *are* “regenerate<sup>c</sup>” now that they *may* be fit to appear before the Son of Man, when, “in the regeneration, He shall sit on the throne of His glory.” And not only so, but of men who were regenerate, whether by baptism or by conversion, it is said by their spiritual father that he “travailed *again* in birth of them,”—and men in the same condition, “believers,” “saints,” “elect,” *have* “put on Christ,” and yet *must* “put on Christ,” (not only this or that Christian grace, *but Christ*,) and Christ must, I think, *be formed* in those in whom *he is*,—and they have “the spirit of adoption,” and yet they “wait for the adoption,”—and they “are redeemed,” and they “wait for a redemption,” and they *are* and they *shall be* “saved” and “justified,”—and they “live by hope,” and they “look for a blessed hope,” (some might indeed call this an equivocal use of hope, the feeling and the thing looked for), and they “have

<sup>c</sup> See Appendix to Lecture II.

eternal life," and they "shall go into eternal life,"—and they are being changed "from glory to glory." I do not place *election* as some might place it, among these words, for it seems to me to be clearly used in two different senses. And Calvin<sup>d</sup> himself allows this in the case of Judas, who, he is willing to own, was *chosen* only to his office; though Leighton<sup>e</sup>, whose stern Calvinism stands out so strangely in the midst of the attractive gentleness of his religion, does not scruple to speak of Judas as "made a vessel of wrath." Luther and Melancthon, as quoted by one of my learned predecessors<sup>f</sup>, seem to me to waver in their use of the term, using it sometimes as merely equivalent to *accepted*; which Tholuck<sup>g</sup> strongly argues is its proper meaning; and another learned commentator<sup>h</sup> quotes Isaiah, saying, that "God *will yet* choose Israel;" and "elect" is clearly used thus in our own Homilies<sup>i</sup>.

But leaving, for the present, this subject, and the thoughts which it suggests, all the other words, which I have mentioned have, I believe, the same notion attached to them, and yet they belong, as it were, in some places to this life, in others to the next.

<sup>d</sup> Inst. iii. 24. 9.

<sup>e</sup> Comm. on 1 Pet. i. 2. vol. i. p. 20. Lond. ed. 1825.

<sup>f</sup> Laurence, Bampton Lect. pp. 424. 425. 428. 434. and 452.

<sup>g</sup> Comm. on Rom. vol. ii. p. 152. Eng. Tr.

<sup>h</sup> Dr. J. Taylor, Paraphrase on Rom. p. 6. 3rd Ed. Isaiah xiv. 1.

<sup>i</sup> Hom. p. 383 "he received us *again* into the number of his *elect* people." See also pp. 363, 364, "He *made* all them that *would* receive him truly and believe his word—the *elect* and chosen people of God." And p. 420, "It profited not the Jews which were God's *elect* people."

And with regard to these it may perhaps be a useful caution to say, that we should take care, in using them, neither to ignore the possession of the principle, nor to anticipate the result of it,—neither to overlook the beginning, nor to cease to look for the end,—remembering, as has been said, that though He who has begun will finish, as to *His* office, yet we, in whom the work is begun, may fail as to *ours*. Hope and fear, thankfulness and regret, present and future, God the Alpha and God the Omega, God all in all, and man, never anything, and yet through God having all things,—belong to these words; and they seem to falter, when we use them, under the weight of their twofold meaning.

A recognition of the difficulty which these words present, and a thoughtful and comprehensive use of them would, I believe, through God's grace keep up in many a heart a sense of the state of transition in which we are, and so help us each to play the difficult part of a true Christian<sup>k</sup>. But, though thus conducive to reflective piety in those who use them aright, it is easy to see that these twofold words interfere with precision of arrangement and system, as well as with the coarser dogmatism of individual assumption. And at the same time, the fact of the unity of meaning which underlies the distinction of time and circumstance which they connote, affords a kind of temptation and plausible excuse to the formalist or the fanatic to wrest them from the

<sup>k</sup> Erasm. Comment. on 1 Tim. i. 6. “arduum est negotium agere vere Christianum.”

humbler hands of reverence, reflection, and common-sense.

How easy again is it for vanity or party spirit to use those words, which are really equivocal, for their own trivial or narrow purposes; and how difficult even for the serious and the honest to make sure that they are not introducing an equivocation of their own, by using the same word in different senses, in the course of a theological argument. How laborious<sup>1</sup> again is that critical induction, which, when careful, is most valuable, which by a comparison of passages overthrows some time-honoured misconception, and promotes man's appreciation of "the mind of the Spirit." Such was the case when men rebelled against the notion, so dear to Scholasticism, which attached to the word "grace," besides its other meanings, that of "a formal habit or inherent quality which maketh the person of a man acceptable, perfecteth the substance of his mind, and causeth the virtuous actions thereof to be meritorious<sup>m</sup>."

Nor is there, I will say in passing, any necessary tendency to Pelagian error even when this induction is carried much further, and the word *grace* is represented as being properly objective, on the ground of such an use being that which is most usual in Scrip-

<sup>1</sup> Cranmer's collation of passages on Justification affords an instance of this. Remains and Letters, p. 203. Ed. Parker Soc.

<sup>m</sup> Hooker's Works, vol. ii. p. 702. Ed. Keble. "A grace," he adds, "which neither Christ, nor any apostle of Christ, did ever mention."

ture. Burnet<sup>n</sup>, while himself using the word in its common ecclesiastical sense, and contending strenuously for the *thing*, declines the question “whether these (inward assistances) are fitly called *grace*, for perhaps that word will scarce be found in that sense in the Scriptures; it signifying more largely the love and favour of God, without restraining it to this act or effect of it.” And Beveridge<sup>o</sup>, in a very able sermon, argues strongly in favour of this objective use of the term, and appears to deliberately prefer other expressions, and among them the word ‘*regenerate*,’ when speaking, as he often does, of experimental piety, in language more glowing, and forcible, and practical, than is now common among us. And, while it would, I think, be somewhat affected, as well as inconvenient<sup>p</sup>, to limit the word to its objective meaning, to dwell, nevertheless, upon this meaning as not only admissible but important, has a tendency to set forth in a stronger light the *personal* working of that Spirit, whom the Son sends from the Father, and to act as a corrective to that logical formalism which revels in the subjective use of the word, and delights to divide and name the different kinds of grace, almost as if it were some

<sup>n</sup> On Article X. p. 120. ed. 1700.

<sup>o</sup> Serm. X. Ed. S. P. C. K. p. 216, &c. See also Serm. XIII. on the Sufficiency of Grace, where the word is treated as objective in 2 Cor. xii. 9, and for the use of the word ‘*regenerate*,’ see Serm. VI.

<sup>p</sup> I doubt whether such a limitation would be even critically correct in every case.



material and palpable thing, separated off from the Spirit, and handed over to man for his use.

The case of figurative language now forces itself on our attention. Allegories, and parables which are short allegories, allegorical interpretation of what appears to be history, metaphorical words, and metaphors proper, and types and signs, at once attract and perplex us. It is here that controversy has fought some of its hardest battles, and indeed must ever fight them, for the worst of it is, that no rules which may be given on the subject can supply the discretion and common sense which is necessary to use them aright. And it is these, and not verbal criticism, or any palpable exegetical principle, which must ever decide the question. Yet a few remarks must be made upon these words, if it were only to exhibit the difficulty which they place in the way of sweeping dogmatism; and possibly it may be of some use to point out *where* discretion and common sense may be applied to most advantage.

Allegorical interpretation of what reads like a narrative, such as that of Origen, who, as Jeremy Taylor<sup>4</sup> observes from Jerome, "turned Paradise so into an allegory, that he took away quite the truth of the story: and not only Adam was turned out of the garden, but the garden itself out of Paradise," ought, I think, at least to be confined to the future. And this partly as a question of principle, partly of prudence. Of principle, because as a matter of fact

<sup>4</sup> Liberty of Prophesying. Works, vol. v. p. 417, 418, ed. Eden.

the language of prophecy is usually made more allegorical than that of narrative; of prudence, because in allegorizing prophecy there may be error, but seldom danger. The passages on which the doctrine of the Millennium is founded, and the account of the Fall of Man in the book of Genesis, are cases in point. Allegorizing should moreover generally be confined to *application*, as when St. Paul speaks of the account of Sarah and Hagar as “an allegory<sup>r</sup>,” not meaning to deny the truth of the transaction, which he evidently believed, but to shew that it was typical of a spiritual contrast. And I cannot help thinking that this is what Origen<sup>s</sup> first intended, though he was hurried away by his success, and perhaps by disgust at the materialism of others, into *substituting* the allegorical sense instead of *adding* it. Still in suggesting such a rule, we must plainly except such parts of Scripture as are poetical in their character, as many of the prophetic writings and of the Psalms, though, even here, the literal interpretation need not be excluded, but only the spiritual included.

<sup>r</sup> Gal. iv. 24.

<sup>s</sup> Gieseler (Eccl. Hist. vol. i. pp. 141, 142. Engl. Trans.) says, that to prove their system from the Scriptures, “the Alexandrians availed themselves of the allegorical method of interpretation which had long been in use. In this way the interpretation of the Scriptures had become a mere play of the fancy, till Origen introduced something better. By distinguishing accurately between the *verbal*, the *moral*, and the *mystic* sense of Scripture, he reinstated grammatical interpretation in its rights.”

Types and signs belong to the same class, and require the same treatment. They must be accepted first as facts, and then used with a view to doctrine, or doctrinal illustration; and in *this* point of view, as types are acted prophecies, sacraments are acted sermons. Allegories and parables, which shew themselves to be such, while they afford a wide and most useful sphere to those who, better far employed than verbal critics, “compare spiritual things with spiritual,” seldom have much to do with controverted doctrine.—And in themselves they are transparent and easy compared either with metaphors proper, or with those single words, which embarrass the mind with a doubt as to how far they are to be considered metaphorical, and how far literal. And the reason of their being so much more manageable seems to be something of this kind. In an allegory or parable we are transferred as it were into another province, say from the moral to the material world. There must be an eye to see the resemblance which justifies the transfer; but, with this proviso, when the transfer is once effected, material things are compared with material, and there is no particular accuracy needed. In fact it is usually allowed to be out of place. All that is expected is that the general lesson should be learnt, and therefore, so long as the respective parts of the parable or allegory have an internal propriety, their external adaptation and resemblance to the *details* of that with which they are compared, is considered of no great importance: the comparison, not involving specific doctrine, is

regarded only in the lump. It is of whole to whole, rather than of parts to parts. The particularity belongs to the thing compared, not to the comparison itself. We have therefore only *one* effort to make, to leave the old world of proper words for the new land of metaphors, and, being there, we soon adapt ourselves to the altered circumstances, and we find soon that all goes on easily; metaphor fits it with metaphor, as proper word with proper, or we may even say, that having begun to speak and think allegorically, the metaphorical word and the new idea are both more *proper* and more natural than the proper word or the old idea would be. They are akin to each other. But while allegories are thus homogeneous, metaphors proper are on the other hand heterogeneous in their very essence. In these we have, as it were, one foot in one world and the other in another. The literal part of the metaphor keeps us back, the transferred drags us forward. We have not only got to adapt ourselves to the new scenes, but we have to reconcile them with the old. And this is the difference between two simple ideas and one complex one, or between ideas contrasted and ideas held side by side unconsciously, or if it should be thought that in allegory and parable (if understood) the complex idea must take its place in the mind, and the contrast must be made, it is at least generally far less explicit, and almost always less particular, and from the nature of the case less sustained. And perhaps the fact of its being less sustained is that which bears most upon

the question. Allegories and parables are rather episodical, metaphors are part of the body of the instruction. The former, as we use them now, are ornamental, the latter are of necessity instrumental. I say, as we use them now, for at first, as was before mentioned, they were suggestive and attractive. But now that we have the key in our hands which unlocks their meaning, and exhibits their bearing on the essential points, which they illustrate but do not teach, they are rather used rhetorically as ornaments. But of Scripture *metaphors* we have never had the key put into our hands. And so when we use them, (let us take for instance the expression “born of the Spirit,”) we are obliged to attempt to adjust the two ideas: we have to consider how the properties of “birth” and those of “the Spirit” can be reconciled; which of each must be taken; whether one is used in its full force, and the other with only part of its meaning. Is a new being produced, a spirit, born of the Spirit, as Jeremy Taylor<sup>s</sup> argues, or only a new element imparted? and is the generative act of the Spirit one and complete, or continual and gradual? and is the new being always unconscious of its birth though conscious of its life, or at least incapable of realizing and recalling its consciousness, as is the case in natural birth? And again, has the new creature any share in the travails which precede the birth, as is *not* the case in the natural birth<sup>t</sup>?

<sup>s</sup> Works, vol. iv. p. 347. ed. Eden.

<sup>t</sup> When (as is certainly the case in our own Church, vid. the Three Baptismal Offices) the word “water” in this passage is in-

It is in this adjustment of the two ideas that the great and almost hopeless difficulty of religious metaphors, properly so called, consists. And it is here that discretion and common sense come in, suggesting that we should not press the combination of ideas too far, but be contented with taking some of the leading properties of each, and moreover, as St. Augustine wisely observes, not always the same in every instance of the same metaphor. We must extend, it seems, to metaphors, notwithstanding their more explicit instrumental use, the same rule of restraint which is admitted in the more ornamental parable and allegory. Perhaps a greater attention to these two rules might have a sobering influence on Theological controversy, and especially that on the Sacraments, and on Conversion, with which the metaphors of Scripture are principally connected. There is moreover the same preliminary difficulty in this case as in the case of allegorical interpretation. When is a word to be considered proper and when metaphorical? on what principle is this to be determined? The famous rule of Hooker<sup>u</sup>, which he ushers in with so much pomp as “most

terpreted literally, a new idea is introduced, and the metaphor, already a complex thing, becomes more complex, or else we have two metaphors instead of one,—“Born of water and the Spirit,” or “Born of water” and “Born of the Spirit.” In either case a new adjustment of ideas is necessary, and in the former a new comparison, to determine how far the outward sign “water,” and how far the inward power “Spirit,” affects the compound notion which the expression describes.

<sup>u</sup> Eccles. Pol. v. ch. 50. 52. p. 336. ed. Keble.

infallible," does not in the least degree supply us with an answer.—"Where a literal construction will stand, the furthest from the letter is commonly the worst." This is certainly a rule, but it does not amount to a principle; it does not help us to decide *when* the literal construction will stand, and still less, supposing it will stand, whether it is *actually* the best, in any particular case. Perhaps indeed the fault is not in Hooker, but in the state of the case; and this may be regarded as an instance of the truth of what I said above, that it is easy to give rules, but not easy to give the discretion as to how and when to apply them. I think, however, that in laying down a rule in so peremptory a manner, a few suggestions as to how to apply it would have been more rational, though perhaps not so polemical. St. Augustine<sup>v</sup>, as is his wont, grapples with the difficulty. And his decision is, that when the letter seems to enjoin a crime, or forbid a duty, it must be given up, but when it enjoins a duty, or forbids a crime, it is to be retained. This is an explanation which Hooker may possibly have assumed in speaking of "when the literal construction *will stand*." But the rule is not exhaustive, for *neither* may be the case, and to assume that one or the other is, may be to beg the question. When, for instance, from the expression "except a man be born of water and the Spirit," Hooker assumes that

<sup>v</sup> De Doct. Christ. Lib. III. cap. xv, xvi. Quoted in Cranmer on the Sacrament.

“water” is plainly and expressly specified as “a duty<sup>a</sup> on our parts,” is he not begging the question? The very point in dispute is, whether there is any duty specified here as “required on our part,” or whether the whole thing may not be an act, or gift, or grace of God. And in the case of the other Sacrament, the monstrous act (*facinus aut flagitium*<sup>y</sup>) which a literal interpretation of the words “body” and “flesh” and “blood” seems to enjoin, is of course removed by the logical invention of a substance independent of accidents; and other expressions, such as being “baptized into one body<sup>z</sup>” are free from this objection, though in order to interpret them literally, so to speak, instead of metaphorically, we are called upon to accept the word “body” as the concrete expression of that imaginary *entity* the “abstract humanity” of Christ. Of this I shall speak in the fourth Lecture, and only mention it now, as an instance of the difficulty of metaphorical language, when it is attempted to be made the ground of definition and refinement, and of the necessity at last of deciding the question by that common sense which, though it may not always be able to confute the subtleties brought forward, will always take upon

\* “When the letter of the law hath two things plainly and expressly specified, Water, and the Spirit; Water, as a duty required on our parts, the Spirit, as a gift which God bestoweth; there is danger in presuming so to interpret it, as if the clause which concerneth ourselves were more than needeth.” Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.* v. 50. 54. p. 337.

y Augustine, l. c.

z 1 Cor. xii. 13.



itself to reject logical or metaphysical crotchets when introduced into religion, and which is never dangerous when united with that reverence and humility, which does not shrink from saying "I cannot understand it; I believe that there is something more than a common metaphor here, but what it is I know not."

The analogical argument which Hooker draws, in the case of the expression "born of water and the Spirit," from the fact of the kindred metaphor, baptism "by the Holy Ghost and fire," having been literally fulfilled, is much stronger than his former argument; but the analogy does not establish the meaning, it only makes it somewhat probable. And of course, the literal interpretation of "fire" may be, as it has been, disputed in spite of the fact of the "tongues, as of fire," which suggests a literal accomplishment. And if I were compelled to say why I feel no doubt myself as to the acceptation of "Water" in the passage in question, I should be inclined to say, that the fact of there being a Baptism of Water, and a Baptism of the Spirit, and here a Baptism of Water *and* the Spirit; added to the other passages in which the importance of the rite of Baptism is magnified, is to me the conclusive internal argument, and one which, when aided by the concurrent testimony of so many ages, is, it appears to me, irresistible. And no verbal criticism can be applied to this passage calculated in the least to shake these practical arguments. In fact, as far as verbal criticism is concerned, either interpretation is admissible.

There is another difficulty presented by indefinite propositions, and by expressions uncertain, either from our ignorance of the exact meaning of the word, or of that which ought to be supplied in order to determine the agent, or to qualify the action spoken of. And as in the case of the more obscure metaphors, so in these passages, if they stand alone, common sense and modesty imperatively condemn anything approaching to dogmatism. Of the first kind are some of those passages which speak of Redemption, and some of those which suggest the idea of Reprobation. Of these the former are determined by the general spirit of the Gospel, with which they agree, and may therefore be interpreted *universally* without this scruple. But the latter, inasmuch as they seem to differ from this spirit, (though there is of course a real harmony, though *we* cannot perceive it,) must be in some degree tempered by it and subordinated to it.

But it is on passages of the second class that the doctrine of Reprobation is especially founded, by those, I mean, who make any pretence to criticism:—for of course, if any one thinks proper to say that such an expression as that of our Lord, “I lay down my life for the sheep,” or “My sheep hear my voice,” tells us *anything* as to *how* or *why* those “sheep” are chosen, the question is at once taken out of the province of criticism or argument, into that of arbitrary assertion. But the expressions to which I am alluding are very different; they *are* unquestionably capable of being interpreted, in a Predestinarian

sense, without any distortion of words, or *arbitrary* insertion, and to ignore this interpretation altogether is the act, not of a sound verbal critic, but of a partisan. In some of them no doubt the result of criticism is to overthrow this interpretation ; but in others only to shake it. And I must fairly own that the latter, rather than the former, seems to me the usual effect.

“The Lord added to the Church daily such as should be saved<sup>s</sup>,” (τοὺς σωζομένους). The translation is no doubt suggestive of bias in the translator, though a bias not very unreasonable, when we remember that it is expressly asserted that “*the Lord added*” them. But is it as certainly faulty? When we read in St. Luke<sup>t</sup> “Lord, are there few that be saved?” (εἰ ὀλιγοὶ οἱ σωζόμενοι) the context requires us to supply “shall,” and we make no objection. But, granting that this passage is unfairly used in predestinarian arguments, can it be said with truth, that in such passages as these—“Whereunto also they were appointed<sup>u</sup>” εἰς ὃ καὶ ἐτέθησαν,—“Who were of old fore-ordained to this condemnation<sup>x</sup>,” οἱ πάλαι προγεγραμμένοι εἰς τοῦτο τὸ κρίμα, and others of a like import, there is any critical objection to such interpretation? I think not ;—and I shall honestly confess my opinion, that the only fair way of treating these dark passages is, not to ignore their darkness. They *do*, they *must*, cause in every humble mind a degree of apprehension, a mysterious feeling of awe,—not enough, (God forbid!) to chill Christian hope, but enough to quicken diligence, to

<sup>s</sup> Acts ii. 47.<sup>t</sup> xiii. 23.<sup>u</sup> 1 Pet. ii. 8.<sup>x</sup> Jude 4.

forbid confident generalities, such as partisans love to deal in, and to suggest the notion, that of the dispensations of Providence two views may be taken, one abstract, beginning with the counsels of God, the other concrete, and confining itself to the manifestation of those counsels. And the first may well be allowed to temper the latter, so as to make it, not less practical but, more awful. But on the other hand, to found a positive doctrine of Reprobation on these passages, and to take the doctrine of Universal Redemption and coolly subordinate it to this doctrine, or even reduce it to the same level, is, I think, intolerable. And it has been so regarded by our Church, whose formularies in this respect should be contrasted with the Canons and Rejections of the Synod of Dort, by any one who wishes to see the superiority of fair over biassed criticism. In the latter, on a few doubtful passages of Scripture continually referred to, is founded a severe Predestinarian system; which, were it not for some practical restraints, (forcibly, no doubt, and ably expressed,) might be almost said to be untempered by the doctrine of Universal Redemption.—In the former, this cheering doctrine gleams in the Articles, shines in the Liturgy, and blazes, as one might expect, in the exhortations and promises which the Homilies hold out, while in favour of Reprobation as a positive doctrine not a word could, I think, be quoted.

And in this is shewn both fairness and wisdom. Justice is done to Scripture as a whole, and yet the individuality of its precepts is not lost sight of.

God's light is welcomed and rejoiced in,—and the shadows are not ignored. We rejoice, but it is a solemn rejoicing. There is, in truth, my brethren, a mist still over those “Distant Hills<sup>y</sup>,” to which we are bound to look, and “from whence cometh our help,” and it is not to the confident theologian, but to the pure in heart, that it shall at length almost melt away before the beams of the Sun of Righteousness.

There are difficulties in the nature of the case,—there are difficulties in Scripture interpretation,—still, as the former need not make us despair, so neither do the latter prevent the Scriptures being a “delight” to those who make them their “counselors,” to those who, while they say exultingly, “O ! Lord, how glorious are thy works ;” are willing to add humbly, “thy thoughts are very deep !”

<sup>y</sup> This is the title of one of the Allegories of the late pious and amiable Rev. W. Adams, of Merton College, which reflect the character of their author, and have, I think, done good service to true religion.

## LECTURE III.

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JOHN i. 18.

*No man hath seen God at any time; the only-begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him.*

THE condition of man in respect of knowledge of the things of God, was reviewed generally in the two former Lectures, in connection both with the nature of the case, and the language of Holy Scripture. We perceived, in our rapid survey of the difficulties which both present, that, while there is no lack of information on points of primary importance, there is in every subject, when treated in a speculative and curious spirit, enough of obscurity remaining to embarrass the thoughtful, and paralyse the confident, Theologian. The existence of Almighty God, the relations between the Divine Persons, the counsel of Redemption which invites, and of Sanctification which brings us to God, the corruption and weakness of our nature, which requires such condescension and such assistance, the institution of holy ordinances, which consign these divine blessings, and of ministerial offices, which appear designed

to tender them, these have been treated as facts easily collected from Scripture, and beyond doubt. But, on the other hand, the Nature of God and man, the mode of the Personal subsistence of Those who *subsist* as Three and yet *are* One, and the complex being of soul and body which is called man, and the reasons why all are redeemed, and yet only some saved, and the method in which the Spirit of God acts on the soul of man, and the connection between signs and means of grace and the grace of which they are signs and means, and the efficacy of ministerial functions which, though always valuable, may yet be never *absolutely* indispensable,—these we have been led to conclude are more or less doubtful questions, on which there is very little definitely prescribed in Scripture, and on which there is therefore room for conscientious difference of opinion. We have assumed as a general truth, that which we must now proceed to prove in detail, that these difficulties of subject and language have been thoroughly, and yet not morbidly recognised by the Church of England; that she is humble and yet not grovelling, modest and yet not shrinkingly sensitive, fearful of rashly defining and so falling into error, and yet fully alive to the duty of holding and enunciating the Truth. Precise in her statements of single points of doctrine, whenever the subject allows of such precision, but not precise in the comparison of doctrines, because such precision is usually impossible, she places before her members the whole of God's truth, instead of garbled or

one-sided extracts of it, not so much regarding apparent harmony of system as the inculcation of practical faith. We have, however, as yet considered the Formularies of our Church as a whole, and all her members as on the same footing. And for the general purpose of the two former Lectures this was the most natural view. But, now that we are going to apply the principles which have been laid down to the details of Theology, we must advert to the well-known distinction between learned and unlearned, teachers and taught, clergy and communicants. This may sound to some ears a rhetorical and tautological sentence, but it is not so according to my meaning. I wish to recognise and explicitly commend the intellectual as well as the official discrimination. The "faithful men" who were "to teach others also<sup>a</sup>," have a *didactic* status in the writings of the apostle, and it is evident that an explicit knowledge of those truths, or rather those arguments for the truth, which others are permitted to hold implicitly, can be only required on the principle of greater "aptness to teach" being a requisite for the ministerial office. And we have perhaps Scriptural warrant for saying, that in those also who are to learn, "if there be first a willing

<sup>a</sup> Ἰκανοὶ καὶ ἑτέροους διδάξαι, 2 Tim. ii. 2, so διδακτικὸν 1 Tim. iii. 2, and in Tit. i. 9 the position of a minister as compared with that of his congregation is spoken of in a manner which accords with the principle laid down in this Lecture, and advocated so strongly by Waterland (in the first passage quoted) that, for controversial purposes, (as also for edification in essential points) knowledge in them should be explicit which in others is implicit.



mind, it is accepted according to that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not<sup>b</sup>." Nor may it be altogether uninteresting to observe that this distinction is no invention of modern liberalism, but is expressly recognised in ancient documents. In the first canon of the Synod of Rheims<sup>c</sup>, for instance, in A. D. 813, when religious learning was reviving under imperial patronage and impulse, it is ordered, that "each man *according to his understanding and capacity* should, *with God's help*, learn and understand the rule of faith," a qualification which is omitted in the second canon, which enjoins a thorough acquaintance with the Lord's prayer as

<sup>b</sup> 2 Cor. viii. 12. I say "perhaps," because the direct application of this passage is only to the duty of almsgiving, but the principle appears to be frequently recognised, e.g. in Luke xii. 48. where what is first said of comparative *guilt* is extended to comparative *requirement*.

<sup>c</sup> Second Council of Rheims, in the reign of Charlemagne, Popedom of Leo III. Labb. Conc. vol. vi. p. 1254.

#### CANON I.

Capitulum primum est de fidei ratione ut unusquisque juxta intellectum suæ capacitatis, domino largiente, disceret et intelligeret, atque operibus pleniter observaret.

#### II.

Ut orationem quam dominus noster Jesus Christus discipulos suos orare docuit, verbis discerent et sensu bene intelligerent, quia illam ignorare nullo Christiano licet.

It is interesting to compare this language with Charlemagne's Circular in A. D. 787, (quoted by Gieseler, Eccl. Hist. vol. ii. p. 30, Engl. Tr.) "utile esse ut episcopia et monasteria—etiam in literarum meditationibus, eis qui, *donante Domino*, discere possunt *secundum uniuscujusque capacitatem* docendi studium debeant impendere."

indispensably and absolutely necessary to salvation. And later in the same century archbishop Hincmar<sup>d</sup> commands his presbyters to learn by heart Athanasius' Discourse on the Faith, and become acquainted with its meaning, so as to be able to explain it in ordinary language (*verbis communibus*), an expression which I cannot think, with Waterland, meant "in the vulgar tongue," when I observe that when in those days the vernacular was intended, the name of the particular country was mentioned<sup>e</sup>, or else the phrase was, "in their own language," (*in lingua sua*.) This reference, in the 19th century, to the practice of the 9th, may seem to some superfluous, or misplaced, but I cannot help feeling that it is not impossible that, on the subject on which we are about to enter, a stricter and more literal rule of orthodoxy may be by others thought necessary. But, however this may be, there can be no doubt as

<sup>d</sup> Hincmar Op. vol. i. p. 710. Necnon et sermonem Athanasii de fide, cujus initium est "Quicumque vult (wishes) salvus esse" memoriae quisque commendet, et sensum illius intelligat, et verbis communibus enuntiare queat. Quoted by Beveridge on Art. I. Waterland on Ath. Creed, Works iii. p. 123 (Oxf. Ed. 1843), and Gieseler, Eccl. Hist. vol. ii. p. 33.

<sup>e</sup> Gieseler, Eccl. Hist. vol. ii. p. 34, note 23. Louis "Le Debonnaire," "præcepit cuidam viro de gente Saxonum—ut Vetus ac Novum Testamentum in *Germanicam* linguam poetice transferre studeret."—And (*ibid.* note 21) the Council of Mayence says, "qui aliter non potuerit (learn the catholic faith, and Lord's Prayer) vel in *sua lingua* hoc discat," and (in note 22) we find catechesis *Theotisca*—interpretatio *Theotisca*, and (p. 33, note 17) in *rusticam Romanam* linguam, aut *Theotiscam*. The word *rusticam* is another argument for my interpretation of *communibus*.

to the fact, that the general distinction between clergy and laity, as to explicit confession, is decidedly recognised by our Church; which, while she requires of the former a subscription to Articles which enter minutely into the several controverted points of Theology, exacts no more of the latter than an acquaintance with the Creed, (that is, the Apostles' Creed,) the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments, and with the Church Catechism, which is set forth for the purpose of instructing those who come to the rite of Confirmation, which is the only ecclesiastical condition which is enforced, in order for an English Churchman to partake of that Holy Supper, which makes him, as far as outward means can, a member of the mystical Body of Christ. From which it is natural to conclude, that the less explicit knowledge is considered sufficient for salvation; subject of course to that moral obligation, by which every man is bound to improve the means of knowledge which have been vouchsafed to him by God. Nor need we dwell upon the obvious reasons which make it desirable that those who are to teach should have a more *explicit* acquaintance with essential points, in order by illustration and argument to procure and establish their reception by others, in the simpler form in which they are proposed to *them*. The reason and necessity of such a distinction is apparent, and will be generally recognised by all<sup>f</sup>.

<sup>f</sup> Wall in his History of Infant Baptism (Pt. II. cxi. p. 390. ed. 1705) strongly supports this view, not representing the "baptism of young children" as one of the terms of Lay Communion. His

The only question is,—does it apply to that fundamental and most solemn subject on which we are about to enter, the essential Nature of God? And to this question an affirmative answer is I think given, both verbally, and practically, by our Church. Retaining with a reverent wisdom the Creeds of Catholic antiquity, for sound explication and adequate defence<sup>g</sup>, claiming for them in the abstract a thorough reception and belief, and the sure warrant of Holy Writ, she nevertheless is not afraid to rest the orthodoxy of her children, with respect to the Doctrine of the Trinity, on the Apostles' Creed as explained in the Catechism. And that explanation consists in neither more nor less than a belief “in God the Father who made us and all the world, in God the Son who redeemed us and all mankind, and in God the Holy Ghost who sanctifieth us and all the elect people of God,” in God, I say, regarded thus as Three Persons, each having his own relation to each, and each having his own office for us, but regarded at the same time as One God, as is *explicitly* asserted, (when the assertion is carefully examined,)

remarks are worth reading at the present time, when it has been the fashion to consider a positive view on the subject of Baptismal Regeneration an *essential*.

<sup>g</sup> Ludolph the Saxon, a Carthusian, (quoted by Waterland, vol. iii. p. 130) says of the three Creeds,—“Primum (the Apostles') factum est ad fidei *instructionem*. Secundum (the Nicene) ad fidei *explicationem*. Tertium (Athanasian) ad fidei *defensionem*.” Alexander of Hales (quoted *ibid.* p. 126) says the same, only using, instead of the last phrase, the negative “*erroris exclusio*.”

in the mention of the One<sup>h</sup> name in which we are baptized, which belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. I hope to make it plain in the course of this Lecture that, interpreted according to the avowed intention of our Church, such a belief is quite sufficient for salvation,—remembering always that we are confining our attention to the single subject of the essential Nature of God, or in other words, of the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity, leaving the historical facts which shew the Second Person in the Blessed Trinity to be our “Lord” and “Saviour,” and the additional<sup>i</sup> doctrines which are derived from the main doctrines of Creation, Redemption, and Sanctification, as well as the law of duty, and the model of Prayer, and the two “Holy Secrets” of Christ, not, (as has been already stated,) as open questions or non-essential points, but simply

<sup>h</sup> Εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος. S. Matth. xxviii. 9.

<sup>i</sup> I was struck with the expression in the letter of the synod at Antioch in Socr. Eccl. Hist. p. 71. Oxford Ed. 1844. After defining their belief in the Trinity, they say, εἰ δὲ δεῖ προσθεῖναι, πιστεύομεν καὶ περὶ σαρκὸς ἀναστάσεως καὶ ζωῆς αἰωνίου, “if anything further should be added, we believe also concerning (no longer “in”) the resurrection of the flesh, and eternal life.” This I found afterwards quoted in that repository of learning the Notes to Pearson on the Creed (vol. ii. p. 449. Ed. Burton), and he observes “From whence it appeareth that the profession of faith in the Father, the Son, and Holy Ghost, was counted essential to the Creed; the rest which followed was looked upon as a *προσθήκη*.” I may as well add here, that this marked difference in the *language* used with reference to the *One* great *Object* of our Faith, and the *facts* of religion, seems to me a strong evidence that this *feeling* existed in spite of an occasional irregularity of expression.

as not belonging to our present subject,—which is to consider what we know, and are, every one of us, bound to think, of God as God.—And this, I repeat, is limited, by the working rule and the actual practice of our Church, to the explanation of the Doctrine of the Trinity which is contained in the Catechism. And the only answer which can, I think, be devised by those who, whether from a real feeling of apprehension that there is danger in such an implicit knowledge being allowed to be sufficient, or from an unconscious love of dictation and inquisition, gainsay this statement of the case, is to oppose to this working rule and unquestionable practice of the Church, a supposed theoretical opinion, evolved from the VIIIth Article regarded in connection with the prescriptive portion of the Athanasian Creed. The Athanasian Creed, it will be said, for which the Church in the VIIIth Article claims an equal reception and belief, and the same warranty of Scripture, with the Nicene and the Apostles', expressly affirms that its contents are obligatory on all. It is not merely a confession, but a rule of faith. It invites us to accept its statements as we wish for salvation, and dares us to reject them as we fear damnation. “Whosoever will be saved,” says the stern “Psalm,” as it used to be called<sup>k</sup>, “before all things

<sup>k</sup> Waterland, vol. iii. p. 129, to whose instances may be added Henry VIII's “Articles of Religion,” quoted in Burnet Hist. of Reform. vol. i. part ii. p. 461. Ed. Oxf. 1829, “The third (Creed) was made by Athanasius(?), and is comprehended in the Psalm *Quicumque vult.*”

it is necessary that he hold the Catholic Faith. Which faith except every one do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly. And the Catholic faith is this, that we worship one God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity ;”—and then the doctrine is (we must say for the sake of the argument) expanded and explained; and this being duly done, this portion of the “discourse” ends by saying, “So that in all things, as is aforesaid, the Unity in Trinity, and the Trinity in Unity, is to be worshipped.” And so little wish was felt by our Reformers to soften down the stringency of these clauses, that not only have they disdained the laxity of the Greeks, who (to say nothing of the one doctrinal point of difference) sometimes omitted<sup>1</sup> the severe and sweeping “without doubt” in the second verse, but the translator has added a sting to the severity of the last verse, by rendering “ita sentiat,” and “οὕτως φρονεῖτω,” not literally “let him thus think,” which is the language of kindly exhortation, but “*must* thus think,” which is the language of imperious obligation. Such is the argument—and there is no palpable flaw in it.—But the question at once arises, ‘*What* is the doctrine or doctrinal statement which is thus fenced in with anathemas, and forced upon our trembling consciences?’ Is it the main doctrine of the Trinity in Unity, or is it every specific point mentioned in this discourse of Hilary of Arles<sup>m</sup>, or whoever it was, which we are every one

<sup>1</sup> The version in Labbe’s Councils does this.

<sup>m</sup> This is Waterland’s opinion, see vol. iii. p. 213, &c.

of us consciously *and explicitly* to believe on pain of certain damnation? Let us hear the answer of Waterland<sup>n</sup>, the great defender, in his day, of this Creed,—“It is horrible misrepresentation of the case, to pretend as if we taught that “the eternal interest of every *ploughman* or *mechanic* hangs on his adjusting the sense of the terms *nature*, *person*, *essence*, *substance*, *subsistence*, *coequality*, *coessentiality*, and the like.”—No: these are *technical* terms, most of them, proper to divines and scholars: and not only *ploughmen* and *mechanics*, but very great *scholars* too, lived and died in the conscientious belief of the doctrine of the *Trinity*, long before any of those *terms* came in. They are of use indeed for the settling the *controversy* with greater accuracy among divines, who understand such terms: but the *doctrine* itself is *clear* without them, and stands firm and unshaken, independent of them.” And in another part of the same work<sup>o</sup>, he says, “when we speak of the *doctrine*, we mean it of the general doctrine itself, not of the minute circumstances, or appendages of it, which are either of a doubtful nature, or of slighter consideration. For though” (he here quotes a passage from Sherlock’s *Vindication of the Defence of Stillingfleet*) “it is *necessary* and *essential* to the Christian faith, to acknowledge Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, to be one eternal God, yet there are a great many little subtilties started by over-curious and busy heads, which are not *fun-*

<sup>n</sup> The Importance of the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity asserted, &c., vol. iii. p. 409.

<sup>o</sup> Ibid. p. 437.



*damental* doctrines, and ought not to be thought so. God forbid that all the nice *distinctions* and *definitions* of the schools, about *essence*, *subsistence*, *personality*, about *eternal generation* and *procession*, the difference between *filiation* and *spiration*, &c., should be reckoned among *fundamentals* of our faith. For, though we understand nothing of these matters, (as indeed we do not, and it had been happy the Church had never heard of them,) yet if we believe the *Divinity* of each Person, we believe enough to understand the doctrine of salvation." And applying this liberal interpretation to the Athanasian Creed itself, as the principal deposit of these technical expressions, Waterland tells us in discussing the words "so that in all things, as is aforesaid, the Unity in Trinity and the Trinity in Unity is to be worshipped," that he "inclines to the moderate opinion of those who think that the author here does not lay the stress upon every little nicety of explication before given, but upon the main doctrine of a coequal and coeternal Trinity<sup>p</sup>." And he cites Hinemar and Wickliff<sup>q</sup> as supporting this opinion, and, though himself considering any further concession unneces-

<sup>p</sup> Vol. iii. p. 240.

<sup>q</sup> These are Wickliff's (or Hampole's) words, "put," as Waterland says, "into a modern dress." "And so we conclude here, as is before said, that there is both an Unity of Godhead, and a Trinity of Persons; and that the Trinity in this Unity is to be worshipped above all things; and whosoever will be saved must thus think of the Trinity, if not explicitly, (or in every particular,) yet thus in the general or implicitly." Ibid.

sary, he quotes<sup>r</sup> also the Rubric, which was agreed upon in 1689, (though, as we know, not substituted for the existing rubric,) which, while retaining the Creed, and claiming for its clauses reception and belief, as “agreeable to the Holy Scriptures,” adds that “the condemning clauses are to be understood as relating only to those who obstinately deny the substance of the Christian faith<sup>s</sup>.”

Nor does the opinion of Wheatly<sup>t</sup> differ from that of Waterland, except in the fact that he extends the obligation of explicit assent to the second verse of the confession, “neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance,” while Waterland<sup>u</sup> on the contrary observes of this verse, “here would be no need of these particular cautions, or critical terms, in relation to this point, had men been content with the plain primitive faith in its native simplicity,” which seems to involve the admission, that provided a man really believed in the Three Persons as one God, his faith would be secure without this addition; a point on which I shall have occasion to insist in the course of my present argument. With this exception, if it should be called one, the two commentators agree, and Wheatly in some respects uses language even stronger than that of Waterland.

<sup>r</sup> Vol. iii. p. 249.

<sup>s</sup> If “the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity, or that of the Incarnation,” were substituted for “the substance of the Christian faith,” the relief would be the same, and the chance of evasion less.

<sup>t</sup> Book of Common Prayer, p. 148. ed. Oxford 1839.

<sup>u</sup> Vol. iii. p. 231.

“Howsoever plain and agreeable to reason every verse in this Creed may be; yet we are not required by the words of the Creed to believe the whole on pain of damnation.” And he goes on to say, that all that follows from the words “dividing the substance,” to the twenty-sixth verse, which resumes the language of the first, “is only brought as a proof and illustration of” the doctrine; “and therefore requires our assent no more than a sermon does, which is made to prove or illustrate a text. The text we know is the word of God, and therefore necessary to be believed, but no person is, for that reason, bound to believe every particular of the sermon deduced from it, upon pain of damnation, though every tittle of it may be true. The same I take it to be in this Creed.”

The view which Burnet<sup>x</sup> adopts, and which he speaks of as “that in which the most eminent men of this Church, as far as the memory of all such as he had known could go up, agreed,” is somewhat stricter, though practically just the same. It is stricter, because he speaks of doctrines *following* those of the Trinity and Incarnation, which he considers to be the duty of all who can to learn, but otherwise it is more lenient, inasmuch as it dwells, as the Rubric of 1689 does, on *wilfulness*, as constituting the guilt of those who do not assent to these doctrines<sup>y</sup>. Of the

<sup>x</sup> On Art. VIII. p. 106, 107. ed. 1700.

<sup>y</sup> And even with respect to the first assertion, which seems to take in the longer statement into the limits of necessary doctrine, it appears from his concluding remarks that he only regarded this statement as subsidiary, not as obligatory in itself.

views which I have brought forward it will be seen that there is not one which considers every clause and every technical expression of this Creed binding, and that the general feeling represented by them is, that it is the great doctrine of the Trinity in Unity which is held to be essential, the rest of the confession being only necessary so far as it ensures the due reception and belief of this fundamental doctrine.

But it may be said that for this subsidiary purpose, and as a bulwark, as Luther<sup>z</sup> speaks, of the Apostles' Creed, an acquaintance with the Athanasian Creed is necessary. And if this is meant to apply to the clergy, or even to those who have leisure and opportunity and ability to make themselves acquainted with these details, with a view to be able to meet errors, which may at any time revive, I willingly agree with the remark. And I am glad to take this opportunity of saying, that in the view which I am at present advocating, I am influenced by no prejudice or personal dislike to the more explicit statements of the Athanasian, and still less to those of the Nicene Creed. On the contrary, I can say with truth, (and there are reasons<sup>a</sup> which make me think there is nothing egotistical in my saying it,) that I

<sup>z</sup> *Propugnaculum primi illius apostolici Symboli.* Luther. de Trib. Symbol. Oper. tom. vii. p. 138. Quoted by Waterland, vol. iii. p. 246.

<sup>a</sup> This allusion is to a sermon preached before the University in 1851, which was somewhat misunderstood, partly, no doubt, from too much matter being crowded into a short space, and the distinction between explicit and implicit belief not being made sufficiently clear.

can never read the Nicene Creed without feeling elevated by its spirituality, or the objective portions of the Athanasian without admiring its grandeur; and, I will add, its general simplicity also. “God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten not made, Being of one substance with the Father, By whom all things were made,”—these deep and lofty titles, which usher in the majesty and the glory of Him, of whom we next say, that “for us men and for our salvation he came down from heaven” and was incarnate and suffered and died,—these glorious and pregnant titles, I say, I am glad controversy has secured to us, though it did not, we know, invent them, but received them as a precious legacy from the piety which first composed them from the words of the Saviour himself and his beloved apostle, the fountain and the channel of the deep spirituality of the Gospel. Again, the bold assertion of coequal and coeternal majesty and glory for the Blessed Three, who are One God, and the grand negations of anything unworthy of their exalted Being, and the prominence, so simply given to that undividing individuality of Those who are sundry<sup>b</sup> and yet not sundered, several and yet not severed, which gives a reality and a force to the triple offices of Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier, on which our life depends,—these to one who considers that antithesis of statement is not necessarily comparison of doctrine, and that

<sup>b</sup> “As there are three *several* and *sundry* Persons in the Deity, so have they three several and sundry offices proper unto each of them.” Hom. for Whitsunday, p. 409.

words of abstract sound may yet be concrete in sense, may well atone, so far as it needs to be atoned for, for the presence of certain expressions which are not to be found in Scripture, and which (though adopted, as can I think be demonstrated, as necessary, and not as logically or metaphysically admirable) a love for logical arrangement and subordination has, from the moment of their introduction, whatever dogmatists<sup>c</sup> may choose to say now, been apt to exaggerate and pervert.

<sup>c</sup> One is surprised to find bishop Bull, (vol. v. p. i. p. 70. De-fens. Fid. Nic. ed. Burton.) treating with contempt the notion that the word *ομοούσιον* was susceptible of that misinterpretation which introduced “substantiam aliquam et Patre et Filio priorem, cujus deinde Pater et Filius ex æquo participes fierent,” when we read not long after (pp. 89, 90) quotations from Athanasius and Basil, which he cites to prove that it was to prevent this very misrepresentation that the Council of Antioch (A.D. 269) rejected this term. The view itself, which I have called further on “a monstrous phantom of Atheistic Realism,” reappears in the hands of John Philoponus, of whom Leontius De Sect. (quoted by Gieseler, Eccl. Hist. i. p. 321) says that he affirmed *τρεις φύσεις ἐπὶ τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος*. “Ἐλεγε δὲ ταῦτα λαβὼν τὴν ἀφορμὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν” ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶν, ὅτι εἰσι τῶν ἀτόμων καὶ μερικαὶ οὐσiai καὶ μία κοινή· οὕτως οὖν καὶ ὁ Φιλόπονος ἔλεγεν, ὅτι εἰσὶ τρεῖς μερικαὶ οὐσiai ἐπὶ τῆς ἁγίας Τριάδος, καὶ ἐστὶ μία κοινή. It is of course not impossible that he may have meant to use *οὐσία* merely in a notional sense, which I think was Aristotle’s own meaning when he applied it to genera or species; (see Cat. c. 5.) but this only shews the danger of attaching importance to these logical terms, and the necessity of explanation. Mr. Wilberforce (Doct. of Inc. p. 38 note, 4th ed.) in attempting to defend his *entity* of “human nature” on the authority of Aristotle, tells us, that primary substances “have each a particular counterpart in nature. The second have not so strictly a counterpart in nature, but yet are not mere qualities.” Now Aristotle says of the second, “that

It is for others then that I am pleading, for those who honestly wish and trust to hold right opinions on these high points, and who yet feel that they cannot understand, not the doctrine itself, (for here we are all on the same footing, high and low, rich and poor, learned and unlearned, teachers and taught,) but the terms in which the doctrine is apparently expanded. Upon the ears of such persons the twang of an anathema jars, in connection with statements which seem to be so explicit, on subjects which are undoubtedly so ineffably and inconceivably mysterious. They wish to be assured, and the divines whom I have quoted do not scruple to assure them, that they may hope for everlasting salvation without dwelling on words such as *person* and *substance*, which they cannot help associating with anthropomorphic and material notions *when they dwell upon them*, and the proper sense of which (if any one knows) yet from the nature of the case no one can definitively explain. Unaccustomed to abstract ex-

they appear to have a particular counterpart," but that this *is not really the case*—οὐ μὴν ἀληθές γε—and I confess I cannot see how these words can be got over. Certainly they never ought to be omitted in any argument from a supposed view of Aristotle. He says, they are "rather qualities than substances," though (as Mr. W. correctly states) not *mere* qualities. But it does not follow that he regarded them as *entities*. But to return to the heresy. We find it again put forward by Gilbert of Poitiers, and condemned by the Council of Rheims, A.D. 1148. His opinion was (as given in Labbe Conc. X. p. 1108. Paris 1671) "*Quod divina natura, quæ Divinitas dicitur, Deus non sit, sed forma quæ Deus est, quemadmodum humanitas homo non est, sed forma quæ est homo.*" The decision of the Council will be quoted further on.

pressions on any subject, and not receiving them without an effort, they are utterly bewildered here, where those who would fain act as interpreters are obliged to allow that their seemingly scientific terms are really mere make-shifts, abstract without abstraction, and still more general without generalization. Such persons are, I verily believe, to be found in every rank of society, though more often no doubt among the less educated, and they should be told plainly that they need have no fears about their salvation, even though they can add no substantive to our Lord's assertion, "I and my Father are One<sup>d</sup>." For that they are generally sincere in their scruples on this subject is, I think, evidenced by the fact that it is to the Athanasian, and not to the Nicene Creed, that their objections are taken. The titular phrases of the latter, which stand out less, and have for that reason a more devotional sound, they find no fault with; and therefore I am inclined to believe that it is not to the *doctrine* of the Athanasian Confession, but to the antithetical phrases which they wrongly think comparative, and to the damnable clauses which, when unexplained, sound harsh and uncharitable, that they really feel a dislike.

And though both these objections may, I think, be removed, (the latter in the way that I have shewn from the writings of others, the former by a resolution of the terms into what they really mean, as distinguished from what they at first suggest,) still the first explanation having been never authorized,

<sup>d</sup> John x. 30.



and the latter requiring much tension of mind to those who are unused to abstract phrases and notions, I cannot but rejoice that a simpler and less explicit form has been considered ordinarily sufficient, and that no private Christian in the English Church is called upon to say, ‘I pin my faith to every statement and term in this human exposition of the doctrine of the Gospel.’ But I should not feel thus, nor endeavour to lead you to feel so, if I did not believe that the Doctrine of the Trinity was fully secured by the more implicit form *as used and interpreted by our Church*. And what do I mean by this? I mean that the Apostles’ Creed is part of our religious worship, and is a confession of a Christian’s faith; and that he who uses it and interprets it thus, is orthodox already beyond the power of explicit statement to make him, beyond the need of damnatory clauses to secure him. “I believe in—that is, “I have a Christian man’s faith in<sup>e</sup>,” πιστεύω εἰς, as the New Testament exclusively though not invariably uses the phrase, (and a little irregularity in Creeds does not alter this fact, which is backed by the authority of ancient fathers<sup>f</sup>;)—I believe in God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, my Creator, my Redeemer, my Sanctifier, I believe the

<sup>e</sup> This is the explanation of belief in Nowell’s Catechism.

<sup>f</sup> Among others Gregory Nazianzen, Epiphanius, Augustine—all quoted by Pearson on the Creed—whose counter-quotation from Basil is very unsuccessful, as it runs thus, πιστεύομεν οὖν καὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν ἓνα—Θεὸν κ.τ.λ., the second verb evidently determining the construction which, without an infinitive, would, I think, be inadmissible with the first.

first to be a proper Father<sup>g</sup>, the second a proper Son, the third a proper Spirit,—but not only this, but those whom in their relations between themselves I acknowledge, in their relations to me I worship, I believe in Them as I believe in no one, and nothing else, I believe in 'Them as God<sup>h</sup>.' Such, my brethren, and you especially my younger brethren, (whose hearts I know will answer to *this* notion of belief,) such is the view of a Christian's faith which is set before you in your own Church. Instead of beginning, as bishop Pearson does, "with a general notion of belief, which being first truly stated and defined, then by degrees deduced into its several kinds, should at last make the nature of Christian faith intelligible," (as if one was not already bewildered by the needless preface!) they preferred to *begin* at once with a *Christian* notion of faith, trusting to instinct and common sense (or rather to these sanctified by God's grace) to understand and appreciate it.—Belief, as having for its object, not anything credible, said by any credible person, but God and what *He* has said, seemed to them the true theological use of that term and notion. And they thought that the object stamped at once a peculiar

<sup>g</sup> These words were, in Lecture II, ranked among the *transcendental* words, and therefore considered proper, not metaphorical.

<sup>h</sup> In "The Institution of a Christian Man," though the distinction is not explicitly made between "believing," and "believing in," yet in the enumeration of the Articles of Belief, the difference of phrase occurs. Not only the facts of our Lord's mission, but all the additional articles are introduced with the words "I believe *that*." Formularies of Faith, p. 29. Oxf. ed. 1825.

character on the feeling or faculty which responded to it. And so they rejected<sup>i</sup>, as “not being *properly* called faith,” that belief which consists in knowing “that there is a God,” and “in believing the word of God that it is true,” and made “a trust in God,” and “a looking for help and benefit from him,” a part of their notion of belief or faith. And as in the case of the expression “I believe in,” which they confined to God, (and which, even if not confined to God, may be said to have always, when applied to Him, a connotation of trust,)—as in the use of this expression, so in the psychological fact which its use or appropriation expresses, they have Scripture on their side. The passage in St. Paul (Heb. xi. 1) of which bishop Pearson quotes a part in proof of his position, is, when quoted entire, clearly in favour of ours, “He that cometh to God,” says the apostle, “must believe that He is,” (here bishop Pearson stops, but St. Paul goes on,) “and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.” The two propositions are presented at once and not consecutively to the mind. And the absence in the original of the second “that” strengthens this criticism. “He that believes in God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.” The existence and benevolence of God are joint arguments in drawing a man to Him. The result which they produce is, if you like to call it so and think you understand it better, complex,—but it does not follow that we can actually divide the

<sup>i</sup> Hom. on Holy Scripture, p. 1.

result, because we can logically analyse it. Here, as in the case of "light shining *in the heart*," which I noticed in the last Lecture, is common sense and reverence on one side, and logical arrangement on the other; and here, as there, reverence and common sense are in truth much more philosophical than logic. For, if we enter into the psychology of this matter, I think we might venture to assert that the mere belief that there was a God never caused any one to 'come to Him.' That which draws them to Him (objectively I mean) is the idea of His goodwill towards them. Power, and even wisdom, as the Homily for Rogation week observes<sup>k</sup>, are repulsive rather than attractive, but "By his *goodness* we be assured to take Him for our refuge, our hope and comfort, our merciful father, in all the course of our life." So that belief, to be Christian, *must* connote trust, and we shall, I think, do well to treat the act of the intellect and the heart (supposing them to be different) as a complex act, existing, as a matter of fact, *as* complex; and not, by over-refining and by a love for logical arrangement, place our Christian faith on a level with that of the devils who "believe and tremble." And we shall be the less inclined to take a purely intellectual view of faith when we remember *where* our Creeds occur; in the midst of our solemn devotions, and as a part of them. Whatever they were at first, pious opinions, statements, expositions, they are now embodied in our worship. And, I must say, it seems to me almost a

<sup>k</sup> Hom. p. 422.

ridiculous notion to suppose that a number of persons who have been praying to God, and praising Him, listening to what he has done for them, and expressing an entire devotion to Him, should in the midst of all this, stand up and gravely confess that they really do believe that there is a God, and that certain assertions which are made concerning Him are true. A bathos like this is a heavy price to pay for a show of logic. It was not with these feelings that the Creed was ordered, as Wheatly<sup>1</sup> tells us, to be repeated *standing*, “to signify our resolution to stand up stoutly in defence of it,” and that “the nobles of Poland and Lithuania used formerly to draw their swords, in token that, if need were, they would defend and seal the truth of it with their blood.”

Used and interpreted thus,—and that this was (whether right or wrong) the intention of our Church at the Reformation, is proved by the Homily on Faith, and Nowell’s Catechism, (which was approved by a Convocation<sup>m</sup>,)—the Apostles’ Creed is a sufficient safeguard against heresy. The man who thus uses it is no longer the possible Arian or Macedonian which on the other supposition he might be, but is a *worshipper* of the Three Persons who are one God. And this worship, and not “a pious opinion,” I would have you notice, even the Athanasian Creed inculcates and declares to be its object. We have allowed it to evolve its own obligation; let it now speak,

<sup>1</sup> Common Prayer—on Apostles’ Creed, p. 147.

<sup>m</sup> See letter quoted in preface to Parker Society Edition of Catechism, p. vi.

for it can speak, the language of devotion. The Catholic faith is—what? that we believe that there is one God and Three Persons—a Trinity in Unity. Not so! The Catholic faith is this, “that we *worship* one God in Trinity and Trinity in Unity.” Thus it begins; and it ends in like manner—“so that in all things as is aforesaid the Unity in Trinity and the Trinity in Unity is to be *worshipped*.” And though it is added, “he therefore that would be saved must thus think of the Trinity,” it is scarcely needful to say that the reason for his thinking thus is not the mere act of reflection upon his own belief, or even on the mysterious object of it, (for God in the divine relations is *not* a proper subject for our thoughts,) but that he may *worship* Him aright. “This is the view of the Trinity which he must take in order to insure a reasonable worship.” If then he already pays this worship, (believing “with the heart unto righteousness” before “with the mouth” he makes “confession unto salvation,”) if he “acknowledges the glory of the eternal Trinity and in the power of the Divine Majesty worships the Unity,” he already knows (as was said before) more than any human exposition can teach him; and that exposition would attempt impossibilities, and therefore deal in blasphemies, which should attempt, in any strict sense of the term, to *teach* him more with regard to the object of his worship. Unless, it must indeed be added, an *explicit* belief in the eternal generation of the Son and the eternal procession of the Spirit be regarded as necessary for one who already believes the divinity of the Son and

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the Spirit, and believing it, worships them as God. If this be so, I can only say that it is indeed a strange thing that these doctrines are not explicitly asserted in either of the three Creeds. We are left to gather that the generation and procession spoken of are eternal from that which *is* explicitly asserted, the divinity and coeternity of the Son and of the Spirit. Only in the second article of our Church is express mention made of the first of these two doctrines—“*Begotten from everlasting* of the Father.” And the plain conclusion is, that though for those who are to defend these doctrines such an explicit knowledge is necessary, it was not thought necessary, no not in all the long controversies on the subject, to introduce an expression of it into any one of the Church’s confessions of faith. It seems to have been thought that this was sufficiently taught in simpler and happier times in the doctrine of the divinity of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and afterwards by calling attention to the scriptural assertion that the one is “begotten of,” the other “proceedeth from,” the Father<sup>n</sup>. How far the self-existence which seems part of the notion of God, and the coequality which is so unequivocally asserted of the Three Persons, are qualified by the fact of this generation and procession, is, one may add, left undecided; and it ought not,

<sup>n</sup> The Procession *from the Son* must be always sought elsewhere than in John xv. 26. Either in this expression, “The Spirit of Christ,” or in the etymology of the word “Spirit” viewed in connection with the coeternity which is involved in the notion of the divinity. To seek it in “I will send” would be most dangerous.

surely, to be discussed. And, in particular, we are at liberty to hold, with our own Homilies<sup>o</sup> and with St. Augustine<sup>p</sup>, that the words of our Lord “my Father is greater than I” refer solely to the human nature which the Word has deigned to assume.

If then it be further granted that the Unity of God and his general attributes (which are indeed included in the very notion of his existence) are always held and taught, as an heirloom which Christianity inherits from Judaism, and that the specific mention of them in the Athanasian Creed is not to be regarded as characteristic of that formulary, except so far as they are applied to the several Persons (and he who believes Them to be one God applies them thus of course,) we may I think repeat fearlessly that the more indulgent and less inquisitorial rule of orthodoxy, which uses the Apostles’ Creed as the ordinary standard or test of belief, surrenders no necessary point of faith, involves no danger, and therefore is not only charitable and modest, but, under the circumstances of our imperfections, wise and right.

For let us look a little more closely into the question. Is there then any real addition made in the Athanasian Creed to the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity? Is there any attempt to reconcile the two doctrines, and so to explain the difficulty? Is unity so expanded as to admit the notion of a Personal Trinity according to any ideas of person-

<sup>o</sup> Hom. p. 262.

<sup>p</sup> Quoted by Beveridge on Art. I. p. 77. Ed. S. P. C. K.



ality or of Threeness which we find within us? I am glad, my brethren, to be able at once to say that no such vain, such impious folly has been attempted. There is no monstrous phantom of Atheistic Realism introducing a prior substance, by a joint partaking of which the Three Persons become one God. There is no fanciful evolution of *substance*, as a notional entity, obtained by abstraction from the Three Persons who are one God. There is no idle definition of the mode of subsistence by which the Three Persons are what they are. There is in fact not the least addition to the view of St. Augustine, which any one who believes the doctrine may take, and beyond which no one can really go; "that these<sup>q</sup> are neither one confusedly, nor three separately; but while they are one they are also three, and while they are three they are also one." And it is well, I repeat, that it is so. For what place have such refinements here? How can there be any logic, where one in number and one in notion coincide and are both inapplicable, not only because He of whom we speak is one without a series<sup>r</sup>, individual without a class, but because while He is One He is also Three, and while He is Three He is still only One.

And therefore it is that the imposing semblance of metaphysical creations melts before the first ray of

<sup>q</sup> Quoted by Beveridge on Art. I. p. 69—"Hæc omnia nec confuse unum sunt, nec distincte (l. disjuncte) tria sunt: sed cum sunt unum, tria sunt, et cum sunt tria, unum sunt." Epist. ad Maximum clxx. 5. vol. ii. 609.

<sup>r</sup> Rufinus on the Creed (quoted by Beveridge and Pearson) says God is called one "non numeri sed universitatis vocabulo."

sober reason and common sense. And your words of abstract sound are only concrete, and are no better than their humbler equivalents. For God is the Godhead<sup>s</sup>, and the one God is the Unity, and the Three Persons are the Trinity, nay, more, as Damascene<sup>t</sup> says, correcting his first statement, that “in them is the Deity,” “They,” he plainly affirms, flinging logic to the winds, “are the Deity,” and They are not only “of” nor “in,” but are “one substance<sup>u</sup>.” And any other notion you attach to these abstract expressions is either worthless, as not being exclusively theological, or dangerous and delusive<sup>x</sup>.

And if, turning from the mode of subsistence, and giving up as hopeless the idea of logical adjustment,

<sup>s</sup> Credimus et confitemur simplicem naturam Divinitatis esse Deum, nec aliquo sensu Catholico posse negari quin Divinitas sit Deus et Deus Divinitas,”—and so on with respect to the attributes—God *is*, not *has*, wisdom, greatness, &c. And of the Persons—“cum de tribus Personis loquimur, Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto, ipsas unum Deum unam divinam substantiam esse fatemur. Et e converso cum de uno Deo unâ divinâ substantiâ loquimur, ipsum unum Deum, unam Divinam substantiam esse tres Divinas Personas confitemur.” Council of Rheims, A. D. 1148, in<sup>e</sup> Labb. Conc. l. c. p. 87. This decision is quoted in Beveridge on Art. I. where I first saw it, but to see the *logical* bearing one should read Gilbert’s opinion quoted above, p. 87.

<sup>t</sup> De Fid. Orth. 1. c. ἐν οἷς ἡ θεότης, ἡ τὸ γε ἀκριβέστερον εἰπεῖν ἂν ἡ θεότης.  
<sup>u</sup> Hom. p. 2. and compare p. 408.

<sup>x</sup> The Church recognises the danger, whether arising from ignorance or logical subtilty, and the equivalence of the abstract and concrete terms, in the Litany, where, after addressing the Trinity, we add “Three Persons and one God;” and in the collect for Trinity Sunday, where we first pray to God by His concrete name of God before we “acknowledge the glory of the Trinity and worship the Unity.”

we speak only of essence, or being, here too we are forced to own that we can say nothing, nay that we can think nothing, except when now and then some blind and weak conception may start for a moment into existence, too transient for words to catch, or too unsubstantial for them to express. But “the only-begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, hath,” we are told, “declared Him.” And He moreover promised his disciples, (and he “keepeth his promise for ever,”) that after his resurrection<sup>y</sup> “he would shew them plainly of the Father.” Nay, he has even said, “He that hath seen me hath seen the Father<sup>z</sup>.” Yes, but alas! he hath also said, “no man hath seen the Father<sup>a</sup>,” and the “declaration” in the text is no counterpoise to this. The word even for “declared” is only ἐδηγήσατο—not ἐφάνέρωσεν—it does not say “revealed;” and so the word for “shew” is only ἀναγγελῶ; and as to the other assertion, it is more than met by these<sup>b</sup>—“ye have not seen his shape”—and “whom no man hath seen or can see<sup>c</sup>”—and “we shall be like him<sup>d</sup>, for we shall see Him as he is,” which, as He is a spirit<sup>e</sup>, we could not do without. And shall we seize on *this* proposition “God is a spirit,” and flatter ourselves we have comprised his nature? Alas! we only know of spirits that they “have not flesh and bones<sup>f</sup>,” that they are incorporeal; the notion is merely negative—we can-

<sup>y</sup> John xvi. 25. παρρησίᾳ περὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀναγγελῶ ὑμῖν “freely tell” not “plainly shew.”

<sup>z</sup> John xiv. 9. and xii. 44.

<sup>a</sup> John i. 18. and vi. 46.

<sup>b</sup> John vi. 7.

<sup>c</sup> 1 Tim.

vi. 16.

<sup>d</sup> 1 John iii. 2.

<sup>e</sup> John iv. 24.

<sup>f</sup> Luke xxiv. 39.

not grasp it—nor should we even dare to refer to the class of incorporeal beings Him, who, whatever He is, must be that alone: above, as Justin Martyr observes, whatever we can call incorporeal<sup>g</sup>. Nay, when we even take the simplest proposition of all, and say that “God is,” still, even then, as Damascene has said with grand simplicity<sup>h</sup>, “we do not rank Him among the things that are, not as though He were not, but because His being is above all things that be, yea, it is above even our very notion of being.”

Thus we must needs allow that even our most elaborate and apparently aspiring expressions are miserably inadequate, and more than this, that the propositions in which we use them, though indeed more real than any that were ever put together, because more connected with the great cause of all things, are to us, by reason of our ignorance, little more than verbal. Of God, as God, we know little more than he to whom it was said, when he asked the name of him by whom he was sent, “I am that I am,” or, “I am I that am<sup>i</sup>.” Since that time indeed “great things” have been “done for us already; whereof we rejoice.” God the Word has become Incarnate, and has wept with us, and suffered, and died,

<sup>g</sup> Καὶ τὸ θεῖον φάμεν εἶναι ἀσώματον, οὐχ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀσώματον—ἐπέκεινα γάρ ἐστιν ὁ Θεὸς τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ ὥσπερ τοῦ σώματος, οὕτως καὶ τοῦ ἀσωμάτου, ὡς ἐκατέρου τούτων ὑπάρχων δημιουργός· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐποίησεν ὁ Θεὸς ἂν αὐτὸς ὑπάρχει, p. 538. D. quoted in Beveridge on Art. I.

<sup>h</sup> Οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶν, οὐκ ὡς μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ὑπὲρ πάντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι ὄν. De Fid. Orth. i. 4. and he calls Him afterwards ὑπέρθεος—above any notion which we can form of God. But see Gregor. Nazianz. Or. 31. c. 15. <sup>i</sup> Exod. iii. 14.

and risen, and ascended, and is interceding, for us, and has sent His Spirit to be with us, and is waiting in heaven to receive us. But with regard to knowledge of the *nature* of God, we are still much where we were. "Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Ghost," infinite, uncreated, eternal God and Lord. That they are this we know, but what this is we know not. Let us therefore, as the Homily advises us, "lay apart to speak of the profound and unsearchable nature of Almighty God, rather acknowledging our weakness than rashly to attempt that is above all man's capacity to compass. It shall better suffice us in low humility to reverence and dread his majesty, which we cannot comprise, than by overmuch curious searching to be overcharged with the glory<sup>i</sup>." And let us turn from those inner relations of the incomprehensible and ineffable Godhead to the practical relations of the Blessed Three to ourselves, to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier, the "Three Persons and one God" who have "had mercy on us miserable sinners."

Or, if we still long for some more abstract notion on which to rest our dreamy thoughts, and round which to wind our heavenward aspirations, let us remember that the blessed apostle has told us that "God is light<sup>k</sup>," and also that "God is love<sup>l</sup>." "A Spirit" who "is light," and who "is love!"—There is nothing here clear or definite, but enough perhaps to interest the heart and employ advantageously the

<sup>i</sup> Hom. p. 421.

<sup>k</sup> 1 John i. 5.

<sup>l</sup> 1 John iv. 16.

thoughts of those who already worship the Triune Jehovah as a Personal God.

It is a more esoteric, and a deeper view of what in relative Theology appears as “mercy and truth<sup>m</sup>.” For “love” is “mercy” in the abstract, without the idea of a practical application, and “light” is Truth, not yet reduced to propositions, but in itself—at once the instrument and the object of the self-reflection of that God which it is. “Light” and “love!”—the notion of light adds purity to that of love—the notion of love adds warmth to that of light. And we feel, rather than understand, what the perfect union of both must be in a perfect spiritual essence. And borrowing the method of interpretation of earlier days, when men wrote for piety and not for criticism, one might apply to the work of our redemption the words of David’s prayer, changed into a thanksgiving, and thank God for having sent Him who is both his light and his truth<sup>n</sup>, to “lead” us by the guidance of His Coequal Spirit and “bring us to his holy hill and to his dwelling!”

Yes, my brethren, we, who are so ignorant of these things now, that we can scarcely imagine what it must be to know them, and who are so unworthy of such knowledge that we should not dare to hope for it, were it not for the promise which we have of being clothed with the mantle of *His* worthiness, we shall be led thither to where, far above the heaven of heavens, the Blessed Three who are One, both

<sup>m</sup> Ps. lxxxv. 10.

<sup>n</sup> Ps. xliii. 3.

self and mutually involved in Trinal Unity, exist°, “dwelling in unapproachable light,”—we shall be led thither for the sake, and in the name, and by the power, of Him our own Incarnate Love, who has said, in his voice of sweet severity, “If any man serve me, let him follow me; and where I am, there shall also my servant be.”

° Damascene says the Persons exist ἐν ἀλληλαίς, and he gives the least inadequate *positive* illustration (borrowing it probably from Gregory Nazianzene Or. 31. c. 14. p. 565. Ed. Benedict.) of the Trinity in Unity that I have read. Improving on Athanasius, who uses that of the sun, where there is the disk, the light, the ray, he employs that of three suns, *applied* to each other, which might thus lose their unity to our senses, keeping it to our thoughts. I call this *the least inadequate*, for of course none can be adequate, and for this reason negative illustrations are better than positive. And it is worth while to contrast the two in a particular case. Hooker (Eccl. Pol. v. c. li. 1.) illustrates the subsistence of the Persons in the Trinity from the case of men—“Every person hath his own subsistence which none other besides hath, although there be others besides that are of the same substance. As no man but Peter can be the person which Peter is, yet Paul hath the self-same nature with Peter.” Damascene on the other hand (lib. 1. vol. 1. p. 139) and Beveridge (on Art. 1) use the same illustration negatively to exhibit the Unity, and in doing so establish the Personality without any attempt to explain it, which can only be erroneous. Hooker’s way of using it seems to me dangerous.

## LECTURE IV.

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1 THESS. v. 23.

*The very God of peace sanctify you wholly ; and I pray  
God your whole spirit and soul and body be preserved  
blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.*

WE endeavoured in the last lecture to do justice to the wisdom and modesty which has been shewn both by the Church Catholic and by our own branch of it, in that they have not ventured to follow the Deity, from that middle ground on which he has designed to commune with redeemed humanity, into the inner sanctuary of the Divine Life. So far from this being the case, we saw that in our most laboured, and seemingly most aspiring, form the province of positive doctrinal precision is extremely limited, and that it consists mainly of a defensive construction of verbal and, so far as the subject is apprehended, notional, barriers against the inroads of unchastened speculation. Not drawing near to see “why the bush is not burned,” not asking curious questions as to the nature of Him who both in the new and old dispensation appears in this respect with almost equal mystery as the unknown “I am,” but contented with



having seen an instance of his power, and received an assurance of His good will, we have stood "with our shoes off" on the holy ground, in part to admire and worship Him in His inconceivable and inexpressible glory, but chiefly to hear and accept our own appointed mission, which, whatever its apparent hardships may be, and however unpromising its commencement, must, we are sure, prosper at last, through Him who has experimentally "known *our* sorrows" and who has promised to be with us "always, even unto the end of the world."

But who is He that is with us? and how will He thus be present? and what is our especial need of His presence? and what means have we of being assured of it?

To answer these questions, or rather to give the Church's answer to them, will be the object of the present lecture. And we shall have, I think, occasion to congratulate ourselves on the humility and discretion which are displayed in the scriptural simplicity of that answer. For simple and unsystematic, as well as scriptural, it most assuredly is, both in the more esoteric form in which it appears in the second portion of the Athanasian Creed, and in our second, ninth, tenth, and twenty-eighth Articles, and in the humbler and more practical, and one may say, incidental, teaching of the Catechism. When we consider that in these formularies is comprehended all that a Christian ought to know and believe with respect to those most deep and difficult questions, the Incarnation of our Blessed Lord, and His especial

presence with us, and the corruption and weakness of our own nature, and the connection between His especial presence and the removal of this weakness and corruption, we cannot fail to admit, on the one hand, that no over-refinement has been allowed to mar the simplicity of that view which is enforced upon the Clergy and presented to the educated Laity, or, on the other hand, that the unlearned among the Laity have been left at once without burthen and without risk.

A very few words on the latter position will suffice, and will indeed illustrate the former sufficiently to enable us at once to proceed to contrast the view of our Church on this subject, whether for her Clergy or for her Laity, with certain more technical and would-be philosophical views which have been put forward. A Layman then of the Church of England believes with regard to the nature of our Blessed Lord<sup>a</sup>, regarded now as man, that he was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary, and that he suffered and died—and whatever else is asserted of Him in the Apostles' Creed. A Clergyman is called upon to say, with more particularity, that He “took man's nature in the womb of the Blessed Virgin of her substance,” or that He is “man of the substance of His mother, born in the world”—and moreover that the nature which He thus assumed was exactly

<sup>a</sup> To avoid misconception I may as well say that the Nestorian error is not explicitly mentioned in these statements, because the subject of all these propositions is the Second Person in the Trinity.

similar (I do not use the word “self-same<sup>b</sup>”) in its respective parts to that with which every man is born, that he is, in other words, “perfect man,” “having a *reasonable* soul,” as distinguished from the principle of life, or the animal soul, which was all that the Apollinarians conceded to Him<sup>c</sup> (even when they allowed Him to have assumed more than a human body,) and again, in opposition both to Docetæ and Eutychians, that He has an actual human body, by which He *truly*, and not in appearance, suffered and died, and rose and ascended, and sitteth on the right hand of God, and shall come to judgment; that He is, in short, “*very* as well as *perfect*” man. The difference between the more explicit and the more implicit view is extremely slight, and moreover bears upon the face of it the same intention of excluding error which we saw in the last lecture was the general object of the Athanasian Creed. Yet when we remember that the word “substance” is used in an immaterial sense of God and Christ as Son of God, and also in a material sense of Christ as Son of man, and that to explain this equivocation is a matter of absolute necessity, in order to prevent either anthropomorphism with regard to God, or unreality with regard to our Lord’s manhood, and that the distinction between the two parts of the soul (which is in-

<sup>b</sup> The reason I object to this word, which is used by Hooker, is, that it seems to favour the mystical notion which makes human nature an *entity*, and indirectly to countenance the error of *substance* and *nature* being equivalent terms in Theology.

<sup>c</sup> See Socr. Eccl. Hist. ii. 46. 11. Aug. Hæres. 55. and Theodoret. Hæret. Fab. lib. v. c. 11.

icated perhaps and perhaps condemned by the word “*reasonable*,”) is of a recondite and philosophical character, while the error of the Docetæ is the offspring of a fantastic, and that of the Eutychians of a somewhat morbid piety—one can see a good reason why the simpler faith of those who are not ordinarily called upon to teach or defend the *doctrine* of the Incarnation should be left unembarrassed by these distinctions, which, though necessary with a view to excluding error, and satisfactory perhaps to some minds as a mere matter of sound knowledge on a high subject, nevertheless do not in the least degree add to a man’s orthodoxy, supposing him to be already orthodox.

And so with regard to the nature of each child of Adam, its temptations, needs, and hopes. Whoever learns the Catechism is taught that he is “by nature born in sin, and a child of wrath,” and that, even now that he is made “a child of grace,” he has occasion to *renounce* the devil, the world, and the flesh,—and indirectly that he cannot *believe* without “God’s help,” which however he trusts to have as being in “a state of salvation,” and for which he declares his intention, or more strictly speaking his practice, of praying; and he is taught, directly and explicitly, that he cannot “do,” that he cannot “walk in the commandments of God and serve Him without His *special* grace,” which he must *not* calculate on receiving merely because he is in this state of salvation, but must “at all times call for by diligent prayer.” And lastly, he is taught to believe that “the body and

blood of Christ are verily and indeed taken and received by the faithful in the Lord's Supper" to "the strengthening and refreshing of our souls."

If now we compare these concrete statements with the more abstract statements of the ninth, tenth, and twenty-eighth Articles, we find that the teaching is exactly the same; that "original sin," "the fault and corruption of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam," the natural *inclination to evil*, the "lusting of the flesh against the spirit,"—the just liability to punishment under which every one is born, but which is removed from those who believe and are baptized (or as the Latin Article arranges the words in better accordance with the *practice* of a Pædobaptist Church, "those who are baptized and believe ("renatis et credentibus")—the necessity of preventing grace, and this constant and continued,—and finally, the Communion, by faith, of the body and blood of Christ,—have been all duly and practically, though in a simple and for the most part untechnical manner, set before every Christian, with a view to Confirmation and the consequent entrance, by partaking of the Lord's Supper, into the full communion of the Church. With regard indeed to the last-mentioned point the teaching of the Catechism is undoubtedly bolder than that of the Articles, (though not than that of the Homily on the Sacrament,) the "*verily and indeed taken and received*," bearing marks of that precision, which in the case of the doctrine of the Trinity and Incarnation appeared in the Articles, but was not thought necessary

in the less explicit teaching of the Catechism. And the same is no doubt the case with regard to the first influences of preventing grace, and so, by implication, with regard to the ordinary effects of baptism. The "grace of God by Christ preventing us" which is stated in the tenth Article to be necessary before any child of Adam can call upon his God, is undoubtedly assumed as being given, in some elementary sense or degree, to every child who is directed to say "I pray"—"I pray unto God to give me His grace that I may continue unto my life's end" in that "state of salvation to which I was called at my baptism." And in a future lecture I shall have occasion to shew that it does not appear to have entered into the mind of our early Reformers to suppose that any one would take upon himself to bring the Doctrine of Election to bear, in a discriminating and exclusive sense, on the baptismal service, but that they regarded this doctrine rather as esoteric, and when treated thus, as a most valuable supplement and bulwark of that doctrine of free grace which is the keystone of their Christian system, as it must be the foundation of our personal hopes.

Nor is there any reason to think that they would have shrunk from the language used in the second part of the Catechism (which, as we know, was added later,) with regard to the Holy Communion, for the strongest possible language on this subject is used and maintained by Cranmer in his Book on the Lord's Supper<sup>d</sup>, though used (it is true) *exclusively*

<sup>d</sup> "I never said that Christ is utterly absent, but I ever affirmed

in a spiritual sense, and moreover extended specially to Baptism, and generally to other acts of devotion performed by Christian men.

With these exceptions (if indeed they<sup>e</sup> are to be considered exceptions) the doctrine of the Catechism entirely agrees with that of the Articles; the only difference being that the former is taught practically and in a supposed particular instance, while the latter is theoretical and general, and therefore natu-

that he is truly and spiritually present, and truly and spiritually exhibited unto the godly receivers:" p. 127. Ed. Parker Soc. and further on he is "really present . . . that is to say, indeed, and yet but spiritually." And in p. 138 he makes no objection to the strong expressions used by old authors, but only concludes that "they are to be understood either of His divine nature (whereby he is everywhere) or else they must be understood figuratively, or spiritually. For figuratively he is in the bread and wine, and spiritually he is in them that worthily eat and drink the bread and wine, but really, carnally, and corporally, he is only in heaven;" but see again p. 140, "Christ is really, (that is to say, not in fantasy nor imagination, but verily and truly) not only in them that duly receive the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, but also in them that duly receive the Sacrament of Baptism, and in all other truly Christian people when they receive no Sacrament;" but p. 141, "I never said of the whole Supper that it is but a signification or a bare memory of Christ's death, but I teach that it is a spiritual refreshing wherein our souls be fed and nourished with Christ's very flesh and blood to eternal life."

<sup>e</sup> Perhaps they are not exceptions, and the greater boldness of the language of the Catechism on both Sacraments, and its apparently greater explicitness even, on the Lord's Supper, should rather be attributed to the absence of explanation, which in a subject, on which men are accustomed to think, and which is capable of something more than mere verbal expansion, has naturally this effect.—N. B. This note was part of the sermon as preached.

rally conveyed in more abstract terms, modified or expanded by kindred phrases, each having, more or less, a technical meaning.

The result of such a comparison is much the same as that to which we arrived by comparing the seemingly abstract words which are used, with regard to God's nature, by Theologians, with the more concrete phrases which express the same object. We see that it is harmony of periods, and facilities of controversy, (the latter, no doubt, sometimes valuable,) and not any real superiority in respect of belief, which is attained by the more scientific expressions. And I must add my own conviction, that while a humble Christian, who uses faithfully the simpler terms, can gain nothing whatever from the phraseology of his more learned brother, the latter may often learn a wholesome lesson, by forcing himself to put into simpler terms those doctrines to which he has become accustomed in their technical dress, and which may possibly for that reason exist in his own mind only after a technical and conventional manner. As to the point of equivalence, let me once more put the two results together. Is not one whose "fault and corruption" "deserves God's damnation," described almost better as "a child of wrath;" and he for whom "there is no condemnation," who is he but "a child of grace?" and he who actually prays by God's help to remain where he is, knows already that he could not have been put there without God; and he who gladly professes that "the body and blood of his Saviour are verily and indeed taken



and received by the faithful in the Lord's Supper," is in even a better position than the man whom the explicit statement has obliged to recognise the necessity of arguing against erroneous notions on this subject; notions which either reduce that Holy Supper to a mere sign or act of commemoration, stripping it of its efficacy and invisible working, or paring these down with a rationalistic precision; or on the other hand (with a view avowedly to exalt the solemn mystery, but too often, it must be feared, from a love of displaying their skill in explaining spiritual difficulties,) either bedizening it with metaphysical frippery, or degrading it by carnal superstitions.

Having thus, I hope, shewn that our Church, while making this common sense distinction between her members with respect to explicit knowledge on the points mentioned—the corruption of man's nature, the universal need, and the general promise of grace, and the particular means of attaining it held out in the Lord's Supper,—nevertheless teaches the same truths to all, and is as careful as she is considerate, I shall proceed to justify that absence of precision which most unquestionably exists in her most explicit statements on the essential nature of man, which is the subject of our present lecture. It may be thought indeed that in thus anticipating the mention of the Lord's Supper, instead of leaving it to be considered in that portion of our subject which will treat of the Institutions of Christ, I have unnecessarily embarrassed our present discussion; but the view which I take of that Holy Institution rendered such

a course inevitable. I may venture to add that I gave in the second of these lectures an indication of this when I mentioned that the word "flesh," in some passages, appeared to me more properly ranked among *transcendental* than among *metaphorical* terms, and I repeat now that I cannot consider that the passages in which this word occurs in such solemn combinations (I allude of course to the sixth chapter of St. John's Gospel) have been either shewn to be merely capable of application to the Lord's Supper, as distinct from being said of it prospectively, or so determined to a purely figurative interpretation, as to involve in either case the surrender of all distinctive connection of that Holy Ordinance with a peculiar personal influence of our Lord Jesus Christ regarded as man as well as God. Detesting as I do the virulent and unchristian sarcasm with which the learned author of the work on the Incarnation<sup>f</sup> attacks those who hold that the body and blood of Christ *in the Lord's Supper*, of which the bread and wine are a sign, are themselves a sign of some spiritual grace, that is to say that the *words* "body and blood of Christ" denote some special gift of the Holy Ghost, and not the actual body and blood of Christ, both God and man, who is in heaven,—wondering at the bigotted partisanship which could blind so acute an intellect as to render the statement possible that

<sup>f</sup> Wilberforce Doct. of Incarn. p. 341. note 15. where he says, "In speaking of this present influence of the God-man, Archbishop Whately mounts up from a denial of His efficacy to a denial of his existence." But see the next note.

to interpret these words thus is to deny the existence now of the human nature of Christ<sup>g</sup>—protesting also most strongly against the notion that the expressions of Cyril, too often exaggerated, are to be *our* standard of faith, and that we are forsooth theologically allied to Nestorianism<sup>h</sup>, or to Deism, in which Nestorianism results, because we may choose to believe that “the second Adam is a quickening spirit,”

<sup>g</sup> Commenting on the statement of Archbishop Whately (Sermons p. 285,) “the bread and wine not only are merely a sign, but are *a sign of a sign*; that is, they represent our Lord’s flesh and blood, and His flesh and blood again are a sign of something else,” Mr. Wilberforce says, “so that our Lord’s flesh and blood, *even if they existed formerly*, have now *at all events* no real existence.” (The Italics in this sentence are mine.) Did malice ever pen a better-worded sentence?

<sup>h</sup> “The body of Christ is life-giving, because it is the temple and dwelling-place of that living God, the Word,” &c. “Because He made that body which was taken of the pure Virgin his own, he rendered it life-giving, and very naturally, for it is the Body of that Life which is the parent of life to all things.” After quoting these expressions of Cyril (which say nothing about “humanity” or “manhood”) Mr. Wilberforce goes on to remark, “St. Cyril is spoken of by Dr. Jackson as generally acknowledged to be “the fittest umpire” in a controversy respecting Real Presence. If his statements are true, and they were countenanced by the universal Church as represented by the third general council, it follows that any school which denies the humanity of the Mediator to be the medium through which divine gifts are communicated to mankind (and such is the error of all Rationalists) is theologically allied either to Nestorianism, or to Deism, in which Nestorianism results.” p. 154 and 5. note. And Nestorius, we are told, (p. 152) “was a victim to that spurious sort of Nominalism which asserts, that because men are able by abstraction to class things together, which have no real connection, therefore there can be no such common entity as nature in the creations of God. (vide p. 36. 37).” So that unless we accept Mr. Wilberforce’s *entity*, we are inevitably Nestorians!

not by means of His humanity, (as distinct from His atonement and intercession which His assumption of human nature rendered, to our eyes, possible,) but by His own divinity and the divinity of the Coequal Spirit, *informed*, if one may use the expression, by the personal experience of our sorrows, which the Son of God has gained by means of that condescension according to which we call Him “the man Christ Jesus,”—holding I say earnestly these simpler and less physical views of our own Church on this subject, and taking my theology from her Articles and Homilies and Liturgy, and not from Cyril in ancient days, or Bucer<sup>h</sup> or Jackson<sup>i</sup>, or any other modern divine who has advocated these more *material* opinions, I nevertheless, my brethren, should wish to observe, with regard to this mysterious language, the same cautious reverence which I think distinguishes our Church, using, without any explanation and in the humble ignorance of an unreasoning faith, the words which we were all taught in our childhood, that “the body and blood of Christ are verily and indeed taken and received by the faithful in the Lord’s Supper,” and that we then spiritually eat His flesh and drink His blood, perhaps in some *especial* manner which we are utterly unable to define, and on which it is better for us not to think, but in any case with more certainty that we are doing so than we can have on any other occasion.

The view to which I have alluded, which regards

<sup>h</sup> Bucer’s views, however, had at least the merit of being undefined, which, on such a subject, any *positive* view ought to be.

<sup>i</sup> Quoted by Mr. Wilberforce, p. 166.

these words as expressive only of a spiritual gift, not especially connected with the *Person* of Christ, is no doubt more 'philosophical, and it is one which has a tendency to commend itself more and more to the minds of those who are revolted by the absurdities of transubstantiation, and the "philosophy and vain deceits" by which the learned author alluded to has paved a way for others, and perhaps trodden it himself, towards these absurdities, as well as towards other errors. And there can be no doubt that there is in many minds a growing feeling in favour of precision on one side or the other. I can remember (and some of my present hearers will, I think, have felt the like) a change of sentiment arising in my own mind on this subject, which strongly inclined me to the metaphorical interpretation, but which never in the remotest degree affected a constant belief in the continuance of the perfect humanity and intercession of Christ. But the veil of reverence which in early days throws a halo round the Holy Communion, as being in some way, which we do not understand, connected with the *Person* of the Saviour, is too delicate to stand the wear of theological collision; and the wretched attempts to define upon this subject and revive what Bishop Beveridge has called "the extravagant opinion of the Ubiquitarians, that the *human nature* of Christ is every where present," lead one to suspect of unreality that sense of a spiritual presence, (*informed*, as I before expressed it, by the human sympathies of Christ,) which one is fully conscious that one cannot bring forward into this sharp and hard prominence. Nor does the logical subtilty of

Hooker, endeavouring to steer as close as he can to ubiquitous expressions without being quite ubiquitous, exercise I think a salutary influence in this strife of opinion. There is a sense of logical correctness which, when it is called into play by attempts at too great precision, rejects such language as this, that "the manhood of Christ<sup>i</sup> may, after a sort, be every where said to be present, because that Person is every where present from whose divine substance *manhood is nowhere severed*." One has a conviction that there is an error here, and that the categories of time and place, of which the latter has been allowed to apply, in its natural meaning of local circumscription, to the ascended body of Christ, are confounded in this statement. We see that *never*, and not *nowhere*, severed, must be the true account, if the "where" of the body of Christ is fixed to be in heaven. And these objections attach, as it seems to me, to that "presence of force and efficacy" also, which is advocated by Hooker on grounds which appear to me to be founded on metaphysical assumptions akin to those which find their expression in transubstantiation, namely, that "His bodily *substance* hath every where a presence of true conjunction with Deity." For if, according to that simpler logic which is now for the most part acquiesced in, there is no such thing as His bodily substance apart from His actual human body, then such a presence as this is only called presence metaphorically, and the difficulty remains unaltered.

<sup>i</sup> Hooker Ecc. Pol. v. ch. lv. 8 and 9, vol. ii. pp. 310. and 313. Ed. Keble. And by *manhood* Hooker avowedly meant "body and soul."

From these metaphysical objections the presence of *information*, which I have ventured to suggest, is altogether free, and to me it appears to be full of support and holy comfort. But I am well aware that it may be disposed of at once, as being merely metaphorical, by those who wish for something more material, or more solid, or more metaphysical, or, as they would say, more real. What is there here, it would be said, but that *improper* presence by which a man is said to be present with a friend who is thoroughly acquainted with his wishes and designs?

But this I cannot admit. For though it be perfectly true, and necessary to be believed, that it is only the Word, and not the Father or the Holy Ghost, who "was made flesh," yet we must remember that, for all this, They are one with Him, and He is one with Them; and though I, for one, should shrink from saying with Hooker<sup>k</sup>, that since the Incarnation "we cannot conceive of God, without man, exercising power, or receiving praise," (for that seems to me to be in effect mere Sabellianism,) yet even as "he who searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit<sup>l</sup>," so we may suppose that the Spirit knows perfectly the mind of the Son, and partakes therefore of that experimental knowledge of our wants and infirmities, (which the Incarnate Word has acquired,) in a far more intimate, and one may say, *natural* sense, than that in which any man can be said to be acquainted with the mind of a friend, however true-hearted and however intimate.

<sup>k</sup> Eccl. Pol. v. ch. liv. 6.

<sup>l</sup> Rom. viii. 2.

Let it be said with Damascene, whom Hooker quotes<sup>m</sup>, (and something of the kind must of course be said,) that the Father and the Spirit took part in the Incarnation only by consent and will, still let us remember that Damascene has also dared to say that the distinction of the Persons in the Trinity *which we make* only exists in thought<sup>n</sup>, that is to say, that it does not interfere with their actual unity<sup>o</sup>, but, though real, is to us so unintelligible, as to partake rather of the character of a conception, than of a distinct fact. I do not at all bind myself to the correctness of this language, but I do think it worth our while to beware that, in avoiding Sabellianism, (which is in truth the danger only of philosophical minds,) we do not introduce (as Gregory Nazianzen tells us was done by the extremely orthodox of his day) a kind of Christian Tritheism<sup>p</sup>.

I know it will be said by some who have taken

<sup>m</sup> De Fid. Orth. lib. iii. c. 11. quoted in Eccl. Pol. v. li. 2.

<sup>n</sup> Θεωρεῖται οὐ πράγματι ἀλλ' ἐπινόῳα.—De Fid. Orth. lib. i. tom. i. p. 139.

<sup>o</sup> This is the evident meaning of Damascene, and in enforcing it he contrasts the case of God and man in this respect. In the case of God the Godhead is the prominent Reality, the distinction of Persons being only “in thought,” while in the case of man the distinction of persons is, or the separate persons are, the reality, the oneness of *nature* being merely notional. And there is a good note of the editor, shewing how completely Gregory Nazianzene was against the notion of human nature being an *entity*, a fancy which Gregory of Nyssa (in a moment of philosophizing, suggests the Editor, not theologizing) had appeared to countenance.

<sup>p</sup> Τίνες τῶν ἀγὰν παρ' ἡμῶν ὀρθοδόξων. Orat. II. c. 37. tom. i. p. 30.



their views of this subject from Hooker, and expect therefore some logical statement, which they may admire as such, that this "presence of information" falls short of their ideas of Christ's presence, and of that "mixture of his flesh with ours<sup>q</sup>," as distinct from "his bodily substance," which Hooker tells us the Fathers unhesitatingly maintain.

But let us try the matter by the language of our own Church. The strongest passage, I think, and that which seems at first sight to favour the idea of Cyril, that the body or flesh of the Saviour is the source of life, is that in which we pray, "that our sinful bodies may be made clean by His Body, and our souls washed through His most precious blood<sup>r</sup>." But does not a nearer investigation of this passage entirely overthrow such an interpretation of it? Is it not clear that if any *physical* effect had been designed there would not have been an attribution of moral effects to a material cause in the second clause, "our *souls* washed through his most precious blood?" Body to be purified by body, and *blood* by

q "The mixture of his bodily substance with ours is a thing which the ancient Fathers disclaim. Yet the mixture of his flesh with ours they speak of, to signify what our very bodies, through mystical conjunction, receive from that vital efficacy which we know to be in his." Eccl. Pol. vol. ii. p. 322. b. v [9]. For the first point he quotes Cyprian (de Cœn. Dom. c. 6.), who says, "nostra quippe et ipsius conjunctio nec miscet personas nec unit substantias, sed affectus consociat et confœderat voluntates," where the positive part of the sentence, we may observe, militates equally against *both* views.

r Holy Communion. Address, or Prayer before Prayer of Consecration.

blood is the only logical and exact account of the matter, and therefore the figurative and objective language of the second clause must, I think, be allowed to qualify and determine the seemingly literal and subjective meaning of the first. I speak of the language of the second clause as objective, because the washing of the *soul* by the *blood* of Christ must necessarily refer to justification, or at least to sanctification with especial reference to his atonement and "all other benefits of his passion." And the passage in the Homily on the Sacrament, which seems to favour these more mystical views, admits, if it does not require, a like simple explanation<sup>r</sup>. "They surely trust to win their bodies a resurrection to immortality"—it is plain, after a little consideration, that "immortality" must here mean immortal *happiness*, for no one could, I suppose, affirm that the never-ending existence of the wicked in hell depended upon the infusion into their polluted natures of some seed of immortality through the Sacrament<sup>s</sup>. So that we must, I think, allow that no positive argument can be drawn from this language in favour of our Lord's *humanity* being the source of our life; though our life may depend upon that spiritual assistance which none but a mediator at once human and divine could have vouchsafed or derived to us. In truth the Homilist, I take it, meant to say that neither part of us should be without the benefit of the imparted sacrifice of Christ,

<sup>r</sup> Hom. p. 398.

<sup>s</sup> Some, one might add, would never even receive the outward element.

that not only our souls, which we might naturally conclude were affected by such benefits, but our bodies also were to be exalted, refined, and, in a high and happy sense, immortalized. And before quitting this portion of the subject, let me press these considerations upon all.—The language, in which these things are spoken of, is certainly equivocal, perhaps it is transcendental. You cannot, we never shall be able in this life to, say what is exactly meant by “eating the flesh and drinking the blood of Christ.” We may be wrong in treating these words as a mere metaphor<sup>t</sup>, though we should of course be more wrong in interpreting them quite literally. Is not a more comprehensive way open to us? May we not agree to say, “this is one of the ‘mysteries of our redemption’<sup>u</sup>: I shall therefore obey, though I do not understand,—and I shall use these solemn words, without pretending to define their meaning, trusting to have them hereafter explained to me in heaven.”—Let none therefore define, but let all revere and love,—let none pretend to interpret, but let all repeat with humble reverence, catching perhaps every now and then some glimpse of the hidden meaning.

In turning now to the general subject before us, the essential nature of man, and therein of our Saviour Christ, it is indeed a comfort to think that

<sup>t</sup> Cranmer in the passages quoted above, interprets the words metaphorically in the first instance, but spiritually in the case of a faithful receiver of the Sacrament. This is his own distinction.

<sup>u</sup> Hom. p. 244.

no fanciful absurdities and no curious refinements have been admitted into the formularies of our Church.

The nature of man is, it is true, spoken of, but it is not spoken of as an "entity<sup>x</sup>," a "real bond<sup>y</sup>," "an actual connexion," a "mysterious<sup>z</sup> principle of transmitted life," a something, not indeed existing otherwise than in persons, but nevertheless so real, that to deny its existence is to deny the manhood of Christ<sup>a</sup>, and to reduce "the doctrines of atonement and sanctification, though confessed in words," to a "mere empty phraseology." Nothing of this kind, we may thank God, appears in the formularies of our Church. Nor are the natural consequences of this extravagant ebullition of realistic materialism<sup>b</sup>

<sup>x</sup> Wilberforce *Doct. of Incarn.* p. 42. See also p. 46 ad fin. and 47.

<sup>y</sup> *Ibid.* p. 31.

<sup>z</sup> *Ibid.* p. 32.

<sup>a</sup> *Ibid.* p. 44. "Now this is the fact declared when it is stated that Christ took man's nature: it implies the reality of a common humanity, and His *perfect and entire entrance into its ranks*. Thus did he assume a common relation to all mankind. This is why the existence of human nature is a thing too precious to be surrendered to the subtleties of logic, because on its existence depends that real manhood of Christ, which renders him a copartner with ourselves." As if God could not create two beings in all things like, ("sin only except") and one deriving his bodily form from the other, by a miracle substituted for the ordinary method of propagation, without there being an objective entity for them both to participate. For when the "real manhood" of Christ is made to depend on this theory, it is childish to talk of it (see pp. 41. 42. and 52.) as merely a probable opinion. It is clearly made essential.

<sup>b</sup> Mr. Wilberforce naturally disclaims any such tendencies, and thinks that he sufficiently guards against the error of realism by

obtruded upon us. We are not involved in the difficulty, (which besets those who, like this learned author, think it necessary to account for as much as possible,) of making a plan beforehand, by which our Lord should assume an abstract nature, in order that he might be thus connected with the whole

confining his entities to organized beings. But in their case his language is that of the grossest realism.—He tells us for instance (p. 29) that “there is the singular phænomenon that qualities will sometimes come out in individuals of a race, for which *we cannot account*,” (this is the key to many of his vagaries,) “except by supposing them to have been buried, if such an expression may be used, in the collective nature, till favourable opportunities allowed them to reappear. Abundant instances of the kind are afforded by the physical history of man. To this principle we must refer the fact, that peculiarities which were accidentally present, as it would seem, in the heads of any particular subdivision of some natural class, are commonly, but not perpetually transmitted to their descendants.” And we are favoured with this note, “Looking lower in the scale of creation, it is often observed, *that from two horses of the same colour will arise a progeny which bears no likeness at all to the colour of its parents.*” Surely physical theories of this kind are strangely out of place in Theology. Again we are asked, “unless there be some principle of interdependency among organized beings, why is not the same variety apparent? (as in throwing dice.) Why should not such anomalies as Virgil attributes to culture be the ordinary law?”

*Castanææ fagus, ornusque incanuit albo*

*Flore pyri: glandemque sues fregere sub ulmis.*”—pp. 33, 34.

So, to account for the difference of colour in horses, an equine, and for the absence of chestnut-blossoms on beech-trees, arboreal natures are evolved! And the idea suggested by the Psalm, “Thine eyes did see my substance yet being imperfect: and in thy book were all my members written;” is scouted as “Creatianism.” It is true that he rejects “the Deistic notion of Transcendence, which supposes that the qualities of matter having been bestowed

race. We hold, on the contrary, that our Lord's body, made of the "undefiled substance<sup>b</sup>" of the blessed Virgin, and his soul in due time breathed in him by God, were *his* soul and body, and that of no one else, thus making Him very Christ. But beyond the fact that he has a soul and body, like ours, we do not go. Not thinking therefore that he took to himself any actual *entity*, but a human body, made in the womb of the Virgin by the Spirit's operation, and in due time informed with a human soul, we are not concerned to remove from that manhood, which he "took into God," any derived corruption or imperfection. Our learned author, on the other hand, is obliged to try his hand at this emendation. And the result is, that that "inclination to evil," which our Articles tell us is every man's lot, is softened down into "weakness<sup>c</sup>" and "disorganization."

This is indeed a favourite and frequent view with those who attempt to give us a more deep and

upon it by its Maker, everything has been left to go on by the impulse which was originally bestowed," and contends for the principle of "God's Immanence," telling us "it is *probable*" ("a real change in the whole nature of those who are acted upon in" sacraments is spoken of as "*certain*," on the ground of "distinct declarations of God's word" p. 335) "that matter depends for its existence upon the constant efficacy of God's power and presence." —But "though every individual specimen of humanity be God's creation, why should it not be his pleasure to exercise his creative powers by a law of mutual interdependency?" p. 33; and further on, "the preservation of the race of man is made to grow out of that quickening impulse which we call the life of humanity."

<sup>b</sup> Hom. p. 470.

<sup>c</sup> See pp. 51 and 63.

thoughtful view of human nature than is attempted by merely Christian writers. There is something which appeals to human sympathy in an account which deals tenderly with human corruption. And I must venture to include among such writers one whom I have been taught in this place to reverence, and to whom I feel that I owe much, I mean bishop Butler, a writer who, besides his other excellencies, has, by applying to scriptural subjects those powers of moral analysis which he so eminently possessed, incited and enabled many from time to time to enter more deeply into the recesses of the human heart. Still, upon the point in question, he appears to me to have taken a too heroic view of human nature. For when he says that evil passions are but perversions of what is naturally good, envy, for instance<sup>d</sup>, of emulation, he seems to me to confound an abstract view of what man ought to have been, and may be supposed to be, with that which he actually is. Unless his account be candidly admitted to be a mere matter of arrangement, I should be inclined to say that it is false; and that, although you can analyse envy so as to represent it as “emulation using bad means to attain its object,” yet as a matter of fact it exists *at once* in all men’s minds as envy, as an evil passion; a fact to which Aristotle himself appears to bear witness, when in the second book of the *Ethics*<sup>e</sup> he tells us, that there are some passions, in

<sup>d</sup> Serm. I. note p. 17. Oxf. ed. 1826.

<sup>e</sup> Lib. ii. c. 6. 18. ed. Bekk.

naming which men at once fix upon a word which has a connotation of wickedness<sup>f</sup>.

The learned author to whom I have alluded most likely smiles now at the unartistic stepping-stones on which he has passed over at last to the firm ground of the Immaculate Conception, which does away with any minor difficulties as to the nature which was assumed by the Saviour, even as he has doubtless willingly embraced Transubstantiation as something far more solid than his own abstract Ubiquitarianism. No doubt also he has gladly developed the qualified expression of our Church, which declares that concupiscence and lust have of themselves "the nature of sin," into the bold denial of there being anything properly called sin in that *fomes*<sup>g</sup> or mere material of evil, which, according to Rome, is all that remains in those who are regenerate. We use indeed the milder term, "nature of sin," (if it is really milder and not only more philosophical,) instead of the "truly and properly sin" of the Augustan Confession, but we are not at all influenced by the fear of including our Lord *in any* statement on the subject, (and the statements of the Homilies are extremely strong<sup>h</sup>,) because, having no faith in a

<sup>f</sup> "Ἐντα εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος, οἶον ἐπι-  
χαιρεκακία ἀναισχυντία φθόνος . . . . . πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα  
ψέγεται τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ' αἱ  
ἐλλείψεις.

<sup>g</sup> Manere autem in baptizatis concupiscentiam vel fœmitem hæc sancta synodus et fatetur et sentit. Conc. Trident. Sessio quinta 1546.

<sup>h</sup> See Hom. "On the Misery of Man," and "On the Nativity."



transmitted *entity*, (which no one can be man without taking,) we regard our Lord as standing in this respect “alone;” through the power, I will say again, which could purify for His own purpose of love the substance of the ever blessed Virgin which was undefiled elsei.

It remains only to say a few words on the manner in which our Church has treated, or left alone, the psychological division which appears to be made in the text. The Trichotomy of human nature, as the Germans<sup>k</sup> call it, was, as we know, introduced into the Church under unhappy auspices, and led to the Apollinarian<sup>l</sup> errors, and Gieseler observes<sup>m</sup> that from that time forth, this Platonic division was regarded as heretical. I call it Platonic, for Plato<sup>n</sup> first introduced it; but Aristotle, whom we rather follow here, no doubt teaches it also; only with his singular good sense he is at the pains to tell us that he only does so<sup>o</sup> with a view to arrangement; and I believe his testimony is against the existence of any actual division of the rational and irrational parts of the soul. In the text, (supposing it to contemplate this division,) the former appears represented by the word “spirit,” the latter by the generic word

i Hom. “Her undefiled substance.”

k Olshausen gives this name to the threefold division, and attaches great importance to it.

<sup>l</sup> Socr. Hist. Eccl. ii. 46.

<sup>m</sup> Eccl. Hist. i. p. 205, note 20. Eng. Tr.

<sup>n</sup> De Repub. iv. p. 349.

<sup>o</sup> Eth. Nic. i. 13. 9, 10.

“soul,” which on this occasion, (as the adjective ψυχικὸς<sup>p</sup>, which we render “natural” and “sensual,”) is appropriated to the lower part of it. If one were now to be asked which is the most precise expression of our Church on this subject, one would choose that in the Athanasian Creed, which does not explicitly enter into this refinement, but speaks of a “reasonable soul and flesh” being “one man.” For when we consider the object with which the word “flesh” is used here, we must regard it as equivalent to “body,” (and the two words are used indifferently in the Apostles’ Creed<sup>q</sup>,) though of course the word itself will bear, and indeed frequently has in Scripture, and especially in St. Paul’s writings, the meaning, either of man’s nature as he is, without reference to God and the influence of the Spirit, or of the body and all those feelings and passions which use the body for their instrument, and are (one must not I think say without qualification, originated, but) certainly acted and reacted upon by it. But here it must mean the body, because the division, being designed to illustrate the Union of the Godhead and manhood in the Person of Christ, must necessarily be exclusive. But when the soul, which is joined with the body, is called *reasonable*, we have [as I said before when speaking of the application of the same term to the soul of Christ] no means of judging whether the

<sup>p</sup> 1 Cor. ii. 14; xv. 44: Jude 19.

<sup>q</sup> In Morning and Evening Prayer, and Catechism—“Body;” in Baptismal Offices and Visitation of the Sick—“Flesh.”

word *reasonable* is merely a conventional epithet of the soul, or whether on the contrary the author meant to call our especial attention to the fact of every soul being necessarily *reasonable*, and so indirectly to condemn the Platonic division of the Apollinarians.

But if the Trichotomy be rejected here (as I think it probably is) as a needless refinement, which had been used for purposes of error, it may be said to appear in effect in the Ninth Article. For the struggle between the flesh and the spirit, which is there spoken of, involves, both in the Article itself, and still more in the details of that chapter in the epistle to the Galatians<sup>r</sup>, from which it appears to be taken, a division of the soul, at least for the purpose of discussion, into those higher faculties which are adopted and strengthened by the Spirit of God, and into those lower portions of it, which, acting often in concert with the body, but sometimes alone, cause in unregenerate man a fearful struggle<sup>s</sup>, which continues even in the regenerate, the grand difference

<sup>r</sup> Gal. v. 16-23. In the Romans (vii. 23 and 25) the word "mind" occupies the place of "spirit" as opposed to "flesh."

<sup>s</sup> Aristotle has given us a description of this struggle in language which bears a striking resemblance to that of St. Paul in the Epistle to the Romans. "Besides the animal part of the soul (*θρεπτικὸν ἢ αἰσθητικὸν*) there seems," he says, *Eth. Nic. i. 13*, "to be another irrational part, which however in some way partakes of reason," which he maintains by an analysis of the contest between right and wrong in the mind both of the man of self-control and the weak-minded man (*ἐγκρατὴς* and *ἀκρατὴς*). Τοῦ γὰρ ἐγκρατοῦς καὶ ἀκρατοῦς τὸν λόγον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ λόγον ἔχον ἐπαινοῦμεν· ἀρθῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ βέλτιστα παρακαλεῖ· φαίνεται δ' ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ ἄλλο

being; that in the latter case, the faint tendencies towards good which *may* be regarded as spoken of under the name of spirit, are at once freed for the contest, and taken under the especial guidance and championship of the Spirit of God; though when we

τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκὸς, ὁ μάχεται τε καὶ ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ. Compare this with βλέπω δὲ ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου ἀντιωτρατενόμενον τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοῦς μου, καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζοντά με τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσί μου (Rom. vii. 23). Compare again (Eth. ix. 4) διαφέρονται γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ ἑτερῶν μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄλλα δὲ βούλονται, οἷον οἱ ἀκρατεῖς· αἰροῦνται γὰρ ἀντὶ τῶν δοκούντων ἑαυτοῖς ἀγαθῶν εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα βλαβερά ὄντα, with (Rom. vii. 18) οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ οἰκεί ἐν ἐμοί, τοῦτεστιν ἐν σαρκὶ μοῦ ἀγαθόν, τὸ γὰρ θέλειν παράκειται μοι, τὰ δὲ κατεργάζεσθαι τὸ καλὸν οὐ γνώσκω· οὐ γὰρ ὁ θέλω ποιῶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὁ οὐ θέλω κακὸν τοῦτο πράσσω.—And, for the result of the struggle, compare στασιάζει αὐτῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἀλγεί ἀπεχομένων τίνων τὸ δὲ ἡδεται [St. Paul uses the religious συνήδομαι (τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ) κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον] καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῦρο τὸ δ' ἐκείσε ἔλκει ὥσπερ διασπῶνται. Εἰ δὲ μὴ οἷον τε ἅμα λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἡδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μετὰ μικρόν γε λυπεῖται ὅτι ἡσθη, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐβούλετο ἡδέα ταῦτα γενέσθαι αὐτῷ· μεταμελείας γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι γέμουσιν——εἰ δὴ τὰ οὕτως ἔχειν λίαν ἐστὶν ἄθλιον φευκτέον τὴν μοχθηρίαν διοτεταμένως καὶ πειρατέον ἐπιεικῇ εἶναι, Ibid.—(but see the avowed inadequacy of such exhortations in Eth. x. 10) with ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος· τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου; εὐχαριστῶ τῷ θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν—Rom. vii. 24, 25. The only question is, Is the inclination to *good* to be regarded in either case as independent of the Spirit of God? And here the answer of our Reformers would certainly have been No,—“If any goodness be in us to refer all laud and praise for the same to Almighty God,” (Hom. p. 428,) compared with p. 425, where the “invention” which led to subdue animals, and to “so many and divers devices in all crafts and sciences” is ascribed to the “goodness of Almighty God,” being “present with men, and *stirring* their wits and studies of purpose, &c.” This inclination to good is not however explicitly mentioned, because “the soul,” (Hom. p. 428,) is regarded as being already the subject of “grace.”

thus speak of Him as the ordinary agent in our regeneration, we do not fail to think also of Him “who loved us.” But it must be observed that all which the Church is careful to state and insist on, is the *existence* of this contest between the flesh and the spirit,—that is to say, (for all practical purposes,) between those natural inclinations which a man finds within him, which have no reference to the will of God, and those inclinations which she tells him are *not* natural, which lead him, in a low state of spiritual life, to wish and to strive to perform that will, and, in a higher state, to love it and find his delight in it. The philosophical arrangement of those elements which cause the struggle, is interesting rather than important. So that there would be no objection if, with Chrysostom<sup>t</sup>, we were to pass over the distinction, dwelling rather on the Apostle’s affection towards his converts, as shewn in his Christian prayer. At the same time we are quite at liberty with Augustine<sup>u</sup> and Calvin<sup>x</sup> to adopt this Trichotomy of man, and to consider “spirit” to be here used for

<sup>t</sup> Hom. on the text.

<sup>u</sup> “Dicitur spiritus et ipsa mens rationalis, ubi est quidam tanquam oculus animæ ad quem pertinet imago et agnitio Dei.” August. tom. III. p. ii. p. 302 C.

<sup>x</sup> Comment. on text, vol. vii. Amstel. 1667. “Notanda est autem hæc hominis partitio; nam aliquando homo simpliciter corpore et anima constare dicitur; ac tunc anima spiritum immortalem significat qui in corpore habitat tanquam in domicilio. Quoniam autem duæ præcipuæ sunt animæ facultates, intellectus et voluntas, scriptura interdum distincte hæc duo ponere solet quum exprimere vult animæ vim ac naturam. Sed tunc anima pro sede affectuum capitur, ut sit pars spiritui opposita. Ergo

the higher part of the soul, to which an individual prominence is given, while "soul" either is the genus mentioned again, without regard to logic, or else is used specifically for the lower part of it. Nor again could any one blame us, if, with Jeremy Taylor<sup>y</sup>, we chose to think that by "spirit" is here meant a new element imparted to every regenerate person. But of this I shall speak in the next Lecture; and I shall only observe with regard to the view of Augustine and Calvin and Olshausen, which I am inclined to adopt, that when we interpret "spirit" here as part of our nature, we must nevertheless include in our view an especial reference to the influence of the Holy Spirit on this part of our souls. I cannot for a moment think, with Calvin<sup>z</sup>,

*quum hic audimus nomen spiritus, sciamus notari rationem vel intelligentiam, sicut animæ nomine designatur voluntas et omnis affectus.*" Others put the "will" in the "Spirit."

<sup>y</sup> "Every man naturally consists of soul and body; but every Christian man that belongs to Christ hath more, for he hath body, soul, and spirit. My text (Rom. viii. 9, 10) is plain for it. 'If any man have not the Spirit of Christ he is none of His.' And by 'Spirit' is not meant only the graces of God and his gifts, enabling us to do holy things: there is more that belongs to a good man than so—by the Spirit of a new life we are made new creatures, &c.—And this is called 'the seed of God' (1 John iii. 9) when it relates to the principle and cause of this production, but the thing that is produced is a spirit, and that is as much in nature beyond a soul as a soul is beyond a body." And then he appeals to our present text in support of his view. Works, iv. pp. 347, 348. ed. Eden.

<sup>z</sup> After giving his interpretation (as above) he goes on to say, "Scio a multis secus exponi Pauli verba; nam animam vocari putant motum vitalem, spiritum vero partem hominis renovatam

that a Christian apostle would talk of the "spirit" of his converts and spiritual children, without this connotation. He never, I feel sure, lost sight either in their case, or in his own, of the constant need of that divine assistance which made them, and alone could keep them, what they were.

Let then, in conclusion, the Trichotomy of human nature be made a matter of argument, but let us as Christians never think of our "spirit," without thinking also of that Spirit, which alone can "sanctify us wholly," and preserve both "spirit, soul, and body," all that we are or have, "blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ."

—*atqui tunc absurda esset Pauli precatio,*" because, I suppose, the renewed part of man did not require to be made an object of prayer. It is difficult to reconcile such a view with the honest avowal of Calvin on Gal. iv. 19 (see next Lecture), that the regenerate Galatians required a new generation, and a reformation of the image of Christ.

## LECTURE V.

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GAL. iv. 19.

*My little children, of whom I travail in birth again until  
Christ be formed in you.*

WE saw, in the last lecture, that the essential nature of man has not been treated of by our Church in a formal and scientific manner. What little analysis there is has been made solely with a theological object. The common division of man into body and soul has been used for the purpose of securing the truth and perfection of the manhood of Christ, and incidentally to illustrate the union of God and man in His one Person. The religious division again of "Spirit" and "flesh" has been employed to exhibit the reality, and the guilt, and the origin, and the remedy of that corruption which results and shews itself in the contest between good and evil in the soul of man. But it has not been thought necessary to reconcile these divisions with philosophical accuracy. The many interesting questions which seem to spring from them have been left unnoticed; not as if they were not interesting, but because they are not theo-



logical. There seems to have been a deep conviction in the minds of those who composed our formularies that abstract definitions and probable opinions were out of place here. All that was needed was that all men should confess that they were guilty and required a Saviour, sinful and in need of a Sanctifier. And it is not without reason that they were thus general and thus discreet in their assertions. For the whole subject is undoubtedly wrapped in impenetrable mystery. "The manner in which spirits are connected with bodies, and they thus become animated, is altogether wonderful and cannot be comprehended by man, and yet this is man<sup>a</sup>." And, if the manner of union is so uncertain, who can exactly define the influence of one upon the other? The body is not, we now know, the prison, but the dwelling of the soul, a dwelling moreover which, in the case of Christians, the joint occupancy of the Spirit has elevated into a temple; but the more exalted language still requires to be used with discretion, for St. Paul has taught us to acknowledge the influence for evil which the body may exercise on the soul<sup>b</sup>.

Who, again, shall say by what process, or at what time, that corruption of nature, which involves guilt and inclines to sin, passes on the individual soul?

<sup>a</sup> "Modus quo corporibus adhærent spiritus, et animalia fiunt, omnino mirum est, nec comprehendere ab homine potest, et hoc ipse homo est."—*De Civ. Dei* xxi. 10.—Pascal quotes it, (apparently from memory) *Pensées* Part. i. Art. vi. xxvi. Ed. Paris 1844.

<sup>b</sup> 1 Cor. ix. 27.

which we can scarcely believe to have come other than pure from the hands of the Creator? Conscious of these difficulties, and not professing to solve them either by reason or by the declarations of Scripture, our Church has been satisfied with taking a practical view of the matter, not attempting to account for every thing that Scripture teaches, but willing to receive this teaching as sufficient and infallible, and training her members to make use, with grateful humility, of those means of present grace and future glory which are brought to light in the Gospel.

We now proceed to consider the language and the temper in which the action of God upon the soul of man, with a view to its renovation, has been described in our Formularies. And this I have thought would be best discussed and ascertained by a free examination of the use and, as far as is possible, of the meaning of the phrase "regeneration" or "new birth" and its kindred expressions. The assertion in the ninth Article, that the "infection of nature doth remain, yea in them that are regenerated," invites us to this discussion, and at the same time helps us so far towards it as to render it unnecessary for us to guard against the extravagant notion of the effect of regeneration being to change *altogether* the *nature* of the regenerate. Interpreting, as it seems, the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans in a manner at once sensible and humble, the painful struggle between spirit and flesh is regarded as ended so far as it was overpowering and hopeless, but as continuing

so far as it is connected with man's nature and with the fact of our trial on earth being preparatory to our happiness in heaven. What then is meant by being "regenerate," or by "regeneration?" Who is the agent, and what the process, and what the result, whether immediate or future, whether gradual or at once complete? As to the agent, there is no doubt that it is the Holy Ghost, of whom we are taught to say, that he "sanctifieth me and all the elect people of God<sup>d</sup>." For we have already considered, and may therefore set aside, separate in its own peculiar sanctity, whatever personal influence the Incarnate Word may be pleased to exercise in His own especial rite of effectual commemoration. It is then a birth "*of the Spirit*" which we are discussing, a peculiar operation of the Holy Ghost. How shall we then describe it? Knowing so very little, as we have seen we know, of the constitution of our own nature, and so very little of the nature of the Spirit, any *essential* account of this divine action upon the human soul is utterly out of the question. All we can hope for is to ascertain certain conditions and certain phenomena, in connection with which we may affirm the fact of regeneration. But are these conditions and these phenomena unvarying and infallible? or, if they are not, has our Church treated them as if they were, or, on the contrary, been wise enough to acknowledge their irregularity and uncertainty? Every serious person, who looks, not to the immediate triumph of his own opinions or of his own

<sup>d</sup> Catechism.

party, but to the prevalence of truth, and the spread of vital Christianity, will be willing to approach such a discussion with freedom, and in a calm unprejudiced spirit; welcoming any modifying influence, which criticism, unbiassed by Shibboleths, may attempt to bring to bear upon the decision of the question.

The important point, however, of the connection of regeneration with certain outward ordinances, or certain inward sensations, will not be brought before you this morning, but only this portion of the subject: what, so far as we are able to ascertain, is meant by *regeneration*? and is the term confined to any one act? The first of these questions may be thus expanded in accordance with what has been previously remarked on this subject. Are we to believe that a new element, “a third” (or at any rate another) “part of an essential constitution,” (as Jeremy Taylor<sup>e</sup> expresses it,) is imparted to him who is regenerated? or are we rather to hold that he is thenceforth the subject of an especial operation of the Holy Ghost? or are we to prefer to say that the Holy Ghost takes up thenceforth His dwelling in the regenerate heart? I confine myself to these three questions, for we may at once reject, as altogether alien to the spirit and the letter both of the Bible and of the Church of England, the idea that the operation of the Spirit is limited to the presentation of a higher set of truths to the human mind and heart, calculated by their intrinsic beauty, without

<sup>e</sup> Works, vol. iv. p. 347, &c. Ed. Eden.

any especial influence of God's Spirit, to draw forth certain emotions, and so secure their own acceptance. Shun, let me beseech you, my brethren, as you value your name of Christian, as you hope for the aid and the comfort of the Spirit, these delusive phantoms of spurious independence, these "whited sepulchres" of a self-complacent Pelagianism, and meditate on the words of our Saviour, "No man can come unto me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him<sup>f</sup>," and those of his apostle which are a kind of practical and historical commentary on them, "No man can say that Jesus is the Lord except by the Holy Ghost<sup>g</sup>." Meditate upon this, and pray that you may receive this Holy Spirit.

But of the three *Christian* views of regeneration which I mentioned which is the most scriptural? This is indeed a point of great difficulty. Separate texts of Scripture of remarkable force may be adduced in favour of each<sup>h</sup>, to examine which would far exceed our limits, and would also break the

<sup>f</sup> John vi. 44.

<sup>g</sup> 1 Cor. xii. 3.

<sup>h</sup> For a spiritual element being imparted, how strong at first sight seems John iii. 5, 6. τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς σὰρξ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος πνεῦμά ἐστι, and 1 John iii. 9. ὅτι σπέρμα αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ μένει; but compare 1 Cor. xv. 12. where πνευμάτων is equivalent to τὰ πνευματικὰ in v. 1. and Luke viii. 11. ὁ σπόρος ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ, and John xv. 7. ἥν μείνῃτε ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ τὰ ῥήματά μου ἐν ὑμῖν μείνῃ—and 1 Pet. i. 23. and part of 25. ἀναγεγεννημένοι οὐκ ἐκ σπορᾶς φθαρτῆς ἀλλ' ἀφθάρτου, διὰ λόγου ζῶντος θεοῦ καὶ μένοντος εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα — τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν τὸ ῥῆμα τὸ εὐαγγελισθὲν εἰς ὑμᾶς. Comp. James i. 18. and 1 Cor. iv. 15. For gifts, see 1 Cor. xii. 9 and 10. and Rom. xii. 6—8; for indwelling, see (e. g.) John xiv. 17. and 20. and 23.

thread of our present argument. I shall therefore be content with expressing my own conviction that, of the three notions mentioned, that which represents the believer in Christ as the continual subject of the regenerating influence of the Holy Ghost is on the whole the most descriptive of the normal state of a Christian. The idea of an imparted element appears to me connected with a somewhat fanciful interpretation of the word "spirit," and one moreover which, unless carefully guarded, might lead to an interference either with the personal identity of each man or with the personality of the Holy Ghost. The subordinate phase again of this view, which speaks of *gifts* of the Spirit, belongs, I think, rather to a time of especial manifestations of the Holy Ghost, exhibiting themselves in palpable results. In saying this however I should wish to guard myself against the suspicion of undervaluing that great truth that "every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of Lights<sup>i</sup>;" and of all good gifts, that of the Holy Spirit, and of regeneration especially, of which St. James goes on to speak, is undoubtedly the best. But the question is, not as to the Author of good, but as to the manner in which he ordinarily manifests His goodness, and this is I think best described to be a continual quickening, and moulding, and purifying, and strengthening, of man's spirit by the Spirit of God, by which it is brought at length into such a heavenly frame as to be fit for Divine intercourse and the new

<sup>i</sup> James i. 17.

life of heaven. And such a view of regeneration I should not wish to separate from that which was mentioned third, which rests especially on those striking and exalting passages which speak of God being “in man,” “making His abode with” him. Such phrases I should wish to consider as merely stronger and more permanent expressions of that spiritual operation of which I have been speaking; and as connoting moreover the fact of the heavenly guest having been duly welcomed, and cherished, and valued, or, in other words, of the divine influences having been resolutely acted upon. And, without being precise in spiritual phraseology, (where, from the variety of the language of Scripture, precision would have been misplaced,) our Church has, I think, on the whole, given her sanction to a preference of this view of the operation of the Spirit. Such is undoubtedly the language of the collect for Whitsunday<sup>k</sup>, and of the Baptismal Office, while the deeper and more abiding, but still consistent, notion of “indwelling” appears especially in the expressions which are used in the Holy Communion. And if in the first of the prayers which are used in the Order of Confirmation the notion of *gifts* appears to be brought prominently forward, there is yet a difference between these gifts and those of early times, inasmuch as they are stated to consist in influences of the

<sup>k</sup> “God, who as at this time didst teach the hearts of Thy faithful people, by the sending to them the light of Thy Holy Spirit; grant us by the same Spirit to have a right judgment in all things, and evermore to rejoice in his holy comfort, &c.”

Spirit of God upon the spirit of man—the “ manifold gifts of grace ” are said to be “ the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and ghostly strength : the spirit of knowledge and true godliness, and the spirit of the holy fear of the Lord.” Such being the case, I am inclined to think that the *word* “ gifts ” is simply a rhetorical expression, and that what is intended is, not an imparted element, but a continual operation of the Holy Ghost on a Christian’s heart.

With these few observations, rather on the language in which we ought to speak of the work of the Spirit in our regeneration, than on that which regeneration actually or psychologically is, we will proceed to our second question—“ Is the term ‘ regeneration ’ applied *exclusively* by our Church to any one act ? ” Now in answer to this question, I have no hesitation in saying that such is not the case, and I hope to be able also to shew that the free use of the term which the Church allows to her members is eminently scriptural, and is recognised as such by some of the most valuable of ancient commentators, as well as of our own divines. But inasmuch as the contrary assertion as to the practice of our Church is often as confidently<sup>1</sup> made, it is necessary to prove

<sup>1</sup> Bishop Mant, in his Bampton Lectures, (which I have read with pleasure and profit, though I cannot go along with him always,) makes a challenge of this kind, and I think expresses the feeling of many, even moderate members of our Church, which, I think, arises partly from the language of this Homily being overlooked, or explained away, and partly from a dislike to the fanatical *manner* in which the *word*, itself blameless, has some-



the point. That is to say, it is necessary to prove that regeneration is not spoken of only in connection with Baptism. For to prove that it *is* spoken of in such connection is of course superfluous. This every one allows; and those who oppose the doctrine of baptismal regeneration oppose it either by a definition of the term, or by a limitation of its universal application. But the upholders of baptismal regeneration are apt to deny the propriety of applying the term regeneration to anything else, and in doing so to appeal to the practice of the Church. That the authority therefore to which they appeal will not bear them out may at once be seen by re-

times been used—"If ever the new birth be not conveyed by Baptism, rightly administered," (so far I should agree, except that I protest against the word *convey* as rather dangerous,) "or if, when once regenerated, it be (I will not say necessary, but) possible for any one to be born again, doubtless there is scriptural authority to that purpose. Let the authority then be adduced. Let it be shewn from Holy Writ, that any person, to whom Baptism was rightly administered, was not regenerated; let it be shewn that any person, having been once baptized, is described under any circumstances whatever of repentance, reformation, renovation, or conversion, to have been again regenerated; let it be shewn that the apostles, who are perpetually exhorting their Christian converts to changes such as these, do once exhort them to become regenerate; do once enforce the necessity of it; (*this* is what *I* say, with the commentators whom *I* quote, St. Paul does in the text) or even affirm, or at least *insinuate* its possibility; and we may then perceive some reason for wavering in our belief." Mant's Bampton Lectures, p. 371. Consistently with this strong view, he blames Whitefield for saying, (Eighteen Sermons p. 307,) that Christ is to be "born in his (any man's) heart as He was born in the Virgin's womb," an expression which seems to me to have the authority of St. Paul in the text.

ferring to the Homily for Whitsunday<sup>m</sup>, which declares the work of the Holy Ghost in “the inward regeneration and sanctification of mankind.” I shall not insist upon the point that these two terms appear to be used as equivalent, (inasmuch as they are sometimes transposed in speaking of the Holy Ghost’s office,) or that there is no explicit mention whatever of baptism in these passages,—or that it *is* explicitly stated that a man “deceives himself” who “thinks well of himself” (that is to say, thinks that he is “endued with the Holy Ghost,”) without the evidence of “virtuous and good works, consonant to the prescript rule of God’s Word, savouring and tasting not of the flesh, but of the Spirit”—I shall waive these arguments; but I shall request your calm and earnest attention to these concluding words of the first part of the Homily—“Let us (as we are most bound) give hearty thanks to God the Father and His Son Jesus Christ for sending down His Comforter into the world, humbly beseeching Him so to work in our hearts by the power of this Holy Spirit, that we, being regenerate and newly born again in all goodness, righteousness, sobriety, and truth, may in the end be made partakers of everlasting life in His heavenly kingdom, through Jesus Christ our Lord.” Now I ask every one, whether the baptized Chris-

<sup>m</sup> Hom. pp. 409. 410. 412. That the word is used *generally*, and without reference to Baptism, is plain from the fact that Peter and Matthew, as well as Paul, are the instances given. And the Homilist adds, “Such is the power of the Holy Ghost to regenerate men.”

<sup>n</sup> “The Holy Ghost to sanctify and regenerate,” p. 409.

tians whom the Homilist addresses are not unequivocally stated here to require another regeneration? The fact of the regeneration being part of the work to be performed by the Holy Spirit, being part of the blessing prayed for, is fixed beyond controversy by the addition of the words "in all goodness, righteousness, sobriety, and truth." Had it been otherwise there would have been room to say, that the regeneration spoken of was the foundation, and not the object, of the prayer. But the insertion of these words renders such an explanation impossible. An infant may indeed be born again "*to* all goodness, righteousness, and truth," and so the Catechism correctly speaks of a "new birth *unto* righteousness," but to be born again *in* all these virtues must plainly mean to have them (being religious *habits* and not elementary impulses) formed in our renewed hearts; formed, I am very willing to allow, better than they hitherto have been, formed effectually, perfectly, after a Divine and Christ-like fashion—formed therefore so as to allow a previous, and more or less abortive, formation; but formed so newly as to be properly described by the word *regeneration* or new birth. I shall not dwell upon the question how far this language of the Homily may be applied to determine the meaning of the phrase "being regenerate" in the collect for Christmas-day, words which are often used as proving that the term *regeneration* should be confined to Baptism; I will only state in passing that, as a matter of fact, the adoption as children of God is part of the thing prayed for in one of those

ancient forms from which this collect is thought to have been taken<sup>n</sup>. I am satisfied to abide by the passage in the Homily, which is perfectly unequivocal, and so decisive<sup>o</sup> of the fact that the Church has not been precise in her use of the *term* regeneration, but allows her members the liberty of applying it, as she does herself, to the actual accomplishment of that spiritual work of which Baptism is a means, a pledge, and a token, as well as to Baptism itself. There is, therefore, nothing irregular in the language of those who, in order to enforce the necessity of a thorough change of heart, and to overthrow the formidable outworks of formality and self-complacency, (those

<sup>n</sup> Sacramentar. Gregorii Menard, p. 7. quoted in Palmer's Orig. Liturg. vol. i. p. 319, The prayer is "da populis tuis in hâc celebritate consortium ut qui tuâ gratiâ sunt redempti *tud sint adoptione securi.*" It is a prayer for a spiritual sonship in connection with our Lord's Incarnation, and one can therefore hardly say that "security," not "adoption," is prayed for.

<sup>o</sup> I am glad to agree, on this point, with my zealous cotemporary, the Rev. J. C. Ryle, who, in his "The Bishop, the Pastor, and Preacher," p. 30, describes evangelical teaching to be (among other things) "such teaching about Baptism and regeneration as does not ignore the seventeenth Article," (of which hereafter) "and does not make the Homily for Whit-Sunday contradict the Baptismal Service," only, while he appears to have adopted the Calvinistic mode of reconciling them, which, I think, has been demonstrated by Archbishop Laurence to have *not* been the view of our leading Reformers, I hold to the Augustinian view, which I think was. According to this view, (which I shall shew in the next lecture to have been that of Bucer,) a child may be regenerate, though not predestinated to life, in which case his regeneration will never take full effect, or "take" *that* "*place in him*" which Bucer and our Homilies alike insist upon as necessary. He will not "become a new creature," as our Homilies (p. 482) say a true penitent (evidently one baptized) must.

deadly enemies to godliness,) prefer to use *regeneration* as a term equivalent to *conversion*, and call upon their hearers to pray to God, through Jesus Christ, that they *may be* born again of the Spirit, for that they seem, from their ungodly and heathenish lives, to be still in the gall of “bitterness and the bond of iniquity<sup>p</sup>,” to have their hearts not yet “right in the sight of God,” and so, it may be, (though God forbid that it should be!) to “have neither part nor lot in this matter.”

When now from the language of our Church we turn to that of Scripture, the view expands before us, and we are led to maintain a still more comprehensive use of this ill-used word, which has been so often tortured and wedged in the narrow vice both of formality and fanaticism. We saw in the second lecture that the word is a twofold word, having a meaning belonging to time and a meaning belonging to eternity. Of this there can be no doubt. Let the punctuation of the passage in the nineteenth chapter of St. Matthew<sup>q</sup> be fixed either way, this fact is not affected by it. If our Lord’s disciples “followed Him in the regeneration,” the word must be used in a comprehensive sense, whether objectively, for His mission as a teacher of righteousness, for what Hammond calls “spiritual proselytism,” or subjectively,

<sup>p</sup> Acts viii. 23. Simon, of whom this is said, had been baptized, and is said to have “believed.”

<sup>q</sup> Matth. xix. 28, “And Jesus said unto them, Verily I say unto you, that ye which have followed me in the regeneration when the Son of man shall sit on the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.”

for what he calls “the change and renovation of the soul and affections in this life which” Christ “has made preparatory” to regeneration in the higher sense<sup>r</sup>. If, on the other hand, the word *regeneration* goes with the words which come after it, and “the regeneration” is the time “when the Son of man shall sit on the throne of his glory,” then *regeneration* is used in the higher sense of the “future being of body and soul” in glory. But it may be said that, granting this twofold use of the term, and this comprehensive or higher sense in the passage in St. Matthew’s Gospel, it is the narrower or lower sense with which we are now concerned, and which I have undertaken to shew is not confined to Baptism. The “washing of regeneration,” it may be said, spoken of in the epistle to Titus<sup>s</sup>, is the only other passage in which the word *regeneration*, *παλιγγενεσία*, occurs; and this the Church has unmistakeably applied to that ceremony. “The laver of regeneration<sup>t</sup>” or in the more poetical phrase of the Homilies<sup>u</sup>, “the fountain of our regeneration,” is the Church’s translation of the words of St. Paul;—the metaphorical meaning being plainly rejected, as in the kindred passage of St. John<sup>x</sup>. Now I am so far from wishing to dispute these assertions, that (for the present) I will not even say, with Hammond, that it is as “a token and a sign of the renovating work of

<sup>r</sup> Hammond on Matt. xix. 28.

<sup>s</sup> Tit. iii. 5.

<sup>t</sup> See The ministration of Private Baptism.

<sup>u</sup> Hom. p. 244.

<sup>x</sup> John iii. 5.

Christ" that *regeneration* is used for Baptism, but will at once allow, for the purpose of the present argument, the appropriation of this particular passage to that Sacrament. Let it be supposed, for the moment, that nothing but the outward rite of Baptism was present to St. Paul's mind when he spoke of "the washing of regeneration" as instrumental to salvation. But is this the only passage in which the metaphor of the new birth occurs? or, because *παλιγγενεσία* expresses a result, and *ἀναγέννησις* the process which leads to it, will any one venture to say that there is not the same metaphor in both cases? A birth of God<sup>z</sup>, a begetting by the Gospel<sup>a</sup>, a begetting with the word of truth<sup>b</sup>, a "being born again not of corruptible seed but of incorruptible by the word of the living God<sup>c</sup>,"—these expressions of St. John and St. Paul and St. James and St. Peter are quite as distinctly expressive of a new and spiritual birth, as the word regeneration (*παλιγγενεσία*) in the Epistle to Titus. And every one of them is used, without any apparent reference to Baptism, and implies a *conscious* reception of the Gospel: and the first and highest, "the birth of God," is used

γ Dr. Thomas Taylor, the eminent puritan divine, whom I alluded to in my first Lecture, considers this passage to be spoken *primarily* of baptism.—Comment. on Tit. iii. 5. p. 639.

λ Ὁ γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ. 1 John iii. 9.

α Ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐγέννησα. 1 Cor. iv. 15.

β Βουλθεῖς ἀπεκύησεν ἡμᾶς λόγῳ ἀληθείας. James i. 18.

γ Ἀναγεγεννημένοι οὐκ ἐκ σπορᾶς φθαρτῆς ἀλλὰ ἀφθάρτου διὰ λόγου ζῶντος Θεοῦ καὶ μένοντος εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα. 1 Pet. i. 23.

by St. John in passages in which to identify it with Baptismal regeneration and apply it to every baptized person would be an absurdity, only not monstrous from being so palpably absurd.—“Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin: for his seed remaineth in him, and he cannot sin because he is born of God<sup>d</sup>.” And again, “Whatsoever is born of God overcometh the world<sup>e</sup>.” I shall not dwell upon these passages; it is not necessary to do so. To explain them away<sup>f</sup> is of course extremely easy, but to explain them so as to exclude the meaning of complete conversion, here called “a birth of God,” is utterly impossible. And looking to the fact that it is *this* birth only which is worthy of the name, Hammond in his commentary on the former passage does not hesitate to say, “This is the difference between pious and wicked, *regenerate and unregenerate men*; he that lives an impious and uncharitable life *is no regenerate child of God’s*, whatsoever he may flatter himself of his state,” even as Origen had said before, “No one has the Spirit of adoption while he

<sup>d</sup> 1 John iii. 9.

<sup>e</sup> Ibid. v. 4.

<sup>f</sup> It may be thought that the view of Origen, which is mentioned further on with approbation, does this; but such is not the case. According to Origen every good deed is a “birth of God,” and therefore a person who never commits sin, but “does righteousness,” *must* be continually “born of God,” and one who is thus “born of God” cannot commit sin. The difference is, that it is not supposed that there is *one* great and irresistible act which precludes any after defection; but it should never be forgotten that the doctrines of “conversion” and of irresistible and what is called “indefectible” grace, may be, and often are, separated.



sins, for he who is born of God does not sin<sup>g</sup>;" and again, in commenting on the more startling passage "he that doeth sin is of the devil<sup>h</sup>," he says<sup>i</sup>, with the same zeal against formalism which Hammond exhibits, "so far as we commit sin, we have not yet put off the devil's generation, even when we have the character of believing in Jesus."

A complete renovation then of the soul such as excludes the possibility of habitual sin, is emphatically termed in Scripture "a birth of God." So far the argument is entirely and, as it seems to me, overwhelmingly in favour of applying the metaphor of "new birth" to conversion. But the text carries us a step further, and throws the dogmatists upon conversion, together with their opponents the dogmatists upon baptism, a step back, or, to say the simple truth, it drives them both off the field, to condole with each other on the provoking irregularity of St. Paul, who allowed his rhetoric to get the better of his propriety, and, while raising the humble reader of Scripture on the wings of the *liberal*<sup>k</sup> Spirit of grace, (as the Homilies admirably express it,) has cut the ground away from the feet of the verbal formalist. "My little children, of whom I travail in birth *again* until Christ be formed in you," τεκνία μου

<sup>g</sup> Οὐδεὶς δὲ ἔχει τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς υἰοθεσίας ἁμαρτάνων· ὁ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγεννημένος οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει. Origen. in Joan. Tom. xx. vol. iv. p. 357 B.

<sup>h</sup> Πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου ἔστω. 1 John iii. 8.

<sup>i</sup> "Ὅσον ποιούμεν ἁμαρτίας οὐδέπω τὴν ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου γένεσιν ἀπεδυσάμεθα καὶ πιστεύειν εἰς τὸν Ἰησοῦν νομιζόμεθα. Ibid. p. 823 E.

<sup>k</sup> Hom. p. 434 ad fin., "very liberal and gentle is the Spirit of wisdom."

οὗς πάλιν ὠδίνω ἕως Χριστοῦ μορφωθῆ ἐν ὑμῖν. What then was the theological *status* of these Galatians in whom Christ was not yet formed, and for whom their spiritual mother<sup>1</sup> was constrained to undergo a second pang, that Christ the new man might be created in them?—"Before their eyes Christ had been evidently set forth, crucified among them<sup>m</sup>." They had "received the Spirit<sup>n</sup>." They had "begun in the Spirit<sup>o</sup>." They were "all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus<sup>p</sup>." "As many of *them* as *had* been baptized into Christ *had* put on Christ<sup>q</sup>. And because they were sons God *had* sent forth the Spirit of his Son into *their* hearts, crying, Abba, Father<sup>r</sup>." "Wherefore *they* were no more servants but sons, and if sons, then heirs of God through Christ<sup>s</sup>." Nay more than this, unless we suppose St. Paul to have been speaking in the end of the second chapter only of himself individually, it is even said of them, that "Christ *lived in*<sup>t</sup>" them.

Must we not fairly own that they were regenerate in both the two senses in which we have hitherto used the term; that they had been regenerated in baptism, that they had been regenerated in conversion? or, at least, must not those who use the term in connection with baptism, and those who use it as

<sup>1</sup> Parturit ergo et creatura quos *regenerat* ad salutem. Origen. in Rom. vii. 4. vol. iv. p. 598 D. Cranmer uses the same term for ministerial teaching. Miscellaneous Writings and Letters, p. 104. Ed. Parker Soc.

<sup>m</sup> Gal. iii. 1.

<sup>n</sup> iii. 2.

<sup>o</sup> iii. 3.

<sup>p</sup> Gal. iii. 26.

<sup>q</sup> iii. 27.

<sup>r</sup> iv. 6.

<sup>s</sup> Gal. iv. 7.

<sup>t</sup> ii. 20.

equivalent with conversion, alike own that they were regenerate? They were become, says Beveridge, “either nothing at all or new creatures in him. If the body of sin be destroyed, the body of grace must be formed in them<sup>u</sup>.” And yet Christ was not yet formed in them, but they required, as Chrysostom on the passage says<sup>x</sup>, “another regeneration and reformation, for that they had corrupted the image, and destroyed the relationship, and changed the form, of Christ.” And Theodoret and Theophylact<sup>y</sup> and Damascene repeat his sentiments, and almost his words, without any scruple or qualification. Nor is the language of Cyril of Alexandria different. “In those who transgress the faith the characters shine not forth as they ought (ὕγιως); therefore they need another spiritual pang, and a regeneration of their mind (or “sensible regeneration”) (ἐτερεῶς ὠδίνος πνευματικῆς καὶ νοητῆς ἀναγεννήσεως), that through the Holy Spirit again flashing forth in them by sanctifi-

<sup>u</sup> Serm. VI. ed. S. P. C. K. p. 135.

<sup>x</sup> Διεφθείρατε φησὶ τὴν εἰκόνα, ἀπωλέσατε τὴν συγγενεῖαν, τὴν μορφήν ἡλλοιώσατε· ἐτέρας ἀναγεννήσεως ὑμῖν δεῖ καὶ ἀναπλάσεως· ἀλλ’ ὁμῶς τεκνία ἔτι καλῶ. vol. v. p. 836.

<sup>y</sup> Theophylact in commenting on Heb. vii. 9, [“and, if I may so speak (ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν), Levi also who receiveth tithes, paid tithes in Abraham,”] says that if these qualifying words (ὡ. ἐ. ε.) do not merely mean to speak “summarily,” they were intended to correct the unusual character of the expression (τόλμημα). May we not then say, that the absence of any such qualification in his commentary, as well as in the text itself, proves the expression to be not irregular? He also observes, that our text is an argument against the Novatians, who denied a place of forgiveness even on repentance to those who had sinned after baptism.

cation they may be formed again after the divine image into Christ<sup>z</sup>."

With them the common sense of Luther<sup>a</sup> naturally follows; speaking with his wonted energy of the corrupters, who had formed within those perverted converts of St. Paul a new form of themselves, and not of Christ, whose form he laboured to restore again after its disfiguration, yea even its abolition ("abolita forma Christi"), in order that they might again put on the new man, which is created after God. But this is not all. In the same track of interpretation, contrary as it is to his own favourite views, though of course not destructive of them, (for the Galatians might be finally saved notwithstanding their defection,) but in this liberal track of comprehensive exposition Calvin<sup>b</sup> unhesitatingly follows. "They had been once before conceived and born, they now needed to be again generated after their defection. And yet with a view to lessen the harshness of his expression, he says,

<sup>c</sup> Cyril. Alex. vol. vi. p. 370 B.

<sup>a</sup> In loco tom. iv. p. 116. ed. Jenæ 1611.

<sup>b</sup> "Semel prius et concepti et editi fuerant; jam secundo procreandi erant post defectionem; invidiam tamen extenuat, quam dicit Donec formetur, non enim abolet priorem partum; sed dicit iterum fovendos utero esse, tanquam immaturos fœtus et informes. ["Ἀμβλωθρίδια," Chrysostom says, "καὶ ἐκτρώματα."] Porro Christum formari in nobis, et nos in Christo idem est; nascimur enim ut simus novæ in ipso creaturæ, et ipse vicissim nascitur in nobis, ut vivamus ejus vitam. Quia igitur vera Christi imago per subintroductas a pseudo-apostolis superstitiones deformata erat, laborat Paulus in ea expolienda ut pura absque impedimentis reluceat."

‘until he be formed in you,’ not doing away with the former birth, but saying that they required to be again cherished in the womb as an abortive and shapeless progeny.” And he goes on to say, “that for Christ to be formed in us, and us in Christ, is the same thing, for we are born that we may be new creatures in him, and he in turn is born in us that we may live his life. Because therefore the image of Christ had been defaced by the introduction of superstitions by false apostles, Paul labours in thoroughly clearing it, that it may shine forth again pure and without impediment.”

Such is the interpretation of the text given by these commentators, and there is not a word in any of them (unless in a *very* slight degree in Cyril and Calvin) to shew any unwillingness to bring out the metaphor boldly, from a fear of interfering with any technical view either of baptism or of conversion. And yet there can be no doubt that with the ancient writers baptismal regeneration was an unquestioned doctrine; and no one is ignorant of the strong opinions both of Luther and Calvin on the subject of conversion. But they did not therefore think it right to emasculate scripture to suit ecclesiastical phraseology, nor did they muffle the bold tones of the inspired apostle to make them contrast less with the feeble trebles of controversial sciolists.

I have left my own opinion upon the language in question for the close of the present Lecture. But it is not only as my own that I shall propound it. Not only Hammond, whom I have already quoted,

but Taylor<sup>c</sup>, and Beveridge<sup>d</sup>, and Sherlock<sup>e</sup>, alike employ the word *regenerate* to express the general influence<sup>f</sup> of the Holy Ghost upon man's spirit, to describe the process which results at last in a fitness for that *regeneration* which admits us to an altogether new life. Nay even the author of the work on the Incarnation<sup>g</sup>, while claiming the first step for baptism, allows the wider use, telling us that "the

<sup>c</sup> "A spiritual man, a man that is in the state of grace, who is born anew of the Spirit, that is regenerate by the Spirit of Christ, he is led by the Spirit, he lives in the Spirit, he does the works of God cheerfully, habitually, vigorously."—Works, iv. p. 305. Sermon "Of the Spirit of Grace."

"It is true there is flesh and blood in every regenerate man, but they do not both rule."—Ibid. p. 253; and compare p. 333, "They have not yet *entertained* the Spirit of God, they are in darkness; *they were washed in water*, but never baptized with the Spirit;" and see Life of Christ, part II. § xii. Discourse IX. c. 20. (vol. ii. p. 365. ed. Eden.)

<sup>d</sup> Serm. VI. ed. S. P. C. K. p. 127 and 137, and compare Serm. XV. He, like Hammond, draws a contrast between "regenerate" and "unregenerate" men, including many baptized persons in the latter class.

<sup>e</sup> Sermons, vol. i. Discourse VIII. p. 234. Fifth Ed. 1764.

<sup>f</sup> To these we may add Cranmer, who in his Answer to Gardiner p. 183. uses the word "regenerate" to express the work of the Spirit in the Holy Communion as well as in Baptism, "For what Christian man would say, as you do, that Christ is not indeed (which you call "really") in Baptism? or that we be not regenerated, both body and soul, *as well in Baptism as* in the Sacrament of the body and blood of Christ?" and his testimony strongly confirms the view taken above of the use of the word in the Homily. Bradford, I may add, uses it most unquestionably for the work of the Spirit in *conversion*. So also does Melancthon.

<sup>g</sup> p. 354. Fourth Ed. Mr. Wilberforce also calls the use in Matt. xix. the "comprehensive" use. To me it seems rather the *higher* use of the *twofold* word.

soul's regeneration, like the body's growth, is of course a protracted process, which the whole of life is not too long to complete." But it is not to these commentators that I shall appeal (though I am glad to agree with them) in order to commend to your attention the opinion which has long appeared to me to do most justice to the metaphorical language of Scripture on this point, and in doing so to bring out and press upon our constant recollection, both our continual dependence upon God, and the futurity of our Christian perfection. In the commentaries of Origen I have found the teaching of the text, and that of the kindred passages in St. John, deeply and comprehensively (though not directly) combined, and full effect given to them. Not only does he take and reiterate the same view<sup>h</sup> of the language

<sup>h</sup> Commenting on Rom. vii. 7, he speaks of Christ being formed twice in a man, once in "the form of a servant," when they begin to fear God, afterwards as "the Word," when the virtues of Christ "in eis formentur ad liquidum."—Vol. iv. p. 458 D. ed. Paris 1740.

Again, "Errantes et in fide titubantes ac velut in aborsum quoddam redactos materno affectu rursum parturiendo donec Christus formaretur in eis."—iv. p. 636 B.

Again, (Hom. in Levit. vi.) vol. ii. p. 219 A, he puts together the text and 1 Cor. iv. 15.

See also Hom. in Num. vii. vol. ii. p. 291 A and B, and in Levit. xii. vol. ii. p. 254 A.

And again, "Sicut in prægnantibus formatur et figuratur semen sic et in anima quæ suscipit verbum paullatim formatur et figuratur conceptio verbi in ea, et hoc puto dicere Paulum ad Galatas, Filii, &c." In Matt. Comment. Ser. vol. iii. p. 861 D and E.

I have often thought that looking to the higher notion of *birth*, (that is, a true formation of Christ in the heart, a genuine turning to God,) the first impulses which we connect with Baptism might well be called a "conception."

of the text, as the other commentators whom I have quoted, but in noticing the other passages he enters into the question of the metaphor of *birth* even in its most startling combinations. The fact that the wicked are called “children of the devil<sup>i</sup>,” (which brought home to my own mind the necessity of treating these expressions with greater liberality,) is insisted upon by him both with boldness and discrimination<sup>k</sup>. Dwelling upon the softening point, that the wicked are not said in Scripture to be actually “*born* of the devil,” though they are called his children, he nevertheless elsewhere does not hesitate to use the metaphors of *seed* and *generation* in speaking of the temptations of the devil and man’s yielding to them. “When<sup>l</sup> he persuades us to evil we receive his seed, when we obey his persuasions he has actually begotten us, and those whom we in turn tempt to evil are our spiritual children of perdition, and so, one generated from the other according to the dreary series of temptation, they derive in succession from their father the devil their pestilent nativity.”

<sup>i</sup> See remarks on 1 John iii. 8, quoted above.

<sup>k</sup> In Joan. tom. xx. vol. iv. p. 325.

<sup>l</sup> “Sicut ergo semen Dei in nobis dicitur manere cum verbum Dei servantes in nobis non peccamus, ut Joannes dicit, Qui autem ex Deo est non peccat quia semen Dei manet in eo; ita etiam, cum a diabolo ad peccandum suademur, semen ejus suscipimus. Cum vero etiam implemus quod suaserit tunc jam et genuit nos. Nascimur enim ei filii per peccatum. Verum quoniam peccantes vix fere accidit ut sine adjutore peccemus, sed aut ministros peccati aut adjutores semper requirimus—qui omnes velut unus ex altero secundum persuasionis ordinem generati ex patre diabolo noxiæ nativitatis ordinem ducunt.—In Exod. viii. vol. ii. p. 160 E.



And in another place he concludes the same argument with these striking words, "wretched then is he who is ever being generated of the devil. And on the contrary, blessed is he who is ever being generated of God. For I shall not say that the righteous is once for all born of God, but he is ever being generated of Him in every good action, in which God generates the righteous<sup>m</sup>."

And it is in accordance with this view that Hammond explains the notion of sonship, when he says, "to be born of God is to have received some special influence from him, and proportionably to be a son of God is that state which is answerable to such a principle, a life proportionable to such a beginning, that higher pitch of Christian living now under the Gospel<sup>n</sup>."

The only difference is, that Hammond by speaking of an "answerable life" takes in the idea of duty as well as of privilege, and represents the regenerate person as cherishing the divine seed, while Origen dwells only (I mean in the passage last quoted) on the *blessing* of the privilege, and on the generative power of God, the continual operation of which makes the new life possible. But both agree<sup>o</sup> in

<sup>m</sup> Οίονεὶ τοσαυτάκις ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου γεγενήμεθα ὡςάκις ἀμαρτάνομεν. ταλαιπώρος οὖν οὗτός ἐστιν ὃς αἰεὶ γεννᾶται ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου· ὥσπερ πάλιν μακάριος ὁ αἰεὶ γεννώμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ. Οὐ γὰρ ἔπαξ ἔρω τὸν δίκαιον γεγενῆσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀλλ' αἰεὶ γεννᾶσθαι καθ' ἐκάστην πράξιν ἀγαθὴν ἐν ᾗ γεννᾷ τὸν δίκαιον ὁ Θεός.—In Jer. Hom. IX. vol. iii. p. 181 E.

<sup>n</sup> Commentary on John i. 13.

<sup>o</sup> See the quotation from Hammond in p. 152, and from Origen in p. 152, 153.

teaching that a man is not a regenerate child of God unless he lives a new life.

To sum up now the result of our critical investigation. The apostolic usage of the words implying "birth," and the patristic interpretation of the text, and, in the case of Origen, of the kindred passages, are both decidedly in favour of that freer use of the word *regeneration* which is allowed and has been adopted by our Church. St. John speaking of a man in whom the quickening work of the Spirit has thoroughly taken effect, as having been "born of God," and St. Paul in the text speaking to his Galatians in terms which enforce the need, in some cases, of a second new birth in this life, unite in justifying the language of the Homilist, who makes the "being regenerate" part of his prayer for his hearers, some of whom must be supposed to have been regarded as converted, and all of whom were no doubt baptized. The latter again by using language which implies a past new birth in those in whom *Christ* was not yet *formed*, justifies our application of the term *regenerate* to those in whom *regeneration* may or may not have actually taken effect, and so to all baptized persons<sup>p</sup>, and much more to all who have made some progress in conscious renovation, in whom "the virtues of Christ"<sup>q</sup> appear, though not formed, to be in a state of formation. In a word, the objective and the subjective, the initiatory and the progressive,

<sup>p</sup> Resting Baptismal Regeneration on Tit. iii. 5. I claim for it a share in the liberal interpretation of the metaphor which the text suggests.

<sup>q</sup> See note <sup>h</sup>, p. 159.

the partial and the perfect, uses of the metaphor, are to be found in Scripture and in the Formularies of our Church.

And the only qualification or rather corollary which I wish to add, is this:—Let us in adopting such a comprehensive interpretation of these terms beware, on the one hand lest in applying them to a conscious and effectual birth of Christ in the heart, we forget that we were made “members of Christ,” in some spiritual sense, in our baptism, and that we have a promise of heavenly assistance, and are therefore under the obligations of a heavenly life: and on the other, lest in extending them to the whole of life, we dissipate their force by generalization.

For the sonship, in its highest temporal sense, must be attained while we are yet on earth. The birth of God, the perfect formation of Christ, must, it may be by degrees, but must at last take place, if we are to be owned as His brethren, and God’s children “in the regeneration.” In this high internal sense, the sonship may be our Omega now, but it must be our Alpha before we die. We must have won our way, or rather we must have been won, into our proper Christian self. We have been all regenerate in Baptism; we have been, some more and some less (but all, I hope, in some degree) regenerate in Conversion. But the characters must be clear, and the image must be sharply cut, before we shall be owned as Christ’s.

The halo of your *φωτισμός*, your spiritual illumination, your ray from the brightness of Him who is

the brightness of the glory of the Father, your share of his derived light, who “lighteth every man that cometh into the world,”—that light which played so brightly round your innocent brows at your Baptism, before the eyes of faithful and tender mother, and loving friends,—at your Baptism, I say, when you were made in prospect, and hope, and opportunity, and power, what you ought to be now in reality, Children of God,—this holy light, the pure and precious symbol of ineffable exaltation,—my “little children”—I can see it now, obscured yet not effaced, amid the mists of conventional indifference, or self-complacent morality, or thoughtless self-indulgence. But in order to pass muster in the day of judgment before the eyes of Him who is Light, it must be *within*<sup>a</sup>, and not only without and around you: it must become (God grant it may become!) the gleam of a single eye, the glow of a loving heart.

<sup>a</sup> Let it not be thought that I am asserting that the spiritual grace of Baptism is never more than *objective*: (though it may be that all grace is *at first* objective so far as this, that the Holy Ghost first works *upon* the heart *in* which he afterwards dwells,) I hold that the contrary *may* be the case so as even to render any conscious *turning to* God unnecessary. The fact of early piety and devotion seems to prove this. But too often it is long before the blessings of baptism are at all realized. I will add that what my argument mainly aims at proving is, that in instances analogous *practically* to the *doctrinal* and fundamental defection of the Galatians, we, like St. Paul, may apply strong language to a strong case.

## LECTURE VI.

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2 THESS. iii. 5.

*The Lord direct your hearts into the love of God.*

WE have hitherto considered the work of God in the soul of man as immediate and objective, neither in connection with outward ordinances, requiring human agency, nor with the witness of inward sensations. I shall now call your attention to the question of this connection and of this witness; so far as they appear to be recognised in the formularies of our Church. And I have thought it more in accordance with the practical character, which I have been throughout desirous of giving to these lectures, to discuss the position of our Church with respect to outward ordinances first, leaving the question of inward sensations to be examined in the next lecture. For to take, for the moment, the lowest and narrowest view of Baptism, *some* Christians must be allowed to be regenerate in a spiritual sense long before they go through the subjective and conscious process described in the seventeenth Article. But before discussing these outward means of grace, in which man necessarily takes some part, let me clearly set before

you the sense in which I have called the work of our regeneration, so far as we have yet discussed it, immediate. It is not then immediate as being independent of the Mediation of Christ; including under that name not only His Atonement, but also His Intercession, and such continual commendation of His disciples to His Father as may be exercised compatibly with that express declaration, (which applies to all His true followers,) "The Father himself loveth you, because ye have loved Me, and believed that I came out from God<sup>a</sup>." This mediation every child is taught to recognise when he thanks God<sup>b</sup> for having "called" him to "a state of salvation through Jesus Christ our Lord," a state of salvation, of which one especial aspect is, that he is made "a member of Christ<sup>c</sup>." And this mediation is moreover continually brought before us, in that we ask for spiritual blessings, almost always explicitly, but always implicitly, in His name—"Through Jesus Christ our Lord" we have our only "access" to the Father. But while we thus devoutly and thankfully acknowledge the need, and the gift, of the "One<sup>d</sup> Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus," and so far allow that the work of our regeneration is mediate, there is not a word in our formularies which favours the notion, that between us (however under the operation of the Holy Ghost) and our God and Father is interposed the perpetual bar of the human nature of Christ. On the contrary, we hold that our Lord

<sup>a</sup> John xvi. 27.

<sup>b</sup> Church Catechism. Third answer.

<sup>c</sup> Ibid. First answer.

<sup>d</sup> 1 Tim. ii. 5.

having by His sacrifice “reconciled” us to God<sup>e</sup>, “we have access<sup>f</sup> through Him by one Spirit to the Father,” that our spirits are put into communication with His Spirit, (though not *such* communication as we shall have in heaven) and that we are, moreover, *not* joined to a human, but “made partakers of a divine” nature. Neither then as an abstract power brought to bear upon our souls<sup>g</sup>, “a diffusive influence,” as it has been called, “of the second Adam<sup>h</sup>,” nor as an *entity* with which we are made one, in some mystical way, (without interfering either with our personal identity or with His,) does the Church of England take into her scheme of mediation the notion of a glorified humanity of Christ, to which<sup>i</sup>, and not to God, Christians are united. No, my brethren, our union with Christ is spiritual, and not material or physical; and our dwelling in Him is by interest in His death, by imputation of His merits, and by being clothed with His righteousness, even

<sup>e</sup> Rom. v. 18. 2 Cor. v. 18, 19, 20.

<sup>f</sup> Eph. ii. 18.

<sup>g</sup> This view was especially considered in Lecture IV.

<sup>h</sup> Wilberforce Doct. of Incarn.

<sup>i</sup> Mr. Wilberforce Doct. of Incarn. (p. 233) quotes Dr. Jackson (Com. on Creed xi. 3. 12) saying, “The Holy Ghost doth not by spiritual graces unite our souls or spirits immediately unto Himself, but unto Christ’s human nature,” and this and the similar remark of Hooker, noticed in lecture IV., Mr. Wilberforce has developed, and, as it seems to me, sadly materialized—Arguing that there is an abstract humanity in the first instance transmitted from Adam to all his posterity, a participation in which makes every one a natural man, he goes on to represent this humanity as having been purified by Christ, and an union with *it* as the only mode in which each may become a renewed man.

as His dwelling in us is by the Holy Spirit<sup>k</sup>, by holy influence, and purifying renovation.

And that which natural generation does in the one case, regeneration does in the other, i. e. unite the individual man to the abstract nature. In the course of the argument (p. 236. fourth ed.) Gregory Nazianzene (who, if the passage to which the editor of Damascene (see Lecture IV.) refers is a fair specimen of his views, opposed this very crotchet,) is pressed into the service thus—"St. Gregory complains of it as an error of the Apollinarians, that they interpreted the words 'we have the mind of Christ,' as though they referred to His Deity alone, whereas they have reference, he says, to that purified humanity of the Son of God, which was set forth *as a model to his brethren*." Now the words which I have marked in Italics render this quotation entirely irrelevant. For the view which makes Christ's humanity "*a model*" is very different from that which makes it a means of grace in the sense in which Mr. Wilberforce uses the term. And a little further on (p. 239) Mr. Wilberforce directly contradicts Gregory Nazianzene, and says, "The union of mankind with Christ is not a mere imitation," (of course not, "he that is joined to the Lord is one spirit,") "*the following a good model*—it is an actual and a real union, whereby all renewed men are joined to the Second, as they were by nature to the first Adam."

<sup>k</sup> Beveridge (Serm. i. p. 9. Ed. S. P. C. K.) gives the simpler view, which I believe to be that of our Church. Considering our Lord's promise to his apostles, (I should add, "and to their converts," but Beveridge takes the more exclusive view,) he says, "we are now to consider in what sense our Lord here promises to be always with them. To find out which we need not have recourse to the wild and extravagant opinion of the Ubiquitarians, asserting the human nature of Christ to be every where present. Neither is it sufficient to observe that His divine essence is present with them; for so it is with every creature, no creature being able to subsist without it: whereas our Saviour here promiseth to be with His apostles in some such peculiar sense, as can belong only to them, and to them only as His apostles. And that we might not be mistaken in a matter of such consequence as this. he himself hath elsewhere explained himself, and left



The work of the Spirit then in our regeneration *is* always immediate so far as regards this material excrescence on the doctrine of mediation which metaphysical piety, or in other words, mysticism, has of late elaborated. But in calling it immediate, for the purpose of our present lecture, I am setting aside these complications, and contrasting it only with those human means with which our Church, in accordance with the teaching of Scripture, has connected it. Not that in our former discussion *all* human means have been omitted; prayer has, on the contrary, been explicitly mentioned as the conscious correlative of grace—but that preventive grace, which led to the employment of this heavenly messenger,

upon record how these words are to be understood. For as he here promiseth His apostles that He will be with them to the end of the world, so he elsewhere tells them that his Holy Spirit shall be always with them (John xiv. 16): which is the same in effect with His own being always with them; for the Spirit proceeding from the Son, as well as from the Father, and being of the same nature and essence with Him, “wheresoever the Spirit is there is Christ also.” So that, in short, our Saviour here promiseth his apostles that He will be always with them to the end of the world by His Holy Spirit accompanying and assisting of them in the discharge of their apostolical office.” Now what is thus said of Christ’s presence with His apostles, is of course *as much* as can be said of his presence with ordinary believers; and as Mr. Wilberforce (p. 45) quotes Bishop Beveridge, as saying, “It was not any human person in particular, but the human nature which He assumed into His second person,” as if this favoured the notion of “human nature” being a “real thing” or “entity,” I have thought it worth while to quote his opinion; and the more so as he sometimes uses language of a *representative* character both of the first and the second Adam, but none that really favours this peculiar notion.

has been as yet unconnected with outward institutions or any form of human agency or subordinate cooperation.

It is in its connection, if it has any, with these that we are now going to regard it. And such a discussion is properly confined to a consideration of the two Sacraments of Christ. For it is these only which are brought before the English Churchman as federal means of grace. Look to the teaching of the Catechism. There is no mention of *ministerial* mediation. "At my Baptism *I was made* a member of Christ, a child of God, &c." "Water wherein the person *is baptized* in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." "What is required of them who come to the Lord's Supper?" A certain *self*-examination. And, "The Body and Blood of Christ *are taken and received by* the faithful in the Lord's Supper." How striking is this omission! The invocation of the one name of the Triune Jehovah, in which we are baptized, has not brought with it the slightest allusion to the officiating minister who pronounces it. Nor has the mention of the child's obligation to perform the promise made for him by his sureties been used as a handle for introducing a confirming Bishop, and still less the mention of repentance an absolving priest<sup>1</sup>. Nor, finally, is a child who is adequately taught at home required to resort to the Curate to learn his Catechism. Is there a word, my brethren, in what I

<sup>1</sup> For some remarks on Confirmation and Absolution see Appendix to this Lecture.

have been saying to interfere with that “reverend estimation of the Clergy” which the preface to the “Forms of Ordination” contemplates? I must be strangely misconceived if I am supposed to be using any such unsuitable and suicidal arguments. To say nothing now of that sympathy and affection which all should feel for those who are aiming at their spiritual welfare, whatever respect, nay obedience, (to use St. Paul’s words<sup>m</sup>), is due to the “ministers” of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God,” let no man from affected modesty be forward to waive, let no man from a false idea of independence be unwilling to pay. But what I do say is, that of that remarkable prominence given to ministerial functions by some in the present day there is no trace whatever to be found in the Lay, which is the same as saying the necessary, teaching of the Church of England. In the Articles<sup>o</sup> the doctrine of an appointed ministry is undoubtedly enforced, and it is mentioned in the order which is there most natural; before the Sacraments, which are to be ordinarily administered by no one else. I say before the Sacraments; for, though the office of “public preaching in the congregation” be equally confined to the Clergy, yet the Word of God, being the foundation of our whole Faith, has been previously duly secured and displayed in its proper prominence<sup>p</sup>. But the lawful ministers are naturally mentioned, in a body of Ecclesiastical instructions, before the Sacraments

<sup>m</sup> Heb. xiii. 17.

<sup>n</sup> 2 Cor. iv. 1.

<sup>o</sup> Art. XXIII.

<sup>p</sup> In Art. VI.

which are to be administered by them; not as if any opinion were thereby expressed as to the *absolute* necessity of their ministrations, (a necessity which, in a case of emergency, few, if any, would maintain,) but because, as a matter of fact, they would be called upon first to assume their ministerial functions before they proceeded to exercise them in particular cases.

I shall not dwell upon the absence of any assertion of the intrinsic superiority of episcopal over other Ordination<sup>q</sup>, or on the defensive language<sup>r</sup> which it is thought enough to use with regard to the forms of Ordination. Nor shall I do more than allude to a point which I before noticed<sup>s</sup>, that in the preface to these very forms the historical *fact* of the existence, since the times of the apostles, of three orders of ministers, and not any explicit doctrine of apostolical succession, is all that is insisted on. The only phrase again which has a subjective sound, and favours the idea of a transmitted power, as distinct from a transmitted office, "Receive the Holy Ghost," does not require discussion, for it has been explained

q "Those we ought to judge lawfully called and sent, which be chosen and called to this work by men who have public authority given unto them in the congregation to call and send ministers into the Lord's vineyard."—Art. XXIII.

r "The book of Consecration of Archbishops and Bishops, and ordinary Priests and Deacons, lately set forth in the time of Edward the Sixth, and confirmed at the same time by authority of Parliament, doth contain all things necessary to such Consecration and Ordination, neither hath it any thing that *of itself* is superstitious and ungodly."—Art. XXXVI.

<sup>s</sup> Lecture II. p. 40.

even by Hooker<sup>t</sup>, (and that even in the case of the apostles,) to mean in part the official power of absolution<sup>u</sup>, in part (that which no one would scruple to claim for any ministry chosen not inconsistently with the Word of God) “the presence of the Holy Ghost, partly to guide, and direct, and strengthen us in all our ways, and partly to assume unto itself, for the more authority, those actions that appertain to our place and calling.” But further; the more moderate and historical view of the ministerial functions, which appears in our Articles, was so unquestionably that of our Reformers, that those who uphold what are considered higher<sup>x</sup> views on this subject, are always

<sup>t</sup> Eccl. Pol. V, ch. lxxvii. 5. p. 585, &c. Ed. Keble.

<sup>u</sup> Some such explanation is necessary in order to reconcile our Lord's present act and words with the due performance of His promise, after “he went away\*,” on the day of Pentecost. For in some sense certainly it was not till then that the apostles were to “receive the Holy Ghost.”

<sup>x</sup> Such views are no doubt *higher* in the sense of exalting man, but not in the sense of realizing that humility which is his true exaltation, (“he that humbleth himself shall be exalted.”) *This* seems to be done more by that general language which dwells upon God's promises to His Church, and so to all its members in their several functions, without any subjective specialty. For myself, I must say, I cannot read without horror (even when allowing for that extremely rhetorical style for which Hooker is so remarkable, and which makes his real meaning often so doubtful,) such claims for a human ministry as these, which Mr. Keble (Preface to Hooker) seems to mention with approbation. “The power of the ministry of God translateth out of darkness into glory; it raiseth men from the earth, *and bringeth God himself down from heaven*; by blessing visible elements it *maketh* them invisible grace; it *giveth daily the Holy Ghost*; it *hath to dispose* of that flesh which was given for the life of the world, and that blood which was poured out to redeem souls; when it poureth

\* John xvi. 7.

fain to allow that it is to Hooker, and to writers of about the same period, and similar tendencies on this point, that we owe the attempt to engraft these views upon the Formularies of our Church<sup>y</sup>. I shall therefore content myself with expressing my own deliberate opinion that the advocacy of these views and the superstitious notions which always cluster around them, has interfered greatly with the good effect of the religious revival of the last thirty years; that it has done, and is doing, much to alienate from the Church of England a large portion of the middle class of this country. Believing as I do that the apostolical appointment of Timothy and Titus, even if temporary, (or perhaps the more so in that case<sup>z</sup>,) and the injunctions given to them as to ordaining Ministers of the Gospel, constitute a strong *moral* obligation upon any Church to abide by this model, I the more regret that this obligation should be so often exaggerated, and represented as a point of express revelation, which it cannot be shewn to be, and still more that views of transmitted spiritual efficacy, of which there is no trace in Scripture<sup>a</sup>, and

maledictions upon the heads of the wicked they perish, when it revoketh the same they revive." Compare the expressions marked in *Italics* with any scriptural expressions, specially with those that speak of "the Holy Ghost" being "given through the laying on of the apostles' hands," (Acts viii. 18.) If these are "high" views one may be thankful to hold "low" ones.

<sup>y</sup> See Keble's edition of Hooker, Preface p. lviii. to lxxvii.

<sup>z</sup> St. Paul's thinking it necessary to appoint a person to the *temporary* office of ordaining elders and deacons, would at least shew that he considered an official regularity of great importance.

<sup>a</sup> On 2 Tim. i. 6. Whitby has this strong note—"Vain, therefore, is the inference of Esthius from these places, that Or-

which I can only call (as I have called them before in this place) *electric*, should be so often obtruded on the common sense of a not irreverent nation.

I leave with satisfaction a subject, which I did not think it right to decline, for one in which reverence and common sense can go hand in hand, and in which I feel every day a growing conviction that they do go hand in hand, and ought not to be divorced, in the united teaching of the Articles Liturgy and Homilies of our Church. We return then in our discussion to that with which we began, the Two Sacraments of Christ. And with regard to these, the Catechism, silent on ministerial functions, speaks plainly and forcibly. It calls them "means whereby we receive an inward and spiritual grace," as well as "pledges to assure us thereof." And in all discussions on the Sacraments the real issue is, Is this definition of a Sacrament qualified by the longer account which we find in the Articles? What is the most, and what the least that can be intended by the expression "means of grace?" Let us look to the description in the Article,—*"Sure witnesses and effectual signs of grace and God's goodwill towards us, whereby he doth work invisibly in us, and not only quicken, but also strengthen and confirm our faith in Him."* There is, no doubt, a shrinking from the use of the word "means" (or

dination is a Sacrament, seeing the grace here mentioned is no ordinary grace, but an extraordinary gift, conferred only in these times by the hands of an apostle, and now wholly ceased." Compare 2 Tim. ii. 2, where it is *the doctrine only* which is to be transmitted.

any one word equivalent to it) discernible in this definition ; a shrinking which is not surprising in those who had lately been engaged in contending against the superstitious “motions and intimations” of the Romanists, which Hooker sets aside, “to make signs in themselves seem causes<sup>b</sup>.” But the result of the two definitions is much the same, at least I shall not now consider how they may be regarded as

<sup>b</sup> Hooker, Eccl. Pol. Book v. appendix, No. I. vol. ii. p. 705. ed. Keble. “Were they not as good to say briefly that God’s Omnipotent will causeth grace, that the outward sign doth shew his will, and that *Sacraments* implying both are thereby *termed* both signs and causes, which is the self-same we say? Their motions and intimations to make signs in themselves seem causes, do amount to no more in very deed than that they are signs. And as we understand not how, so neither can they express in what manner they should be more.” Compare however p. 703, “They (the Romanists) pretend that to *sacraments* we ascribe no efficacy, but make them bare signs of instruction or admonition ; which is utterly false. For sacraments with us are signs effectual ; they are the instruments of God, whereby to bestow grace ; howbeit grace not proceeding from the visible sign, but from his invisible power.” In the former passage Hooker appears to make a distinction between “being” and “being termed” causes. The former view he decidedly opposes, plainly saying that sacraments *are* “signs ;” the latter he allows in a secondary and improper sense of the word “cause.” “Sign” is, speaking logically, the genus, and “effectual” the difference, and “effectual sign” is only so far different from “means,” that it makes the *significance* of sacraments the *main* or most *essential* point in the consideration of them, and so draws our thoughts away from the human instrument to God who makes use of it. It shews (I will add) that where the inward grace is called *part* of a sacrament (as in the Catechism) it is not a strict mode of speaking. Indeed it is inconsistent with the previous definition, which agrees with that of the Article.



different, but rather apply myself to the practical question—*in what sense* are Sacraments “means of grace?”—What is the meaning of God’s “working invisibly in us,” his “not only quickening but also strengthening and confirming our faith in Him?” Are these expressions adequately accounted for by saying that the Sacraments as it were rouse up our slumbering faith, but are not used by God as instruments, wherewith to give us our first motions towards it, or to add anything to it? or do they on the other hand involve or admit the notion of our receiving some *specific* gifts, or at least some grace differing in *kind* from any other influence of God to which we give the name of “grace”? and thirdly, is it necessary to suppose that grace, in a subjective sense, is always received, or in other words, that the “invisible work of God” begins, *then and there*?

The idea of the only effect of Sacraments being to stir up a slumbering faith, appears to me inconsistent with the language of the Article, which insists on a “strengthening” and “confirming,” as well as a “quicken<sup>c</sup>” of faith. But in order to see this more clearly I must ask you briefly to consider what is meant by Faith. And to this the Homilies, which alone enter into the question, give a clear answer. Faith is described in them as a motion of

<sup>c</sup> I cannot indeed think that “quicken” “excitat” is equivalent to “give the first principle of life,” and therefore to me the terms ‘strengthen’ and ‘confirm’ suggest the idea of an addition or new influence more than the word “quicken.” But they *do* suggest such an idea, and so appear at variance with the notion which speaks *only* of awakening a dormant faith.

man towards God, which requires in order to subsist, I will not say a previous, but a present good condition of the soul. Instrumentally faith appears as the particular faculty by which "we embrace the promise of God's mercy, and the remission of our sins<sup>d</sup>," but essentially it is a habit of the soul, which in order to exist "at any time or season<sup>e</sup>," involves the notion "of true repentance, hope, charity, dread and fear of God." This is an assertion which can be easily tested by a reference to the Homilies, and I therefore shall not detain you with quotations. But, if this is the case, it is plain that such a habit of the soul must be susceptible of very great improvement and progression. For these feelings, without which, as the Homily says<sup>f</sup>, it cannot "consist or stand," are themselves undoubtedly capable of such increase. And their increase must affect the substance of the soul, in which they subsist; and, inasmuch as this substance is the seat of faith also, we must, I think, allow that the substance of the soul in which faith subsists, is susceptible of real spiritual improvement. And, without making any pretence to psychological insight or investigation, it is not, I think, too much to say that faith must itself also be affected by the improvement of that in which it subsists; that we cannot imagine its acts to be repeated and resuscitated by any invisible operation of the Spirit of God, without their being also purified and strengthened and elevated; without, in short, their being *better* acts of faith. In other words,

<sup>d</sup> Hom. p. 25.<sup>e</sup> Ibid. p. 21.<sup>f</sup> Ibid. p. 36.

when we speak of “quickenings, confirming and strengthening” *faith*, we cannot exclude the notion of a real spiritual work in the heart; a work which not only recalls but adds, not only clears away but essentially and deeply spiritualizes the substance (whatever it be) of a man’s soul. This is, I think, a necessary inference from the *complex* view of faith which the Homilies present to us. And to me the notion of anything less than this being intended by the Article, appears to accord better with the Romish view of a *character* impressed once for all upon the soul<sup>g</sup>, than with the freer and more spiritual account of regeneration which I have claimed for the Church of England. Nor can I conceive anything more prejudicial to a growth in holiness than the adoption of either this notion, or one which appears to me to resemble it, according to which a man “*has* already all that he can receive in a Sacrament.” This is a view which we find advocated by Peter Martyr, in a letter recently published. Writing to Bullinger from Oxford on the 14th day of June 1552, he tells us that there was at that time a discussion as to whether grace<sup>h</sup> is conferred or not by means of Sacra-

<sup>g</sup> Such a view would be almost equally superstitious whether it were connected with baptism or with conversion.

<sup>h</sup> “An gratia conferatur per sacramenta hæsitatum est a multis. Et fuerunt nonnulli qui omnino id affirmarunt, et in hanc partem voluissent decerni. Quod cum alii non obscure viderent, quantum secum ea sententia portaret superstitionum, principio quidem conati sunt omnibus modis ostendere, nihilo plus concedendum esse sacramentis quam verbo Dei externo, nam utroque verbi genere significatur et ostenditur salus nobis parta per Christum,

ments. And among the arguments which were brought against this notion, which was thought superstitious, (but which may or may not be superstitious according to the meaning attached to the word “confer,”) occurs the deadening theory of which I have been speaking. After saying that Sacraments cannot be worthily received, unless the receiver already has that which is signified by them, for without faith they are always used unworthily<sup>i</sup>, he goes on to observe, “but if on the other hand those who come to the Sacraments are endued with faith, they have *already laid hold by faith of the grace*<sup>k</sup>

quam percipiunt quotquot his verbis et signis credunt, non quidem vi verborum aut sacramentorum, sed efficacia fidei. Quin addebatur, fieri non posse ut sacramenta digne perciperentur, nisi sumentes prius habeant quod per illa significatur; nam absque fide semper usurpantur indigne; at, si fide sint præditi qui ad sacramenta accedunt, jam per fidem apprehenderunt gratiam quæ nobis in sacramentis prædicatur, quorum deinde sumptio et usus perceptæ jam promissionis est σφραγίς et obsignatio. Utque valent externa Dei verba ad fidem sæpe in nobis torpentem et quodammodo consopitam suscitandam et excitandam, hoc quoque idem sacramenta vi Spiritus Sancti facere possunt, neque parum est utilis eorum usus ad nostras mentes alioquin imbecillas de promissionibus et gratia Dei confirmandas.”—Letter to Bullinger in “Writings of Bradford,” vol. ii. p. 400. ed. Park. Soc.

<sup>i</sup> This is undoubtedly true, (except in the case of the Baptism of Infants, which stands alone,) but it is quite a distinct point to every one who does not allow that faith is *the* one grace or virtue of the soul, which, in its instrumental sense, it certainly is not.

<sup>k</sup> It is possible he may have meant to use “grace” solely in an *objective* sense, in which case, as faith is that whereby we embrace the “remission of our sins,” “which thing none other of our virtues or works properly doth,” the statement would be true; but the Article clearly uses “grace” in a *subjective* sense also when it speaks of God’s *working invisibly* in us.

*which is preached*<sup>1</sup> *to us in Sacraments*, the reception and use of which in that case is a seal and obsignation of the promise already received. And as the external word of God has often power to rouse and quicken (*excitare*) our faith when it is sluggish and as it were laid asleep, so Sacraments may do the same by the power of the Holy Ghost." Faith is we see described as a state incapable of improvement, as having exhausted all God's treasury of grace, as in fact requiring nothing but to be occasionally stirred up and awakened, lest, being sure of salvation, she should sleep away her appointed time on her couch of triumphant godliness. A view, in my humble opinion, as utterly inconsistent with a state of probation, as unphilosophical, and as unscriptural as any that could well be set before us. According to this, which I cannot but think a most wretched caricature of faith, there can be no spiritual improvement in the soul, (at least in connection with either the Word or Sacraments,) without our being conscious of it at the time, and making it the object of a particular act of self-reflection.

I have already said that to me this theory appears inconsistent with the language of our Article. The same may be said also of the Homilies. Strong as they are in their statements of the necessity of our having faith *before* we can do good works, and of our

<sup>1</sup> This phraseology is to be found in our Homilies, (p. 317.)—"To administer a sacrament is by the outward word and element to preach to the receiver the inward and invisible grace of God."

inability (to put the question differently) to *work ourselves* into faith, in the first instance, by *any* works, yet they are explicit in affirming also that faith, when once attained, not only will necessarily produce good works, but must be “nourished with good works<sup>1</sup>.” And those “who perceive and feel such a faith within” them, are exhorted not only to rejoice in it, but to be “diligent to maintain it, and keep it still in” them; and to “let it be *daily increasing and more and more by well working*<sup>m</sup>.” Those therefore who accept the statements of the Homilies cannot retort the argument in favour of an increase of faith which I have drawn from its complex nature. They cannot, I mean, say “faith, if it be thus complex, and ‘of itself full of good works’, cannot either need or admit of any increase;” for it is plain that the complex view taken of it in the Homilies is not abstract or theoretical, but practical: one which requires, indeed, faith to be present first, before any good actions can be done, and maintains that, faith being there, any good action may in time, by God’s grace, be done, but nevertheless admits that faith, once given, may be reacted upon by works, and practically and actually receive additions in those very graces which theoretically and potentially are included in it in their perfection. Such is I think the view of faith presented to us in the Formularies of our Church, and it is far deeper and more comprehensive than that of Peter Martyr. And as the whole of the passage which I have just read to you

<sup>1</sup> Hom. p. 43.

<sup>m</sup> Hom. p. 40.

<sup>n</sup> Hom. p. 33. and 43.

has been lately quoted by an amiable and learned writer<sup>o</sup> of our own to prove that our Reformers confined the grace of Sacraments to worthy recipients, (a point which few would question, but which, as I said, is distinct,) I shall call your attention to the continuation and conclusion of this letter in order to guard against the error of supposing that it contains any evidence to shew that they agreed with Peter Martyr<sup>p</sup> further in affirming that the worthy receiver “already has all that is signified by the Sacraments.” After some remarks then on Infant Baptism, to which I shall recur, Peter Martyr goes on to say,—“We could have wished this to be established and decreed in the matter of Sacraments, with a view to restoring at length the simple and genuine use of

<sup>o</sup> Dr. Macbride, Lectures on the Articles, p. 435-6.

<sup>p</sup> Hooper, indeed, seems to have agreed with him. See a letter of his to Bucer, dated as early as June 14. 1548, in “Original Letters,” vol. i. p. 47. Parker Soc. ed. E. g. he says of Baptism, “the Church of God publicly receives him in Baptism who had been previously received by grace.” And of the Lord’s Supper, “to eat the body of Christ is *nothing else* than to believe, as He Himself teaches in the sixth of John.” This hard exclusive language is very different from that of Cranmer, quoted below, from his book on the Sacrament. And there is a remark in a letter of Martin Micronius to Bullinger (dated May 28. 1550) in “Original Letters,” vol. ii. p. 563, which leads, I think, to the conclusion that Hooper stood alone in his extreme views on the Sacraments. “Some of the council lately proposed certain articles for him to subscribe to, but he excepted against three of them. One is, that the Sacraments confer grace. He wished the word *confer* to be changed into ‘*seal or testify to.*’” If he had had influence enough there would probably have been no mention of “invisible working,” which is that which gives to the rest of the description its spiritual, as distinct from a *merely moral*, sense.

them. But a counter-cry was raised, and many, who in other respects lack neither learning nor piety, will have it that grace is, as they say, conferred by means of Sacraments. And they will not allow that young children are justified or regenerate before Baptism. It is true that when you come to their reasons they can every one of them be disposed of with the greatest ease." (This is a matter of opinion.) "It is, however, made a great objection to us, that we altogether differ from Augustine—and had our view been sanctioned by public authority, then, say they, Augustine would have been most palpably condemned. What more need I say? There is no drawing men away from the merit of works, and what is more lamentable, they will not own it;" (considering how perfectly separate a question the 'merit of works' is from that of 'grace in Sacraments,' there was perhaps some excuse for these recusants;) "and there are continually endless hindrances, coming one after the other, and delaying from day to day the restoration of divine worship. So hard a thing it is to bring back pure truth into the Church! And yet we must not therefore despair. In fact I feel considerable confidence that this, which at present has had but a sorry issue, may at some future time be brought about<sup>q</sup>."

q "Hæc de Sacramentis constitui atque decerni voluissimus, ut purus atque simplex illorum usus tandem restitueretur. Sed reclamatum est; et volunt multi, atque hi alias non indocti neque mali, per Sacramenta ut aiunt conferri gratiam. Neque volunt concedere parvulos justificados aut regeneratos ante Baptismum. Sed cum ad rationes illorum venit, nullæ sunt quæ non solutæ sint et quidem facillime. Ex eo tamen haud parva nobis movetur



The evidence of this letter is, we see, decidedly against the supposition that the views of the writer were at the time adopted. That portion of them, no doubt, which has reference to the Sacraments having a wholesome effect only in the worthy receivers, is incorporated in our Article; (and the worthy and learned writer who quoted the letter no doubt designed to assert no more than this;) but, there is no sign whatever of the solidian view of Peter Martyr having met with final favour. And the point is so important that I could not avoid calling your special attention to it. For in magnifying the office of faith, as being the “hand of the soul,” by which we apprehend God’s grace, “the first<sup>r</sup> entry into the Christian life,” the only actual means of justification, let us not fall into the error of speaking of it as if it were the sole virtue of the soul, nay one might almost say the soul itself, instead of being merely one phenomenon or result of the spiritual change and renovation which produces all those other graces without which faith cannot subsist, and with which faith itself must, as the Homily reminds us<sup>s</sup>,

*invidia, quod ab Augustino prorsus dissentiamus. Et si auctoritate publicâ fuisset probata nostra sententia tunc iniquum manifestissime damnatus esset Augustinus. Quid plura? Non possunt homines ab operum merito avelli et quod magis dolendum est id fateri nolunt; suntque infinita semper impedimenta, eaque mutuo sibi succedunt, ut remotentur indies divini cultus restitutionem. Tantæ molis est puram veritatem in ecclesiam revocare. At propterea non est desperandum; immo non parum confidimus, alias fieri posse quod nunc minus feliciter successit.”*

<sup>r</sup> Hom. p. 432.

<sup>s</sup> Hom. p. 23.

be renounced as not meritorious, as something "far too weak, and insufficient, and unperfect, to deserve remission of our sins, and our justification, and therefore we must trust only in God's mercy, and that sacrifice which our High Priest and Saviour Christ Jesus, the Son of God, once offered for us upon the cross, to obtain thereby God's grace and remission, as well of our original sin in baptism, as of all actual sin committed by us after our baptism, if we truly repent, and turn unfeignedly to Him again." Now the true repentance by which we thus turn again to God after sin in itself implies an accession of grace in the soul, and surely no one would say that such an accession would not react on a man's faith, or that it could not be connected with "the strengthening and refreshing of our souls by the Body and Blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper." And any one who compares the language of the Homilies<sup>s</sup> on the Sacra-

<sup>s</sup> For instance, Hom. p. 316, (of Common Prayer and Sacraments,) they are spoken of as "visible signs expressly commanded in the New Testament, *whereunto is annexed the promise of free forgiveness of our sin, and of our holiness and joining to Christ.*" Again, "when prayers or administration of Sacraments shall be in a tongue unknown . . . who shall in the ministration of the Sacraments understand what invisible grace is to be craved of the hearer *to be wrought in the inward man?*" Ibid. p. 318. [The share that the prayer, whether of individuals or of the minister in the name of the Church, may have in bringing down grace, is quite a separate question.] Some passages relating to the Lord's Supper I leave to be quoted further on. It would be unfair to omit that there are other passages (besides that quoted p. 181) taking strongly the moral as distinct from the spiritual view, or the conscious as distinct from the secret:—e. g. "a

ments, with their language on the subject of faith, will, I think, come to the same conclusion, that the effect of Sacraments in worthy receivers (who alone receive any internal thing<sup>t</sup>) is spiritual rather than moral, if by moral efficacy is only meant a revival of past feelings and dormant susceptibilities and hopes. But the difference is, I truly believe, often only verbal. Even in Peter Martyr's letter, the awakening and arousing of the torpid faith is ascribed to the

visible sign of an invisible grace that setteth out to the eyes and other outward senses the inward working of God's free mercy, and doth, as it were, seal in our hearts the promiscs of God."—Ibid. p. 314. And of the Lord's Supper—"being rightly done by the faithful, it doth not only help their weakness, (who be by their poisoned nature readier to *remember* injuries than benefits,) but strengtheneth and comforteth their inward man *with peace and gladness*, and maketh them thankful to their Redeemer, with diligent care and godly conversation," though in this passage both views are combined.

<sup>t</sup> This is a point which, except in the case of this question, "what is worthiness in infants?" most members of the Church of England admit, and so I have not dwelt upon it. The remarks made further on in this Lecture on the probability of the internal benefit of Sacraments not being always at once conferred, but being supplied, from time to time, as required, and this especially in the case of Baptism, (a point which Bucer, and Jeremy Taylor in his "Life of Christ," treat in much the same manner,) sufficiently guard against any superstitious notion of grace being conferred by the mere outward element or act. But I should wish to call attention to the remarkable discretion of the Homilist, who while claiming as I have shewn an *inward spiritual* benefit for the *worthy* receiver, takes care to use *objective* language in speaking of the peril to the *unworthy*. See first part of Hom. on Sacrament ad fin. and part ii. p. 404, where the illustration, being natural, is spoken of in subjective terms, but the objective word *destruction* is applied to the thing illustrated.

power of the Holy Ghost, and were it not for the paralysing view of a man "having already all he can receive" from God, (at least in a Sacrament,) I should not quarrel with his statement. For in arguing in favour of a spiritual operation, I am well aware, and should strongly maintain, that in very many, if not most, cases the only *sensible* result of such an operation would be to strengthen and quicken the *existing* feelings of the soul; only I should regard these strengthened and quickened feelings as an evidence of an inward work of progressive renovation, real, although visible only to the eye of God.

And one of the great reasons which induce me to oppose the notion which confines the efficacy of sacraments to an effect of which man can be conscious, (which is no doubt what some mean by a *moral* effect,) is that it excludes infants from a participation in any sacramental blessing: an exclusion at variance with the practice of him who said, "Suffer the little children to come unto me," at variance with the whole spirit both of our ordinary Baptismal Office, and of the Catechism, at variance, as it seems to me, with the opinion of Cranmer, and, I am glad to be able to add, with the unequivocal admission of both Bucer and Peter Martyr themselves. I shall not argue from our Lord's language<sup>u</sup>, because when

<sup>u</sup> Few members of the Church of England would, I suppose, extend the hypothetical view of the language, which affirms regeneration of each baptized infant, to that which declares that "it is certain by God's word that children which are baptized, dying

used by a Church which as a matter of fact does baptize infants, it seems to me to speak plainly and strongly enough for itself; nor from the language of the Baptismal Office, for that no one attempts to invalidate but only to confine to the elect. But how is it, I should wish to ask, that *every* baptized child is directed to speak of himself as the object of the sanctification of the Spirit, and by implication one of the elect? "The Holy Ghost sanctifieth *me*." Can this be hypothetical<sup>x</sup>? In answer to this ques-

before they commit actual sin, are undoubtedly saved," but would allow that *this* statement was meant to be universal; and they would, I apprehend, ordinarily consider our Lord's invitation the strongest scriptural groundwork of it. Otherwise they would argue that all those who died thus *must* be elect. But is not such an argument, being founded only on *natural* views of God's justice, less satisfactory than that which appeals to this text? But if this text is allowed to be the foundation of the hope or certainty, I confess I cannot understand how those who found on this language a firm hope of the salvation of baptized, or even unbaptized, infants, dying before they commit wilful sin, should object to an equally firm hope of their receiving spiritual benefit from baptism being founded on it.

<sup>x</sup> In speaking on this subject, "hypothesis" and "assumption" seem to me often confounded. Our Church seems to state that all baptized children are the objects of spiritual assistance, and to *assume* not merely *suppose* that they are *elect*. With regard to the use of the word "elect," I can see no reason why it should not be considered equivalent to "favoured" or "accepted," as it is unquestionably used thus in the Homilies, as I have shewn in Lecture II. But even if it is used in the sense of predestinated to life, (and Nowell's Catechism favours this view,) the position of our Church, as that of the Lutherans (as Bucer, interpreting Melancthon, plainly proves) would be, that until there was any evident and unmistakeable sign of a *reprobate* mind, it is to be taken for granted that a baptized child is one of the elect. And, even if

tion I will say first, that Cranmer in twenty or thirty passages in which he speaks of Baptism—attributing to it the grace of “regeneration,” arguing that therein we be “clothed with Christ,” telling us that “as the priest putteth his hand to the child outwardly and washeth him with water, so must we think that God putteth to his hand inwardly and washeth the infant with his holy Spirit; and moreover that Christ himself cometh down upon the child, and apparelleth him with his own self<sup>y</sup>,” in all these passages never once introduces the doctrine of election as qualifying these promises. And to call him—as he has been called<sup>z</sup>—“decidedly Calvinistical,” is, I have no hesitation in saying, the language of a rash partisan. But Bucer, to whom, with Melancthon, we owe we allowed (which I do not) that only the *elect* are *regenerate*, still to argue, or suggest, that a great many baptized children are not elect and therefore not regenerate, is to nullify the Church’s assumption.

<sup>y</sup> “Answer to Gardiner,” p. 366. Parker Soc. Ed., p. 394 orig. Ed. It is not necessary to refer to other particular passages, for one of Cranmer’s leading arguments being, that “we receive whole Christ” in Baptism as much as in the Lord’s Supper, his language on that Sacrament is throughout excessively strong. But the point I am arguing for is not this, but that there is no *qualification* expressed or hinted in connection with Predestination.

<sup>z</sup> Mr. Ryle does this in his “Bishop, Pastor, and Preacher,” p. 31: the truth is that Cranmer was *Calvinistical* so far as to insist on “election” being entirely irrespective of our works, (see “Corrections of The Institution by Henry VIII, with Cranmer’s annotations,” p. 95, Miscell. Remains and Letters, xxxviii. Ed. Parker Soc.,) but I do not believe a sentence could be quoted from his writings in favour of Reprobation, which is an essential part of the system of Calvin.

(though indirectly) a large portion of our Baptismal Office<sup>a</sup>, enters into the question as to how far the doctrine of Predestination qualifies the universality of Baptismal grace. And he unquestionably takes

<sup>a</sup> Dr. Macbride, "Lectures on the Articles," p. 470, argues in favour of "the hypothetical principle" as the only way of reconciling the Liturgy and the Articles, in part on the grounds of our "form of baptism" being "mainly of Protestant origin," and being "largely indebted" to the book "drawn up by Melancthon and Bucer" for Herman of Cologne. Now in this book, as has been pointed out by Abp. Laurence in his Bampton Lectures, (Notes (on Serm. VIII.) p. 439, 440, 441,) the language is unequivocally in favour of *every* baptized infant being therein regenerate, by which they meant that the external call which brought him to baptism was a sure sign that he was the object of God's saving mercy, which they extended to the whole human race. "*Sed Deus pater, pro ineffabili sua misericordia erga genus humanum, Filium suum misit, ut mundum servaret, quare etiam et hos infantes servatos vult.*"—"Et vobis *certissimum sit*, Dominum nostrum Jesus Christum hoc opus charitatis vestræ erga *hunc* infantem clementissime respecturum." Nostra *Hermanni &c.*, p. 71. "Itaque ex baptismo *certo statuimus*, nos Deo acceptos et fœdere gratiæ sempiterno ei conjunctos esse," p. 72. "Debent pastores subinde accuratius et solidius explicare et excutere *ratum* habere Deum baptisma infantium nostrorum, infantes per baptismum adoptare in filios, et constituere hæredes gratiæ suæ et vitæ æternæ," p. 75. "Quod cum fecerint, *ne dubitent* infantem suum *vere* baptizatum, *peccatis ablutum in Christo, renatum*, et filium hæredemque Dei *factum esse*," p. 77. "Ex his ergo Christi verbis *certi sumus* infantes, *quicumque* Christo juxta verbum ejus offeruntur, pertinere ad regnum Dei, esse filios Dei, membra Christi," p. 78. Most persons will, I think, agree with Abp. Laurence in saying that "these passages express something more than the language of hope." And if we put together with them the remarks of Bucer (from Melancthon) which he elsewhere quotes (p. 430) arguing that no one can be a Christian, without assuming that he is one of the predestinated to life, the propriety of substi-

the Augustinian view, which represents every baptized child as spiritually regenerate even though not predestinate. Not only does he insist on our Lord's having blessed<sup>b</sup> *all* the children *indifferently* who

tuting the word "assumption" for "hypothesis" appears incontrovertible, so far as regards the regeneration *of infants*. "Qui de hoc (that is, his being himself predestinate) dubitat nec vocatum se et justificatum esse credere poterit, hoc est nequit esse Christianus. Præsumendum igitur, ut principium fidei, *nos omnes* a Deo esse præscitos, præfinitos, separatos a reliquis, et selectos in hoc ut æternum servemur, hocque propositum Dei mutari non posse." Enarrat. in Romanos, p. 360 (or p. 411 B and C, ed. Basil. 1562.) Of course this argument will only prevail with those who think that in translating the Lutheran form of baptism our reformers meant to adopt their sentiments. If any one thinks that they meant to take a Calvinistic view of the question of infant baptism, while they used Lutheran language, any argument drawn from the language of the Baptismal Office would of course be of no avail with him. Compare the sentence from the Cologne Form, quoted above, beginning "Debent pastores," with this from the Articles of Concord between the Churches of Zurich and Geneva, drawn up in the year 1549. "Præterea sedulo docemus Deum *non promiscue* vim suam exercere in omnibus qui sacramenta recipiunt sed tantum in electis. Nam quemadmodum *non alios* in fidem illuminat, quam quos præordinavit ad vitam, ita arcana Spiritus sui virtute efficit, ut percipiant *electi* quæ offerunt sacramenta." Art. 16. See Abp. Laurence's Bampton Lectures, pp. 438, 439, and compare Bucer's view of the case of Baptized Infants *not* predestinated to life, quoted further on.

<sup>b</sup> "In his autem illud observandum est, Deum uti ad hæc ecclesiæ ministerio, pro ea ratione qua illa in his ipsi cooperari potest. Deus suos selegit ante conditum mundum, et in hoc ut in filios ipsi adoptentur prædefinivit, idque juxta bene placitum voluntatis suæ. Atqui quos elegit, inque sortem filiorum sibi destinavit non solet vulgo revelare. Utque in adultis confessionem fidei, quam vita non arguit falsam, satis ad id esse nobis statuit, ut eis participatum salutis per sacramenta exhibeamus qui



were brought to him, on the promise "I will be the God of thy seed" being without exception, on the mere fact of infants being brought to baptism by those who have the charge of them, (although they are not the children of pious parents or even parents within the covenant,) being enough to bring them, so far as man can venture to criticise, within the benefits of baptism, but he also contemplates the case of those who are *not* predestinated to life; and he says that in their case the effect of baptism is to leave them without excuse if they *reject so great gifts of God*. His constant argument is, that God has not revealed those whom he has predes-

illam edunt, sic in infantibus nihil jussit morari ultra hæc, si sint ex sanctis progeniti, aut alias in jure sanctorum, vel denique si benedictioni Christi apportentur, hoc est, si hanc pro eis petant ii in quorum sunt potestate. Nam præcipit Dominus circumcidere non solum qui essent ex suo populo nati, verum etiam vernas et emptitios. Et Dominus ipse qui apportati ei fuerunt, *promiscue* omnes benedixit, et cælorum participes pronuntiavit. Jussui itaque Domini Ecclesia simpliciter paret, ipsi Domino permittens quos vitæ æternæ deputavit."—Enarrat. ad Roman. p. 161 B. And again, after saying, "Itaque plerumque accidit ut quibus sacramenta ecclesia administrat ii rem sacramenti tamen non percipiant," which must however be qualified in the case of infants by what I have quoted further on (p. 194), and means in *their* case "the *full* benefit of the sacrament," he goes on to say, "nec proprie fallitur hic ecclesia quæ in his omnibus nihil aliud agere instituit quam id ad quod Dominus ejus uti ministerio decrevit. Habet promissionem Dei de infantibus hanc, Ero Deus seminis tui: erga adultos illam, Qui invocaverit nomen Domini salvus erit. Has promissiones ut accepit a Domino simpliciter ita citra exceptionem sequitur, certa pendere ab ultronea Dei electione omnia. Agnoscit enim sibi nec corda hominum, nec arcanum electionis, hoc est secretum cordis Dei pervestigandum."—Ibid. C.

minated, and that man therefore has no right whatever to confine His promises. And this is the more striking, because all the while he insists upon absolute election. His views however on election may be left to the next Lecture; I only wish you to see that he does not allow them to interfere with the universality of the benefits of baptism,—“In the case of those however,” are the words (at full) of the last and most particular passage, “who are not predestinated to life God nevertheless commends his goodness, both to the infants themselves and to their parents and people, and thus deprives them of all excuse if they willingly reject so great gifts of God<sup>c</sup>.” And to shew his opinion as to the reality, as well as the universality, of the benefit, I will add his description of the effects of infant baptism; “When they (that is, young children) are by the Church’s ministry initiated into His service by the sacraments, though they perceive nothing of it, He yet receives them into the fellowship of eternal life, and gives them the gift of his regenerating Spirit, who will put forth His powers, and unfold the new creature in practical life, when this, according to the counsel of his will, is likely best to promote His glory<sup>d</sup>.”

<sup>c</sup> “Erga eos vero, qui ad vitam ordinati non sunt, nihilominus Deus bonitatem suam commendat, cum infantibus tum parentibus et populo eorum, nudatque hoc pacto eos omni defensione qui ultro tanta Dei dona rejiciunt.”—Enarrat. ad Rom. p. 162 D.

<sup>d</sup> “Cum hi (parvuli) ecclesiæ ministerio ei (that is, ‘Deo’) per sacramenta initiantur, ipse eos licet nihil hujus sentientes in communionem vitæ æternæ suscipit, et spiritu regeneratore donat, exerturo se, et novam creaturam in vita explicaturo, cum id juxta

Let us now hear Peter Martyr, who, you will observe, dwells more at first on the children of *Christians* being *already* within the covenant, and seems to limit the benefits of baptism to them; but nevertheless, in describing the effect of baptism, uses even stronger language than Bucer, language, in fact, which (if I were to dare to make it my own) would be thought redolent of Popish superstition—"In the case of children however who are baptized," (he evidently treats their case as exceptional,) "inasmuch as by reason of their age they cannot have that assent to the promises of God, in which faith consists, the effect of the sacrament is to seal the pardon of original sin, and reconciliation with God, and the grace of the Holy Spirit with which they are gifted through Christ, and to engraft them visibly in the Church to which they already belong. Though there is no doubt that to those who are baptized, whether young children or adults, *much good and advantage must accrue from the invocation of (or prayer to) the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, which is made over them, for God never fails to hear the faithful prayers of his Church*." Now

consilium voluntatis ejus ad gloriam ejus optima ratione facturum est."—Enarrat. ad Roman. p. 161 A.

<sup>e</sup> "In pueris vero qui baptizantur, quia per ætatem habere non possunt assensum promissionibus divinis quæ fides est, hoc in eis efficit sacramentum ut condonatio labis originis reconciliatio cum Deo, et Spiritus Sancti gratia qua per Christum donati sunt in eis obsignetur atque pertinentes jam ad ecclesiam visibiliter quoque illi inserantur. Quamvis et his qui tinguntur, *sive parvulis sive adultis, multum boni atque commodi accedere non sit ne-*

what good and benefit a child (let alone an adult) can gain from this invocation, except it be an inward operation of the Holy Ghost on his unconscious soul, I cannot imagine. But whatever he may have exactly meant, he evidently distinguished this "benefit and advantage" from the remission of original sin before spoken of<sup>f</sup>, and I think I am therefore justified in saying that he, as well as Bucer, does not hesitate to make an exception in the case of the baptism of infants, dispensing in *their* case for the time with the requirement of faith, without suspending altogether the blessings of regeneration. Such, moreover, is unequivocally the language of the document which is believed to be the foundation of our Articles, and the result of the consultation of our divines with the continental Reformers. In the Article<sup>g</sup> on the use of sacraments, it is there said, "The promise of grace and eternal life belongs not only to adults but to infants as well. For since

*gandum ex invocatione Patris, Filii atque Spiritus Sancti quæ fit super eos; nunquam enim Deus non audit fideles ecclesiæ suæ preces."*

<sup>f</sup> Whether by the "prayers of the Church," he intended the invocation, which alone he mentions, I cannot tell; from the conjunction "enim," and the fact of no other prayers being mentioned, and the well known habit of the Reformers of regarding blessings and declarations in the humbler light of prayers, I think it extremely probable. In our own Article "*Invocatio Dei*" is the expression for "calling upon God," and "*divinæ invocationis*" for "prayer unto God."

<sup>g</sup> Art. IX, "De Sacramentorum usu," in "Miscellaneous writings and Letters of Thomas Cranmer," published by the Parker Society, p. 477.

infants are born with original sin, they stand in need of this sin being remitted, and it is remitted so far as regards the removal of the guilt, though the corruption of nature, or concupiscence, remains in this life: *though it begins to be healed, inasmuch as the Holy Spirit exerts his power, even in the case of infants, and begins to cleanse them<sup>h</sup>.*” And the “*Reformatio legum Ecclesiasticarum*<sup>i</sup>” speaks “of the cruel impiety” of those who denied Baptism to Infants, “utterly without reason,” and after arguing from the analogy of circumcision, goes on to say, “they are partakers of the same promise and divine covenant, and were moreover received with the greatest kindness by Christ<sup>k</sup>.”

Turning from the Sacrament of Baptism to that of the Lord's Supper, I shall quote one or two passages to shew that an actual accession of benefit was herein also contemplated. In the first “exhortation” then it is expressly said, that “Almighty God our heavenly Father hath given his Son our Saviour Jesus Christ, not only to die for us, *but also to be our spiritual food and sustenance in that holy Sacrament.*” In the Homily “concerning the Sacrament,” “an incorporation into Christ” is said to be “therein

<sup>h</sup> “*Promissio gratiæ et vitæ æternæ pertinet non solum ad adultos sed etiam ad infantes. Quia vero infantes nascuntur cum peccato originis, habent opus remissione illius peccati, et illud ita remittitur ut reatus tollatur, licet corruptio naturæ sive concupiscentia manet in hac vita; etsi incipit sanari quia Spiritus Sanctus in ipsis etiam infantibus est efficax et eos mundat.*”

<sup>i</sup> Cap. 18. De Baptismo.

<sup>k</sup> “*Ejusdem promissionis et fœderis divini participes sunt et a Christo sunt etiam cum summa humanitate suscepti.*”

*wrought* by faith in the souls of the faithful<sup>l</sup>," it is said to bring with it not only "happy trustings," but *effects*<sup>m</sup>, a "spiritual thing"<sup>n</sup> is distinctly said to be received by the faithful, and moreover it is promised that they shall "be united to Christ our Lord *in his mysteries*<sup>o</sup>," and lastly, "Here," it is said<sup>p</sup>, "the faithful may feel *wrought* the tranquillity of conscience, the increase of faith, the strengthening of hope, the large spreading abroad of brotherly kindness, with many other sundry graces of God:" "wrought," we may observe, not merely "revived," "increased" and "strengthened," not only "sealed."

To these testimonies I shall add another which appears to me of great weight, as coming from one who is supposed to have advocated a purely Zuinglian and commemorative view of this sacrament. "When," says Cranmer<sup>q</sup>, "such men" (that is, "faithful Christian people, Christ's true disciples") "who continually from time to time eat Christ's body spiritually,—for their more comfort and confirmation of eternal life given unto them by Christ's death, come unto the Lord's holy table; then, as before they fed spiritually upon Christ, so now they feed corporally also on the sacramental bread,—by which sacramental feeding in Christ's promises, their former spiritual feeding is *increased*, and they *grow* and *wax* continually more strong in Christ, until at the last they shall come to the full measure and perfection

<sup>l</sup> Hom. p. 398.<sup>m</sup> Ibid. p. 399.<sup>n</sup> Ibid. p. 400.<sup>o</sup> Hom. p. 405.<sup>p</sup> Ibid. p. 399.<sup>q</sup> Answer to Gardiner, p. 71 (p. 70 orig. ed.) ed. Parker Soc.

in Christ." Their "spiritual feeding" is, he says, *increased*, they *grow and wax more strong* in Christ. I do not say this language is adequate to the occasion; but I cannot but think that it shews that Cranmer, though in opposing Romish error he went perhaps too far in the opposite direction, had no sympathy with the cold and solifidian view which represents a man as already having all that the Sacraments can give him.

But because we believe that the benefit and the grace of Sacraments are real, are we therefore bound to regard them as specific? Not, I should say, in any strict or formal sense. Both in the Catechism and in the Articles the benefits of Baptism<sup>r</sup> are described in language which may be regarded, I think, as mainly objective and prospective so far as regards an actual change in the soul<sup>s</sup>; but whether prospective or instantaneous, not surely *specific*, except as being initiatory. A specific distinction may indeed be inferred in the case of the Lord's Supper from its peculiar blessings being connected with the communion of the Body and Blood of Christ. But I do not think that we know enough on this point, to say that the effect upon the soul, however exactly produced, is different *in kind*; and I am sure there

<sup>r</sup> The being made "A member of Christ, a child of God, and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven." Answer in part 1 of Catechism. "A death unto sin and a new birth unto righteousness, for being by nature born in sin, and the children of wrath, we are hereby made the children of grace." Answer to question in second part, "What is the inward spiritual grace of Baptism?" See Art. XXVII.

<sup>s</sup> The prospectiveness belongs rather to our third question.

is no such strict language to be found in our Formularies. You will observe, I do not say the *agency*<sup>t</sup> may not be different, but, when persons speak of grace, they are wont to use the word subjectively, and if it is thus used we must, I think, allow that our knowledge of the nature of the soul does not enable us to speak specifically, if we choose to speak subjectively on this point. And I believe that to do so has a tendency to repel many who love simplicity, while they yet do not fail in reverence, and who would, I think, often gladly go with what I have now said, as to a real accession of grace, a real spiritual work in the soul, a real internal difference in degree and intensity, (a difference, I mean, not of conscious sensations, but of hidden influence,) if they were not required to go further, and allow a difference *in kind*. And in behalf of the more moderate among the party which is called Evangelical, (with whom I often sympathise,) I wish humbly to suggest the wisdom of not pressing this distinction<sup>u</sup>.

<sup>t</sup> In Lecture IV. I have stated it to be my opinion that this is in some degree the case. And this in popular language would make the grace *special*.

<sup>u</sup> I cannot but think that there would be a great prospect of union among the more moderate, who are generally the most valuable, of either side, (that which is called "High Church" and that which is called "Evangelical,") if the former would give up (what they cannot, I think, prove) the exclusive specialty of Sacramental grace, and the latter accept the notion of an accession being made, by the unseen agency of the Spirit working in the worthy recipients of Sacraments, to that state, or part, or whatever it be, of the soul, of which faith is the index or expression; and I believe that most of the really valuable members of the latter party are inclined to make the concession.



The last question I proposed was this—Must the grace connected with the Sacraments be always received *then and there*, the invisible work *then and there* begun? In answering this question we must, I think, take into account in the first place our great ignorance, which I have already insisted on, of what is really meant by the renovation of the soul. We know that it is something real, but what it is we know not. May we not also say, that we connect it with certain ordinances, but that we cannot dogmatize as to the nature of the connection? And if not as to the nature, not surely as to the exact time when the Spirit of God begins to work upon the soul. Are we not safe in leaving this to His good pleasure while we reverently obey His commandments, surely trusting that grace will ever attend His Holy Institutions? That while we do this zealously and faithfully, praying unto God through Jesus Christ to be present with us by His Spirit, we shall receive whatever we most need at whatever time, and in whatever manner He may think best, is a sure truth of Scripture: can a man be far wrong who acts upon it? Is there any thing irreverent, any thing rationalistic, in the view of Bucer, which I have quoted above, that the Holy Spirit will exert himself in the baptized at such time as shall seem most suited for the furtherance of God's glory? Have we become so strict as to be frightened at the freedom of the view of Jeremy Taylor, who does not scruple to say<sup>x</sup>, that we who

<sup>x</sup> Life of Christ, Sect. xii. Discourse ix. ch. 20. p. 365. Ed. Eden.

“are baptized in our infancy do not actually reap that fruit of present pardon which persons of a mature age in the primitive Church did?” And that “Baptism<sup>z</sup> and its effect may be separated, and do not always go in conjunction, the effect may be be-

<sup>y</sup> This closely resembles the language of Bucer (Enarrat. ad Roman. p. 326 F.) “Quantum ad ipsum attinet semper peccatis abluit (that is God) et regignit baptizandos, utcunque aliqui suâ culpâ in peccatis et carnis vetustate permanent. Qui tamen simul atquè incipiunt benevolentiae Dei et redemptioni Christi baptismate exhibitæ habere fidem, *fructum baptismatis recipiunt*.” This is what Jeremy Taylor describes (Life of Christ, l. c.) in these words, “when we by acts of our own election verify the promise made in Baptism, and so bring back the rite by receiving the effect of Baptism.”

<sup>z</sup> Ibid. sect. ix. part ii. p. 248. and again ch. vii. p. 252-3. “Baptism is not to be estimated as one act transient and effective to single purposes, but it is an entrance to a conjugation and state of blessings. All our life is to be transacted by the measures of the Gospel covenant, and that covenant is consigned by Baptism, there we have our title and adoption to it; and the grace that is there given to us is like a piece of leaven put into a lump of dough, and faith and repentance do in all the periods of our life put it into fermentation and activity. The seed may lie long in the ground, and produce fruits in its due season, if it be refreshed with “the former and the latter rain,” that is, the repentance that first changes the state, and converts the man, and afterwards returns him to his title, and recalls him from his wanderings, and keeps him in the state of grace, and within the limits of the covenant: and all the way faith gives efficacy and acceptance to this repentance: that is, continues our title to the promise of not having righteousness exacted by the measures of the law, but by the covenant and promise of grace, into which we entered at Baptism, and walk in the same all the days of our life. Sixthly, The Holy Spirit which descends upon the waters of Baptism does not instantly produce its effects in the soul of the baptized, and when He does it is irregularly and as He pleases.”

fore, (as in the case of Cornelius,) and therefore much rather may it be after its susception; the Sacrament operating in the virtue of Christ, ‘even as the Spirit shall move:’ according to that saying of St. Austin, ‘*Sacrosancto lavacro inchoatur innovatio novi hominis ut proficiendo perficiatur, in aliis citius, in aliis tardius*; and St. Bernard, *lavari quidem cito possumus, ad sanandum vero opus est curatione multâ*: ‘the work of regeneration, that is begun in the ministry of Baptism, is perfected in some sooner, in some later,’—‘we may soon be washed, but to be healed is the work of a long cure.’” Have we, I repeat, become too strict for this free and comprehensive language, which blends the present and the prospective in that humble trustfulness which, though rising above *hypothesis*, still takes into account the difference between our circumstances and those of the early converts? Has not, I will further ask, our own Church sanctioned a degree of prospectiveness (if we may use the expression) in making so marked a distinction between the Baptismal and Communion Offices; claiming, indeed, for the baptized child “spiritual regeneration,” but keeping the deep and lofty language of “indwelling” for the more perfect ordinance and the conscious recipient? And if one should believe that even here the blessing sometimes was not an immediate operation of the Spirit, but only a more vivid abiding aid, leading to the elevation of after life, would there be any thing irreverent, any thing rationalistic in this<sup>r</sup>? To conclude, can it be

<sup>r</sup> I do not recommend this view; but it does not seem inadmissible.

said that our Church, in presenting the Sacraments to us as means of grace, prescribes to us the exact position which they are to occupy in our thoughts, binds us to the adoption of the result of a particular reflection of the human mind upon the institutions of Christ? Have we not room for those, have we not (which is of more consequence) a hand and a heart for those who dwell mainly upon the spiritual grace of which they believe the institutions of Christ are means, and for those also who, dwelling mainly on the positive institutions<sup>a</sup>, regard them yet as in-

<sup>a</sup> I shall not hesitate to say that to me the latter view seems as reverent and perhaps more scriptural. In Scripture the *first* impression with regard to the two Sacraments would, I think, be to consider them as positive institutions, Baptism as a rite of admission, and the Supper of the Lord as an act of commemoration. But the next and more thoughtful view would be to connect spiritual blessings with them, blessings suggested by the the words which express presence, union, regeneration, incorporation, feeding upon Christ. And, in going on to set forth to others' admiration that which oneself heartily believed, it would be natural to most men to expand and amplify the words expressive of these high and spiritual privileges and blessings. And this would, I think, have been never objected to if the language had not been dogmatized, and as it were stereotyped, and then used as a test. But a man might have believed and spoken thus, without entering at all into the question of the degree or mode of connection between these acts of obedience or (in a higher religious state) of love, and the grace which was associated in his mind with them. The difference is between thinking and saying, that "all who are baptized and partake of the Holy Communion worthily will receive certain blessings from God," and refining on this thought and expression so as to insist that "they will receive them" *in and by* "Baptism and the Holy Communion." And the latter seems an ecclesiastical view, grafted on the simpler view. Of course persons who lay great stress on the *exact* connection between the grace and the rite, will accuse me of making the Sa-

stitutions by which spiritually blessings are signified, and to which they are ordinarily attached? If there

craments, after all, only signs. It would be something to say in answer to such an accusation, "I make them signs of *future* blessings, not only of past or present." But the accusation would be utterly false. I connect the blessing *with the performance of the act of obedience or love*. And I argue that a person who does not perform the act, or does not perform it in a right state, cannot expect the blessing. And so Sacraments are "*means whereby we receive*" grace. Only I do not *lay stress* on the notion that something actually takes place at the very moment, though I am far from wishing to deny that such may often be the case. The idea of being *called upon to admit* this seems to me to have been one of the reasons which have led some writers to reduce the effect of Sacraments to a *moral* effect of which a man is *conscious* at the time. If a man sees the water, and the bread and wine, and is reminded, as a matter of fact, by them of cleansing and union with Christ, or "eating his flesh and blood," (in the sense of *believing*,) a *moral* effect is produced "thereby." And in order to keep close to the word of the definition, and yet not admit a notion which they thought superstitious, they have made the effect *exclusively* moral. I prefer a freer interpretation of the word "thereby" and a higher of the "effect" of Sacraments.

The notion of obedience and simple trust that those who obey in this, as in other cases, will be blest, is, I think, very well brought out by Bucer in the following passage—"Cum autem quæritur unde hoc Sacramenta habeant, unde tantum valeant, in promptu responsio est. *Deum ita decrevisse* in his et per ea operari suaque dona *non tam sensibus et per hos menti repræsentare* quam re ipsâ simul donare, et quasi in manus tradere."—Enarrat. ad Roman. p. 160. It will be seen that he lays more stress than I have on the "in his et per ea" and the "simul," which seems natural to one who appears to have retained a lingering feeling in favour of *consubstantiation* in the Lord's Supper from his objecting to those who "appear to believe that nothing else but the bread and wine *is there distributed*." Letter to Brentius, May 15, 1550, in "Original Letters," vol. ii. p. 544. Ed. Park. Soc. We retain one expression of the same kind (which I should be

is more conscious and hopeful piety in the first view, there is a deeper humility in the second. If there is a more glowing faith and a more technical expression in the one, the resolution of those who, whether it be dark or whether it be light, are determined to "abide to the end," when all will, they know, be revealed, and all explained, and all accomplished, and all humble faithful Christians comforted and glorified, is not, I think, wanting in the other. Only, the holders of the former should beware of superstition, and also of unreality and hollow formalism, which assume that the inward work is truly going on, because the outward act has been duly performed, and the latter should guard against *their* temptation, which is, to sever altogether those things of which they cannot affirm an actual present connection, and to neglect the duties, or at least underrate the privileges of time, from a fear of seeming to anticipate the clear revelations of eternity.

glad to see altered) in the titles of the Second Book of Homilies, given at the end of the First Book—"Of the due receiving of his blessed Body and Blood, *under the form of bread and wine*\*." This appears to me a relic of superstition; but to believe the effect of Sacraments to be spiritual (even if not instantaneous) seems to be almost essential to a due estimation of them and to the language connected with them in Scripture.

\* It may be worth observing that in the list of the titles of the Second Book in Art. XXXV. this title is altered to "Of the worthy receiving of the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ."

## LECTURE VII.

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1 JOHN iii. 20. 21.

*For if our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things. Beloved, if our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence toward God.*

THE counsel of God for our redemption, and the work of sanctification, by which that counsel is carried out, were considered in the last lecture in connection with the Two Sacraments of Christ. These we regarded<sup>a</sup> as expressing at once our entire dependence upon God for spiritual birth, and life, and growth, and also the certainty of divine assistance which belongs to those who follow the Lord's guidance. I propose this morning to contemplate God's gracious purpose and God's holy work in connection with our inward sensations and consciousness. Even if there were no mention of "predestination" to be found in our Articles, we should be invited to such a discussion by the language of the Homilies, which,

<sup>a</sup> This is of course *in their capacity of signs*. That they are *effectual* signs, or *means*, of grace was also insisted upon in the last lecture, but for the present argument it is only necessary to look upon them as *signs*.

while speaking of Baptism as equivalent (instrumentally of course) to justification<sup>b</sup>, nevertheless speak of faith as the “first entry into the Christian life<sup>c</sup>,” thus giving to Infant Baptism a partially prospective character, and requiring a self-examination<sup>d</sup>, (which is supposed to result in the consciousness of a lively faith,) of all “who come to the Lord’s Supper.” But inasmuch as our Reformers thought fit to engage in this difficult question, instead of acquiescing in that silence which pleased the strong common sense of Luther<sup>e</sup>, and the mild wisdom of Melancthon, we are more than ever called upon to consider the manner in which they have discussed the subject. And in doing so calmly and dispassionately, (setting aside all the irrelevant feeling which has been too often introduced,) we shall,

<sup>b</sup> “Our office is not to pass the time of this present life unfruitfully or idly, *after that we are baptized or justified.*” Hom. of Salvation, third part, p. 26.

<sup>c</sup> “The gift of faith, the first entry into the Christian life, without which no man can please God.” Hom. for Rogation Week, third part, p. 432. And again, we are told that “The first coming unto God, good Christian people, is through faith, whereby (as it is declared in the last sermon) we be justified before God.” Hom. of Faith, third part, p. 59.

<sup>d</sup> Question—What is required of them who come to the Lord’s Supper? Answer—To examine themselves whether they repent them truly of their former sins, stedfastly purposing to lead a new life; have a lively faith in God’s mercy through Christ, with a thankful remembrance of His death; and be in charity with all men.

<sup>e</sup> In the confession of Augsburg, as first exhibited, there is no mention of predestination: in the Wirtemberg edition of 1540 the subject is thus alluded to and dismissed in the Article on Faith:—“Non est hic opus disputationibus de Prædestinatione, aut similibus. Nam promissio est universalis,” etc.



I think, be greatly struck by the modesty which tempers the piety, and the zealous devotion which elevates the good sense of this treatment. There is the confidence of those to whom God has spoken, and the cautious restraint which remembers both who they are to whom He has spoken, and that He has not told them all. There is in short the highest development of "faith" which consists with a confession that it is not yet "sight." And the absence of precision, which will be shewn to exist, will appear, if I am not mistaken, more especially humble and reverential, as well as scriptural.

Let me however premise that by an absence of precision I do not mean a vague and negative account of the matter, under which extreme opinions can shelter themselves without absolute dishonesty. On so abstruse a point indeed even this may be perhaps desirable. But what I speak of is a clear, substantive, and intelligible position, which at once recognises the difficulties of the question, which are sometimes enhanced by the plain statements of Scripture, and refuses to exaggerate them by connecting them with those passages which are controverted and obscure. And first I shall call your attention to that which is the doctrinal excellence of this treatment of our Church, the enunciation of the tenet of Election without the shadow of a mention either of the Calvinistic deduction of Reprobation, or of the Arminian panacea of foresight. And to speak first of the complete silence on the subject of reprobation, even in its milder form of præterition.

I endeavoured to point out in the second of these Lectures that the passages of Scripture which suggest the notion of God having actually appointed some of his creatures to damnation without giving them the means of escape, are all of them involved in more or less obscurity. They are moreover remarkable for being episodical, and accidental. They grow out of the narrative or argument, and do not belong to the body of it. And, like most incidental confirmations or illustrations of a main argument or truth, they are introduced without the qualifications and explanations which may be, and, I think, often are, a part of them when regarded as principal, and not merely as accessory. I shall instance only one case, but that one is the strongest. Pharaoh<sup>f</sup>, you will remember, is spoken of in the Epistle to the Romans as having been “raised up<sup>g</sup>” (whatever that may mean) in order that God might “shew in him His power.” And then, when the idea of God’s irresistible will, as shewn in his being hardened, provokes the bold question “Why doth he yet find fault?” the apostle meets the murmur with a marked and crushing assertion of God’s unlimited and unaccountable

<sup>f</sup> Rom. ix. 16—22.

<sup>g</sup> Tholuck, after first interpreting this word to mean “allowed to remain” after the LXX *διετηρήθης*, concludes that “beyond all doubt the correct exposition is ‘I have set thee up—brought thee forward (in history)’” (vol. ii. pp. 238-9. note. Eng. Tr.) Whitby, however, (in loco,) quotes numerous commentators in favour of the former opinion. Beza translates the word “feci ut existeres,” and Anselm (both quoted by Tholuck) “Cum malus esses prodigiis quasi sopitum excitavi.”

power over His creatures. Now I maintain that it is a mistaken inference to conclude from this language that Pharaoh had done nothing to draw down upon him the wrath of God which was shewn in the hardening of his heart, and that he therefore is an instance of a man absolutely and eternally reprobated. All that the apostle is careful to prove is this, that God is not accountable to man for His actions. His almighty will must be assumed, when we cannot prove it, to be always in accordance with justice. We must therefore always conclude (as one of the Homilies expresses it<sup>h</sup>) that, though "Christ Jesus is a fall to the reprobate," "yet" they "perish through their own default," an opinion which in the case of Pharaoh the details of the narrative abundantly bear out. If the obscurity and disputed sense of these and other passages be duly weighed, it will, I think, appear scriptural, as well as reasonable, to decline to found any positive doctrine upon them.

If now from the positive evidence in favour of the doctrine of Reprobation we turn to the argument which deduces that doctrine from that of "Predestination to *life*," we shall be even more impressed with the wisdom of disregarding it. I call the tenet of Reprobation a *deduction* from that of Predestination to life, and I do so deliberately and emphatically.

<sup>h</sup> "As Christ Jesus is a fall to the reprobate, which yet perish through their own default; so is His word, yea, the whole Book of God, a cause of damnation unto them, through their own incredulity." Second Part of the Information of certain places of the Scripture, p. 337.

It is not an immediate inference from it. There is nothing that we know to prevent, perhaps there may be something to cause, a predestination of some men to life, without one single human being having been predestinated to death. In the Homilies<sup>i</sup> God is spoken of as “of his mercy and special favour towards them whom he hath appointed to everlasting salvation,” offering his grace especially to them, and they as receiving it so fruitfully, as to declare that “they are the undoubted children of God, appointed to everlasting life.” But in the same passage, “the children of wrath and perdition,” who are opposed to these especial objects of God’s favour, though they are termed “reprobates and castaways<sup>k</sup>,” are not said, we may observe, to be *appointed unto damnation*. It does not indeed logically follow that it was the intention of our Reformers to assert explicitly this view of the question, for they may have simply chosen to decline to go further than was necessary for their pious purpose. But as a matter of fact I think we may assert that such was their intention. For Bradford, who we know was a strong asserter of an eternal election irrespective of our foreseen good works, and who probably went somewhat further than Cranmer<sup>l</sup> and Ridley, uses in

<sup>i</sup> Hom. of Alms-Deeds. Second part, p. 347.

<sup>k</sup> Ibid. p. 348.

<sup>l</sup> This I infer from a Letter to Cranmer, Ridley, and Latimer, exhorting them to take some steps to defend the doctrine of Election, which he thought in danger. The tone and expressions of the letter will, I think, be found to bear out my inference.—Writings of Bradford, Letter 62, p. 169. ed. Parker Soc.

his “Defence of Election<sup>m</sup>” the very argument in effect which, from the language of the seventeenth Article and of the Homilies, I have concluded to be that of our leading Reformers.

“As for the argument which be gathered of the contraries, ‘If there be not reprobation, ergo there is no election,’ a man of God may see that it is not firm. For though we may well say, and most justly say, that damnation is for our sins, yet can we not say, that for our virtue we are saved: even so because God hath elected some whom it pleaseth him, as Christ saith, ‘few be chosen,’ it doth not well follow that therefore he hath reprobated others, but to our reasons,” (I will add only to them at first sight) “except the Scriptures do teach it. And in that the Scriptures speak little thereof, (I mean of reprobation) in that the next cause (that is sin) may well be seen to be the cause of condemnation, and in that also it pertaineth to us to see and speak of that which is given of Christ to us ‘that be within,’ let us labour hereabouts, and leave ‘them that be without’ to the Lord, which will judge them in his time.”

And this discretion of theirs, from whichever cause arising, appears to me to be a triumph of common sense over logical deduction, of which it is impossible to speak too highly. When we read the contemptuous remarks of Calvin<sup>n</sup> upon the weakness

<sup>m</sup> Part II. p. 325. ed. Parker Soc.

<sup>n</sup> On Rom. ix. 18. (tom. vii. p. 66. ed. Amstel. 1667.) “In-

of those who refused to admit the idea of reprobation, and an actual appointment to damnation, while we note the marked difference of view, we can value more highly the moral courage as well as the wisdom of the Fathers of our Reformed Church.

I have called this restraint a triumph of common sense over logical deduction; but it may be as well to add, that there is more true logic shewn in thus knowing when to stop in discussing such a subject, than in the bold carrying out of premisses to what mere logicians (who forget what and where they are) would call their legitimate conclusions. And if there is more true logic, there is also much more evangelical comfort. There is no risk run of a man being deterred from repentance by being "persuaded that all *he does* is but labour lost," from which, as the Homily<sup>p</sup> warns us, "either sudden desperation doth arise, or a licentious boldness to sin, which at length bringeth unto desperation." No shadow of this kind is allowed to interfere with the

durandi verbum cum Deo in scripturis tribuitur non solum permissionem (ut volunt *diluti quidam moderatores*) sed divinæ quoque iræ actionem significat." (What follows is quoted by Abp. Laurence, Bampton Lectures, p. 391, where I first saw it.) "*Corruit ergo frivolum illud effugium quod de præscientia Scholastici habent. Neque enim prævideri ruinam impiorum a Domino Paulus tradit, sed ejus consilii et voluntate ordinari, quemadmodum et Solomo docet non modo præcognitum fuisse impiorum interitum, sed impios ipsos fuisse destinato creatos ut perirent.*" And further on he speaks of them as "*ab utero certæ morti devoti* qui suo exitio ipsius nomen glorificent." See also a letter to Christopherus Libertetus, Epist. et Resp. p. 65. Op. tom. ix.

<sup>p</sup> Hom. on Repentance, p. 472, 473.

genial warmth of that heaven-sent ray which first thaws the frozen heart, and then dries the falling tears of the true penitent.

The practical exhortations of our Church are, on the contrary, all conceived in humble imitation of the spirit of Him who said, in answer to the curious question, "Lord, are there few that be saved?" "Strive to enter in at the strait gate: for many will seek to enter in, and shall not be able." "You *must* strive, for the task is difficult. You *may* strive, for it is not impossible; or at least it is not so in the abstract: you therefore must never deem it so; you must never think of yourselves as among the "many" that shall seek to enter in and not be able, but as among the number (whether many or few) of those who strive, at my bidding, to enter in." "Nay but if many will seek to enter in and not be able," the logician will rejoin, (breaking himself

¶ Luke xiii. 23-28. "Then said one unto him, Lord, are there few that be saved? And he said unto *them*," (making his precept, we see, *universal*,) "Strive to enter in at the strait gate: for many, I say unto you, will seek to enter in, and shall not be able. When once the master of the house is risen up, and hath shut to the door, and ye begin to stand without, and to knock at the door, saying, Lord, Lord, open unto us; and he shall answer and say unto you, I know you not whence you are: then shall ye begin to say, We have eaten and drunk in thy presence, and thou hast taught in our streets. But he shall say, I tell you, I know you not whence ye are; depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity. There shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth, when ye shall see Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, and all the prophets, in the kingdom of God, and ye *yourselves* thrust out."

upon the wheel of his own difficulty,) "there must needs be but few saved." Such is the decision of the schools. But for all that, "Strive to enter in" is the Saviour's precept, substituted for a direct answer; and it stamps the reserve of our Church's formularies on the doctrine of Reprobation with the seal of divine sanction. Fortified with His approval we may well afford to be despised by the impatient logicians of the world. But if any one should still argue, saying, "Nay, but *it is written* of the strait gate 'Few there be that find it',<sup>r</sup> so that the answer to the question which was there denied<sup>s</sup> is here given," how must we meet the argument? We will not allegorize away the awful sentence, saying, (what criticism might perhaps allow,) that it is but a concrete expression of the abstract difficulty of godliness, but taking the words as they stand we will examine their real import. And we see that in this passage, which speaks of the ill success of the majority, the universal invitation or command is especially direct. It is not "Strive to enter in," as in the other exhortation, but "Enter ye in," as if to temper the universal difficulty with a stronger individual encouragement. "Enter ye in at the strait gate," our Lord says; and God forbid that we should think (as Calvin<sup>u</sup> seems to have thought)

<sup>r</sup> Matt. vii. 14.

<sup>s</sup> i. e. in Luke xiii. 24.

<sup>t</sup> Matt. vii. 13.

<sup>u</sup> Comment. on 2 Pet. iii. 9. "Sed hic quæri potest, si neminem Deus perire velit, cur tam multi pereunt? Respondeo non de arcano Dei consilio hic fieri mentionem quo destinati sunt re-



that such invitations of God are ever illusory! But more than this, we may observe that “to be saved” is an objective expression, suggesting it may be certain qualities in man, but expressing nothing but a blessing of God, whereas to “find” is a subjective word, which, while it may or indeed must connote God’s grace, denotes or speaks principally of man’s effort. And if therefore the majority fail to find the strait gate, it may be, perhaps we should say it *must* be, that they have not sought for it aright, but have waited without necessity until “the door was shut.” Or else, like those who are spoken of in the parallel passage in St. Luke, they have been actual “workers of iniquity,” whom the Lord cannot recognise or approve; not because they have grown out of his knowledge, as they have themselves imagined, and have become improved and strengthened and developed, so as to have a will of their own, independent, self-sufficient, capable of trying a fall with God, but because they are so hardened and seared, and begrimed and befouled with sin, that they have lost every mark and character of Christ, so that though he is still the same, having no *con-*

probi in suum exitium, sed tantum de voluntate quæ nobis in Evangelio patefit. *Omnibus enim promiscue manum illic porrigit Deus, sed eos tantum apprehendit ut ad se ducat quos ante mundum conditum elegit.*” On which Tholuck (in whose Commentary I first saw the passage) observes, “Alas for the poor reprobate! How God mocks them, stretching out his hand and yet refusing to draw them to himself.” And it should be observed that this is very different from supposing that God “draws” some *more* than others. It implies a *total* absence of grace.

*tradictory* will to that which first called them to salvation, they are by their own act aliens and reprobates, and in nothing but the burden of an unalienable identity, like those to whom he said by the voice of the minister of his Gospel, "Suffer the little children to come unto me and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of God." But the unconscious innocence, which was at once an emblem and an opportunity of that conscious conversion which should have made them meet for that kingdom,—this has passed away, and the other has not come, and because they would not come, although they were brought, to God, they have never, neither first nor last, neither by early piety nor by after repentance "come unto themselves." While therefore we do not explain away that painful prophecy, we know that while we are "seeking" and "striving" we need not dwell upon it, because we have been told by God that "he that seeketh findeth<sup>x</sup>," and that the "labour" of the faithful "is not in vain in the Lord<sup>y</sup>."

The absence of any mention of Reprobation in our view of Predestination is that which enables us to assert unequivocally the doctrine of free and gratuitous Election, without any mention of foresight. And this was, I feel sure, the intention of our Reformers. It was undoubtedly the principle of Cranmer. Avoiding, as I have before noticed, all such language as might appear to limit the invitation of God, he nevertheless is explicit in maintaining an absolute election of the

<sup>x</sup> Matt. vii. 8. Luke xi. 10.

<sup>y</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 58.

faithful, irrespective of any foreseen works. Nothing can be more certain than that he held the doctrine of perpetuity of faith in the *elect*, and that he distinguished these *elect* by that especial name from nominal Christians. It is in this spirit that he rejects the corrections of the Institution of a Christian man, proposed by Henry VIII<sup>z</sup>. "God," says the Institution, "will never utterly abject this Holy Church, nor any of the members thereof, but [that] the same doth and shall perpetually continue and endure here in this world." "If," King Henry adds, "fault be not in themselves." But "this article," says Cranmer, "speaketh only of the elect, in whom finally no fault shall be, but they shall perpetually continue and endure." And then the article goes on to say, "all such members as be fallen out from the same by sin, shall at length rise again by penance, and shall be restored and united again unto the same holy body." "If," King Henry adds again, "wilfully and obstinately they withstand not His calling." But Cranmer again rejoins, "Likewise the elect shall not wilfully and obstinately withstand God's calling." And of election he says, in answer to another correction<sup>a</sup>, "Certain it is our election cometh only and wholly of the benefit and grace of God, for the merits of Christ's passion, and for no part of our merits and good works: as St. Paul disputeth and proveth at length in the Epistle to the Romans and Galatians,

<sup>z</sup> Miscellaneous Writings and Letters. Ed. Parker Soc. p. 91.

<sup>a</sup> Ibid. p. 95.

and divers other places, saying, ‘Si ex operibus<sup>b</sup>, non ex gratiâ; si ex gratiâ, non ex operibus.’” Taking into consideration the passage before quoted from the Homilies which speaks of certain persons being “appointed unto salvation” without the slightest suggestion of their good works or repentance being foreseen, but on the contrary representing their repentance after an evil course as the result of this election, and the equal absence of any mention of prevision in the seventeenth Article, I am strongly inclined to believe that these sentiments of Cranmer were those which were meant to be expressed in that Article. That they were the sentiments of those who finally published it as an authoritative document in the reign of Elizabeth would, I suppose, not be disputed. And this assertion of absolute election, or this absence at least of any qualification on the grounds of a foresight of faith and obedience, is, as I said, especially connected with the silence on the subject of Reprobation which our Reformers so wisely kept. For the doctrine of foresight as determining election needs not to be brought forward except as a corrective to that logical deduction which insists on explicitly introducing the tenet of Reprobation. Let it be at once clearly understood that we are not looking, that we decline to look, at the darker side of the question, that we are speaking only of Predestination *to life*, of a decree which has

<sup>b</sup> Rom. xi. 6. “And if by grace, then it is no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then is it no more grace: otherwise work is no more work.”

to do with good and not bad tidings to men, and the free grace of God may be taught without fear or scruple. We are at liberty to regard the question, as it ought sometimes to be regarded<sup>c</sup>, *solely* from a divine point of view. The plan of redemption, the publication of it, the call of the Spirit, justification, adoption, and an admission to future glory, these may all be looked upon as absolutely gratuitous, unconnected with the foresight of anything in man to deserve them, and therefore as being due, from first to last, to the gracious mercy of God. Nay, more, even the obedience to the calling may be regarded *solely* as an act of God's grace. God gives them the heart to obey, and they obey. All is His doing. The work is begun, continued, and ended in Him. Man's obedience is but a drop lost in the overflowing ocean of God's goodness. The "golden chain," as it has been often called, is held out to us

<sup>c</sup> The advantage of such a view is, that it counteracts the tendency to emancipate man, for the purpose of more exact and consistent theological statements, from the chain of his destiny, and (without perhaps intending it) to set him, as it were, *without*, as an independent being able to bring some influence, purely and entirely his own, to bear upon the course of the providence of God: or, (to state the result in other and positive terms,) according to this view all the subordinate instruments by which the purpose of God is to be worked out—Sacraments, instruction, education, ministerial assistance, prayer and personal effort, self-reflection with a view either to humble penitence or hopeful confidence—all these are viewed as united, not as separate, each being affected by that which goes before, as well as affecting that which follows, beyond what it is possible for man to ascertain. This view of things, as they appear and are to God, as well as as they appear to us, keeps up the *awe* of life.

as all one, and as all golden; the inferior link, of which man contributes the material, being regarded, not in itself, but as adopted and transmuted by the wondrous alchemy of God. The cooperation of man in the work of his salvation is here lost sight of, in dwelling upon that grace which could alone give him anything wherewith to cooperate. And truly, if we look deeply into this question, we shall see that there is no cause to regret the absence of any mention of foresight. For, though to bring forward this as the principle of God's decrees may set part of the difficulty of human life in a more logical and correct frame, it does not do away with it. It leaves unsolved that awful problem, Why does this man use his freewill for evil, and that for good? It is not enough to say, He does so because he chooses to do so: for what determines his choice? That we are accountable for the use of our freewill we know, and are bound to act upon our knowledge, but I have never seen any explanation of the subject which accounted for this guiding power differing so much as it does, not only in strength but in direction<sup>d</sup>; any explanation, I mean, except this, Such is the will of

<sup>d</sup> I wish to guard myself against the imputation of favouring the notion that the wills of some men are so bound down to evil that they *cannot*, by using the means of grace afforded to them, avoid yielding to this tendency—or that some are left by God altogether without good impulses. All I wish to call attention to is the fact, that (besides the gift or habit of self-control) some persons appear to desire what is evil so much less, and what is good so much more than others, and therefore to be so much less tempted to allow their will to sanction, instead of resisting, evil inclinations, and so much more encouraged and furthered in well-doing.

God. Nor is the patent and unquestionable fact of some men being gifted with an especial aid of God's Spirit capable of being accounted for. It must be accepted and acquiesced in. And when we think of these things we are inclined to look with indifference on the exclusion of foresight from the view of election presented to us, and to be rather glad than otherwise that it has not been allowed to embarrass a decided and unequivocal enunciation of the doctrine of free grace. I say, you will observe, to embarrass it. For to say that it does more, or at least need do more, is the language either of prejudice or of thoughtlessness. When the acts which God is supposed to foresee, and foreseeing to approve, are expressly said to be done "only under the aid of a system of grace<sup>e</sup>," (as was said by those whose case Prosper represented to Augustine<sup>f</sup>;) and still more when they are not even brought so prominently forward as this, but God is said to elect men to salvation (to use the expression of Grotius) "with a foresight of faith, but not on account of faith foreseen<sup>g</sup>," there is no ground what-

<sup>e</sup> "Sub ipso gratiæ adjutorio."

<sup>f</sup> "Illud etiam qualiter diluatur quæsumus patienter insipientiam nostram ferendo demonstres; quod retractatis priorum de hâc re opinionibus, pene omnium par invenitur et una sententia, quâ propositum et prædestinationem Dei secundum præscientiam receperunt: ut ob hoc Deus alios vasa honoris alios contumeliæ fecerit, quia finem uniuscujusque præviderit, *et sub ipso gratiæ adjutorio* in qua futurus esset voluntate et actione præscierit." Epist. ad August. cviii. quoted in Mant's Bampton Lectures, p. 174 note.

<sup>g</sup> Quoted in Tomline on Calvinism, p. 252. "Cum Deus ab æterno præsciat omnia actu futura ac proinde novit hunc hominem ad finem usque Christo crediturum, illum vero non ita crediturum;

ever for a charge of impiety or Pelagianism. Nor is the view really open to the metaphysical objection that we are supposing a futuration which does not exist<sup>h</sup>; at least the most absolute view of predestination does this also: for in order to exist at all it is obliged to admit a conception in the mind of God of individuals about to be created in order to be given to Christ. But it may nevertheless be more simple and more safe to dwell only on God's free grace, lest occasion be given to others less sound, to confound the effects (which are in some sense conditions) with the cause of salvation. And as it is more simple and more safe, so it is also more scriptural. It is thus certainly that the doctrine appears in the epistle to the Ephesians<sup>i</sup> from which the first part of the language of the seventeenth Article is taken, and, I think, also in the Epistle to the Romans<sup>k</sup>, which supplies the second. There is in each an assumption of true belief in individuals, not classes of men, who in the first Epistle are said "to have faith in Jesus Christ, and love to all the saints<sup>l</sup>," and

certum est Deum huic ita considerato vitam, illi mortem æternam decernere. Quicquid enim facit in tempore id ab æterno facere decrevit; at in tempore servat hunc credentem illum incredulum damnat: quare, ut cum Fulgentio loquamur, prædestinavit illos ad supplicium, quos a se præscivit voluntatis malæ vitio discessuros; et prædestinavit ad regnum quas ad se præscivit *misericiordiæ prævenientis auxilio* credituros, et in se *misericiordiæ subsequentis auxilio* mansuros. Et hoc decretum salvandi *singulares personas prævisa Fide, sed non ob prævisam Fidem*, Prædestinationis nomine intellexerunt omnes Catholici Scriptores ante Augustini tempora."

<sup>h</sup> This Archbishop Leighton brings against it. Comment. on 1 Pet. i. 2.    <sup>i</sup> (1. 4—7.)    <sup>k</sup> (viii. 29.)    <sup>l</sup> (Eph. i. 15.)



in the second, to be “lovers of God<sup>m</sup>.” And these actual believers are spoken of as the objects of a decree of God predestinating them to life. It is true that on the grounds of that decree St. Paul not only encourages the Romans under afflictions, and prays for the Ephesians that they may have a thorough sense of their blessings, but explains to the former the doctrine of sanctification, and exhorts the latter to holiness. But the doctrine of either passage, considered in itself, is that of absolute and gratuitous favour bestowed upon them by God. And it may be confidently affirmed that, in comparison with this plain language, that which speaks of God’s election as dependant upon His prescience of man’s faith or obedience, is casual, obscure, and controverted.

Leaving for the present the doctrine of our Church with regard to God’s decrees, and turning to the application of it, and to that inward witness which interprets for individual comfort the general statements of the Gospel, we meet with the same evidence of zeal tempered by humility and discretion. The distinction between faith and knowledge is carefully kept up. The expressions of assurance, confidence, and trust, are there, but the language of certainty is not. The decrees of God are expressly stated to be “secret to us,” a statement which at once excludes the idea that the Predestination spoken of is identical with Redemption and not more particular, for the counsel of Redemption is no secret (“these things were not done in a corner”) and the presumptuous

<sup>m</sup> Rom. viii. 28.

assumptions of individuals that they are the objects of some special enlightenment, and able to pronounce upon their own destiny or that of other men. No divination therefore of Election is invited, but on the contrary it is discouraged. The secrecy of the decrees is supposed to check it; or, if it does not check it, it at least teaches all soberminded persons to disregard those who say that they have found the key to unlock these hidden counsels, and can give, without any chance of error, the roll of God's Elect. The feelings therefore which are created by the contemplation of the doctrine of Election, even in those who have sensible evidence that they may venture to contemplate it, can never, from the nature of the case, which belongs to a state of Probation, rise above the standard of a lively hope.

But besides the abstract assertion of the secrecy of the decrees, the conditions required of every one who is to apply the comfort to himself are such as both suggest the possibility and guard against the danger of self-deceit. They are to be "godly persons<sup>n</sup>." They are to "feel within themselves the working of the Spirit of Christ, mortifying their earthly members, and drawing up their minds to high and heavenly things." This is a higher view of spiritual advancement than that which is presented

"As the godly consideration of Predestination, and our Election in Christ is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons, and such as feel in themselves the working of the Spirit of Christ, mortifying their earthly members and drawing up their minds to high and heavenly things.—Art. XVII. paragraph 11.

to us elsewhere. It suggests the notion of a confirmed and constant as well as zealous servant of Christ. It speaks of practical mortification as well as of religious feelings. In fact it enforces a self-examination of so deep and searching a character that if a man were to go through it honestly, without being blinded with self-love, there would be no fear of the result. He would either turn away and say, "This is a blessing beyond my present state, a prospect too bright for me as yet to look upon;" or if he did feel the "confidence towards God," of which St. John speaks in the text, it would be because his "heart" really did "not condemn" him. This is a very different thing from a man's examining himself whether he is "in the faith," or even examining himself as to whether he "discerns the Lord's body" in the holy Communion. But the higher the standard is, and the more glorious the result of attaining to it, the greater is the danger of misapplication by ordinary Christians. And therefore the doctrine has been wisely placed, not in the front of the array of the practical doctrines of salvation as that which was to form the basis of our dogmatic teaching, but in the rear, as supplementary and esoteric. Not as an ascertained fact from which to argue downward with unblushing confidence to that which must be his state as one of God's elect, to whom faith and good works and perseverance in spite of failure must belong as a matter of course, but as a probable inference to be drawn from the experimental feelings of awakened and practical and purifying love, and from

“the answer of a good conscience towards God,” is the decree of Predestination to life presented to the English Churchman.

And here, as in the case of the avoiding the doctrine of Reprobation, modesty and humility have their due reward. The statement of the subject which proscribes *any* contemplation of this deep doctrine by the ungodly secures a lofty one for the righteous. The sanctuary is fenced around against intruders, but the beauty in which its worshippers delight is not impaired for them. To those who are admitted to the holy mount, to a nearer view of the divine glory, who are in their degree transfigured with their Lord, and “changed from glory to glory,” the voice is not generalized which says, “This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.” And in this application of the doctrine<sup>o</sup> we somewhat differ

<sup>o</sup> Judging from the extracts from the works of Luther and Melancthon given in the notes to Abp. Laurence’s Bampton Lectures, there is a difference as to the doctrine also. According to these, eternal election extends only to the Church, *as a body, not to individuals*, and election in the case of the latter is merely equivalent to the acceptance\* of those who entertain the proffered grace of God. Justification and Predestination are expressly represented as on the same footing, and for all practical purposes identical. Abp. Laurence argues that the same was the case with our own Reformers; but while that portion of his argument, which proves how far their opinions (and those of the Lutherans

\* Bucer, in his *Enarratio ad Rom. c. viii. p. 411 B and C*, ed. Basil. 1562, gives Melancthon’s views only on the point *ad quid Prædestinatio consideranda sit*. And in these he only speaks of *judging of election a posteriori*, not of election *itself being a posteriori*. But the quotations from Melancthon, given by Abp. Laurence, distinctly speak of the latter, a view which Calvin (also quoted) expressly condemns. See Notes to Sermon VII. *passim*.

from the Lutherans. While Melancthon (whose words Bucer quotes and makes his own) represents a conviction of predestination as a necessary requisite for belief, and says that a man<sup>p</sup> cannot be a Christian without it, our Church discourages her children from contemplating the doctrine *at all*, till they have good reason to believe that they have a true and lively and practical faith, and have attained to a high degree of heavenly-mindedness. Both aim at the same object, the enjoyment on the part of the faithful of a certainty of salvation. Only the Lutheran doctrine, into which the notion of assurance undoubtedly enters much more *prominently* than it does into that of our Church, takes naturally a less

also) differed from those of Calvin, appears to me to amount almost to a demonstration, I do not think he alleges anything decisive to counteract the impression, which is made both by the language of the XVIIth Article and that of the Homily quoted above, and the expressions of both Cranmer and Bradford, that an *individual* predestination was contemplated by our Reformers. And this impression is greatly increased by the caution shewn in that application of the doctrine which is recommended or allowed in the second and third paragraphs of Art. XVII.

P “Tanquam caput omnis noxiæ tentationis repellenda est hæc quæstio, Simusne prædestinati. Nam ut dictum *qui de hoc dubitat, nec vocatum se et justificatum credere poterit*, hoc est *nequit esse Christianus*. Præsumendum igitur *ut principium fidei* nos omnes a Deo esse præscitos, præfinitos, separatos a reliquis et selectos in hoc ut æternum servemur, hocque propositum Dei mutari non posse, et inde omnis nostra cogitatio curaue in hoc intendenda ut prædestinationi huic Dei et vocationi *respondeamus*, ut ad vitam æternam nos pro viribus quas unquam nobis Dominus suppeditarit *cooperemur*, quas etiam augeri nobis orare debemus sine intermissione.” Enarratio ad Roman. c. viii. p. 411 C.

delicate and discriminating, and less progressive view of faith. So that while we go together in *assuming* Election of all baptized infants, we differ in our treatment of adults. A doubt as to your own predestination, say Bucer and Melancthon, is to be shunned above all things as a dangerous temptation. You are to include yourself without scruple among the predestinated, or else you make God a mocker<sup>q</sup>. On the other hand, Bradford says, expressing, I think, in this particular, the general sentiment of our leading Reformers<sup>r</sup>, "If you feel not this faith, then know that predestination is too high a matter for you to be disputers of it, until you have been better scholars in the school-house of repentance and justification, which is the grammar-school, wherein we must be conversant and learned, before

<sup>q</sup> Regarding justification and predestination as always inseparable, Bucer says, "Itaque primum quod Deo debes est ut credas esse te ab eo prædestinatum" (*we should say redemptum*), "nam, ni id credas facis eum tibi cum te ad salutem vocat per Evangelium illudere. Vocat enim te Evangelio ad justificationem et gloriæ suæ communionem : hoc autem non potest contingere nisi prædestinatis, præscitis et electis in hoc. Omnia siquidem Deus præfinit facit quia sapienter. Proinde si dubitas te prædestinatum esse, dubitare quoque necesse est, te esse vocatum ut salvus fias, esse justificatum esse denique glorificandum ; hoc est necesse est te dubitare de omni promissione salutis tuæ, dubitare de Evangelio : hoc est Deo nihil credere omnium quæ tibi in Evangelio offert." Enarratio ad Rom. p. 411 B.

<sup>r</sup> Hooper should be excepted as agreeing rather with the view afterwards put forward by the Arminians, which, if Abp. Laurence is correct, was identical with that of the Lutherans. See Notes to Scrm. VIII. p. 451 &c. and Scrm. VIII. p. 172.

we go to the University of God's most holy predestination and providence<sup>s</sup>."

And of himself he says, "Thus do I wade in predestination, in such sort as God hath patefied and opened it. Though in God it be the first, yet to us it is last opened; and therefore I begin with creation, from thence I come to redemption, so to justification<sup>t</sup>, and so to election." The Lutheran method, on the other hand, puts the teaching of grace all on the same footing, and extends to every one who feels any thing which can be called faith, the quintessence of comfort which our Church more reverently and carefully reserves for the tried servants of Christ. Let us remember this distinction, and if we do so, we may at once and without risk reject the notion

<sup>s</sup> Letter 48. p. 134. ed. Parker Soc. This evidence is stronger from the fact that Bradford sometimes (e. g. even in the beginning of this letter) uses language more like Bucer's, calling the faith given to the predestinated a *justifying* and *regenerating* faith.

<sup>t</sup> It does not follow that Bradford considered predestination and justification as different; indeed his language is against such a supposition; his view seems to have been, that justification should not be regarded *in its character of predestination*, till a person was able to do so without danger. His views, as I have before observed, were more Calvinistic than those of Cranmer, who, judging from the Homily of Salvation, evidently thought a man if baptized was *justified*, and (judging from his Answer to Gardiner) was *regenerate*, even though he was not among the number of the elect "in whom finally no fault shall be." Abp. Laurence quotes a passage from the latter work, in which Cranmer says, "The Holy Ghost doth not only come to us in Baptism, and Christ doth there clothe us, but they do the same to us continually so long as we dwell in Christ," p. 71.

that in speaking of predestination an election of *classes* not *individuals* was intended to be affirmed.

Unascertained individuals must indeed be ever regarded as classes by men, who cannot judge the heart, (and this necessity should teach us humility in judging ourselves, and charity in judging others,) but the man whose heart indeed “condemns him not” may exalt the “confidence” which he feels “towards God” into a loftier comfort, by believing himself to have been the object of an especial decree of his grace. And such a view is, I think, far more in accordance with a worthy and reverent view of God’s providence than one which supposes Him only to have predestinated a Church, that is, all who should be true Christians, without having entered into the question who *would* be such, or passed an irrevocable judgment on their individual destiny<sup>u</sup>. And when guarded by the self-examination which we have seen is required, and the position of the doctrine in the teaching of our Church, it is altogether free from the danger which might otherwise attend the climbing to so high an eminence.

In conclusion I will only say that the inward witness of which we have been speaking, and the true claim of which I have been inviting you to allow, is placed before us in the teaching of our Church in

<sup>u</sup> It is no argument against this view to say that it anticipates the final judgment. Any adequate view of God’s foreknowledge *must* do this. When we think of His omniscience, what is decided in time *can* only be a *declaration* of what is decreed (not necessarily *arbitrarily*) from all eternity.



connection<sup>x</sup> with our being within the covenant, being all of us the objects of the general counsel of Redemption, and the subjects of God's *general* grace. Within these limits we may exercise ourselves in praying that his *special* grace may be extended to us, so that at last we may have in our hearts this sense of election, this glorious earnest of our inheritance in Christ, this most heavenly and most exalting voice of an indwelling Spirit. Let us not pray directly for it, but that we may be made fit to have it. And if we do not feel it, let us not despair or slacken our efforts, and our prayers, (those best efforts of dependent beings, whose best work is to "believe in Him whom God hath sent,") but rather redouble them with all Christian earnestness, certain that he who has "begun a good work" in us will "perform" it, if we will only walk faithfully in his guidance.

And finally, let us not despise others who take a lower and, as we think, a colder view of the doctrinal question, nor, on the other hand, when we come to its application, suspect those who, being, for all we know, especial objects of God's grace, and for all we know more faithful and zealous users of it than

<sup>x</sup> In accordance with the language of Bucer, quoted above, even Bradford, while arguing that "this assurance" (of salvation) "God's first commandment requireth under pain of damnation: the Gospel of God and all his promises, the sacraments and the substance of them, which is Christ Jesus our Saviour, doth above all things require it," adds, "*of every one that is baptized and brought into God's Church.*" Letter 60. pp. 166, 167. ed. Parker Soc.

ourselves, are able to walk more happily in the light of his countenance, which as yet only throws occasionally a gleam of encouragement upon us<sup>y</sup>. For let us remember, (and oh! what a sad recollection it is for many of us, what an overwhelming thought it would be for all, were it not for the overflowing grace of God,) that “confidence” is only their privilege whose “hearts condemn *them* not.”

<sup>y</sup> Wishing only to give what I believe to have been the view of our Reformers on the Doctrine of Predestination, I have not explicitly mentioned that view which supposes that some who are *not predestinated* may yet be finally *saved*. The view of Cranmer I think was not this, but the Augustinian view that all who were not elect, though “justified” and “regenerate,” would as a matter of fact finally fall away. In other words, that no one could be saved at last who was not one of God’s elect. The other view appears tenable to *our reason*, and more satisfactory to our feelings, but it is not I think equally scriptural: and inasmuch as *nothing* can quite clear up the subject, I have been satisfied with attempting, with our Reformers, to exclude utterly the doctrine of Reprobation.

## LECTURE VIII.

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PSALM cvii. 43.

*Whoso is wise, and will observe these things, even they shall understand the loving-kindness of the Lord.*

IT is no abstract theory of liberal and comprehensive Theology which I have been desirous in these Lectures of recommending to your attention, but merely that degree of freedom and toleration which appears to me to be impressed on the Formularies of the Church of England. This will, I hope, account for what may have appeared at first inconsistent with my general object, the attempt which has been occasionally made to shew that on certain controverted points her statements are *more* precise and *more* decided than is sometimes imagined. For it is *her* absence of precision, and not absence of precision in the abstract, which I have been defending and maintaining. Where therefore it has seemed to me that the outlines of her system have been represented as more indistinct than they really are, I have endeavoured to add a clearer and more decided touch to bring out the old expression. This

was, I hope, done in the Sixth Lecture, where the *spiritual* effect of Sacraments in worthy receivers was strongly insisted upon, and in the Seventh, in which the individuality of Predestination was recalled from that obscurity into which it has been cast by writers of eminence, who have thought that it was only thus that the doctrine of the foresight of merit on the one hand, or the dangers of fanaticism or desperation on the other hand, could consistently be avoided. This morning I propose to employ this corrective method, in a few points of importance, on which a greater latitude than really exists appears to be sometimes claimed as in accordance with the Formularies of our Church. I shall not however do more than allude to the great doctrine of Justification by Faith only, because no sincere member of our Church would be inclined to dispute the clear and marked position which is assigned to this fundamental doctrine. It is perhaps not impossible that the doctrine of Sanctification may sometimes be taught in so formal and technical a manner as to interfere with a due enforcement on the individual soul of its personal need of a Saviour: but the existence of such teaching would not be acknowledged, and would be often unknown to him who made use of it. No one would attempt to defend it as theoretically right, consistently with the principles of the Church of England. Leaving therefore this subject, as one on which, if men go wrong, they do so in direct contradiction to the clear, distinct, and loud voice of their Church which guides

them aright, I shall bring before you four points, on which the language of our Formularies, though less marked, or at least less prominent, than on this great point, appears nevertheless to be more precise than is often thought. And I shall discuss them in the order in which they occur in the Articles. The first then is the obligation of Works. On this the latter clause of the Seventh Article is very clear and express, "No Christian man whatsoever is free from the obedience of the commandments which are called moral." And the language of the Latin Article is still more stringent, and shews that the word "*whatsoever*" is not otiose, but emphatic; "*ab obedientia mandatorum, quæ moralia vocantur, nullus quantumvis Christianus est solutus.*" "No one, *though ever so much a Christian,*" would be the exact translation, and there can be little doubt that the inquisitorial expression was especially levelled against the licentious fanaticism which, as we know, so soon began to pervert the doctrine of free grace. And we may observe in the Homily on Faith (which is usually attributed to Cranmer) the same language of obligation. "When men hear in the Scriptures so high commendations of faith, that it maketh us to please God, to live with God, and to be the children of God; if then they phantasy that they be *set at liberty* from doing all good works, and may live as they list, they trifle with God, and deceive themselves<sup>a</sup>." And in another place they are warned

<sup>a</sup> Homily of Faith. First Part, p. 31.

against “casting *the yoke<sup>b</sup> of God’s commandments* off their neck.” And faith “doth not shut out<sup>c</sup> the justice of our good works *necessarily* to be done afterwards *of duty* towards God : (for *we are most bounden* to serve God, in doing good works *commanded* by him in his holy scripture, all the days of our life :” and “when” the fathers “say<sup>d</sup> we be justified freely, they mean not that we should or *might* afterwards be idle, and that nothing should be *required* on our part afterward :” on the contrary, “he that hath this faith *must<sup>e</sup>* have also good works, and be *studious* to observe God’s *commandments obediently<sup>f</sup>*.” And in a later Homily we are taught “that when<sup>g</sup> the Scriptures say, that by good and merciful works we are reconciled to God’s favour, we are taught then to know what Christ by his intercession and mediation obtaineth for us from his Father, *when we be obedient to his will.*” The *obedience* is indeed taught to be “*worked*” in us “*by*” God’s “*Spirit*,” but to our consciousness it is obedience ; and obedience, unless it is mechanical, is the recognition of an obligation. Though therefore the “service of God” is “perfect freedom” to all his true servants, it is a liberty which is commensurate with the honesty and the zeal of their service ; and

<sup>b</sup> Homily of Faith. Third Part, p. 38.

<sup>c</sup> Homily of Salvation. First Part, p. 19.

<sup>d</sup> Ibid. Second Part, p. 21.

<sup>e</sup> It is demonstrable from the context that “*must*” does not mean *is sure to*, but *is bound to*.

<sup>f</sup> Homily of Faith. Second Part, p. 36.

<sup>g</sup> Homily of Alms-Deeds, p. 349.

at any moment when the higher motives by which they are supposed to be actuated, and perhaps are ordinarily actuated, cease to be active in them, they lapse under the legal obligation. And inasmuch as human frailty is ever liable to such cessations or temporary suspensions of gratitude and love and the other motive elements of faith, it is in accordance with strict piety as well as common sense, that such imperfect beings should be always regarded as *bound* to obey the commandments. While therefore we have a right to dwell upon St. Paul's assertion, "that the law is not for a righteous man<sup>h</sup>," and, if we are in our degree righteous, are above the law, under the guidance of a higher principle, and have no need to think of restraints and obligations, still in the event of our faith failing us, these return again into their position of masters, and we are again in some sense under the law. I have entered into this question because I believe there is a tendency in zealous upholders (as every one ought to be) of the doctrine of Justification by Faith, when their zeal is not sufficiently tempered by thoughtfulness and discretion, to declare war against all teaching as *legal* which speaks of the obligation of works, and, in magnifying gratitude and love as our proper motives, to do away altogether in their theory with the notion of duty, which all the while they are making the rule of their lives. They argue that to speak of a Christian as *obliged* to perform any works is to place the matter altogether on a wrong founda-

<sup>h</sup> 1 Tim. i. 9.

tion. No man, they say, can be a Christian without a lively faith ; but from a lively faith good works do “necessarily spring.” So that the idea of obligation is delusive, or at least superfluous: delusive, as suggesting the notion that a man can be a Christian without such a lively faith as necessarily produces good works: superfluous, because the works to which a man is said to be *obliged*, will be already done on the higher motive of a “faith which worketh by love.” But such an objection appears to overlook the fact, that faith and love do not ordinarily exist in that perfect state which any theory must of necessity regard as their normal state and adopt in any definition of them, but are capable of increase and progression ; and that in fact Christians may ordinarily be said both to have and not to have them ; to have them, in the sense of their being formed to a certain degree in their hearts, and not to have them, in the sense of their not yet being formed in that perfection of which the word of God declares them to be capable. Thus does the notion of futurity enter in to qualify every theological statement of present state, attainment, or blessing, or grace ; and “faith” and “Christian” must, if we wish to be practical, be taken into our list, already large, of two-fold<sup>i</sup> words ; though “faith” will lose its name and become “sight” when the highest notion which it suggests is realized, and *Christian* will be changed into actual walkers *with* Christ, in the presence of His and our Father and God. The com-

<sup>i</sup> See Lecture II.



plete freedom of the faithful belongs therefore to another world, when having nothing in them to answer to temptation, and no one, and nothing to tempt them, and nothing to deny or resist, and nothing (so God has willed it) to be condemned, they will act, uninfluenced by external law, in willing sympathy with God. But while they are on earth, however well they may have realized their name of Christians, they are still regarded (because they are still "in the flesh," in one sense though not in another) as being under an obligation; under an obligation, if any one likes to put it so, not of the moral commandments, but of performing the works of the moral commandments.

There is no doubt a theoretical difficulty in this view of the case. The recognition of the obligation of works is not reconcilable on abstract principles with the view which represents every Christian as such as possessed of a superior principle, not only superseding duty and obligation, but dispensing with them. But, when a due regard is had to that state of probation in which we are, we can see our way through the difficulty, not so as to reinstate the logical definition of *faith* or of a *Christian* in scholastic grandeur, but so as to appreciate the wisdom which disregarded the apparent discrepancy between the two statements, for the sake of the practical safeguard for actual Christians, which is attained by the illogical, but most scriptural and necessary, enunciation of the obligation of works<sup>j</sup>.

<sup>j</sup> It is obvious that this which I have called a case of there

The second point, on which I shall claim for our Church a greater precision than is sometimes allowed, is that of the possibility of a Christian man falling away from grace<sup>k</sup>. "After we have received the Holy Ghost" (we read in the sixteenth Article) "we may depart from grace given, and fall into sin, and by the grace of God we may rise again, and amend our lives." Is not the plain meaning of this language that the rise of the lapsed (ordinarily) is *possible*, not *certain*. On what other principle is the use of the potential "*may*" and not the future "*shall*" to be accounted for? We may fall, and we may rise. Both are possible, but neither certain. When we consider that Bradford<sup>l</sup>, in speaking of the elect, says expressly of them that if they fall they *shall* not lie still, and Cranmer<sup>m</sup> says likewise, "in the elect

being greater precision than is sometimes thought in the teaching of our Church, may be regarded *from the point of faith*, as merely another instance of *absence* of precision: the statement of the *obligation* of works qualifying the view which represents them *solely* as the necessary consequents of a lively faith.

<sup>k</sup> I cannot help thinking that the abstract expression *defectible* grace is better avoided. Such language *appears* (though it is not meant) to interfere with the efficacy of divine assistance. We must never think of God's grace as unable to accomplish its purpose, as not being "sufficient for" us: but we may with advantage think of ourselves as failing to answer God's gracious invitations and impulses, or, after answering them, shrinking nevertheless from that sacrifice of natural inclinations which a constant compliance with them seems at first to exact. And this appears to me to be the view of our Church.

<sup>l</sup> "When you fall the Lord will put under his hand that you shall not lie still." Letter xlviii. p. 134. Ed. Parker Soc.

<sup>m</sup> Miscellaneous Writings and Letters, p. 91. Ed. Parker Soc.

finally no fault *shall* be—the elect *shall* not wilfully and obstinately withstand God’s calling,” it is natural to suppose that the same plain language would have been used here, if that which is stated as certain of the *elect* had been intended to be also predicated as *certain* of all who “receive the Holy Ghost.” It is perfectly true that in the Latin Article the “*may*” “*possumus*” is not repeated as it is in the English<sup>n</sup>; and it may be argued that it was not intended to exclude the view, that all that is contemplated as possible is a *temporary* departure from grace given. But it is difficult to understand how, if this had been the case, a translation so plainly suggestive of a different opinion should have been tolerated. The rejection in the days of James I. of the proposition to add the words “yet neither totally nor finally” to the assertion of the possibility of falling, demonstrates, as Archbishop Laurence<sup>o</sup> has observed, that then at least the Calvinistic interpretation was not affirmed. That it was not at first intended appears to me further evident from the language of the Burial Service, and still more from that of the Homilies. I cannot see how the words “Suffer us not at our last hour for any pains of death to fall from thee” can be interpreted, without violence, on any other supposition than that which regards such a fall from God as ordinarily possible to the last, at least theoretically; though as a matter of fact impossible in many cases.

<sup>n</sup> “Post acceptum Spiritum Sanctum possumus a gratia data recedere, atque peccare, denuoque per gratiam Dei resurgere ac resipiscere.” Art. XVII.

<sup>o</sup> Note 1 to Sermon i. p. 161.

But inasmuch as it is only God who actually knows the state of the case, we speak as if such fall were possible, and pray that it may not be ; or, we speak as if it were possible for some though not for all. And this is a striking instance of the difference between *that which is, and that which we are at liberty to affirm*. We are obliged to speak according to what we see and think, except when that about which we speak has been clearly decided in Scripture. And upon the point before us the language of Scripture is that of serious exhortation as well as of trust, and does not profess to give any abstract decision of the question. But to return to the view of our Church as further represented in the Homilies. “What deadly grief,” says the Homily Of falling from God<sup>p</sup>, “may a man suppose it is to be under the wrath of God, to be forsaken of Him, to have His Holy Spirit, the author of all goodness, to be taken from Him, to be brought to so vile a condition that he shall be left meet for no better purpose than to be for ever condemned in hell?” And that this is possible is argued, (not merely left to be inferred from this interrogation,) from the language of the Psalms, and of the fifth chapter of Isaiah. And the latter passage is directly applied to Christians, and explained to mean that “God<sup>q</sup> will take that (His Word) away from them so that they shall be no longer of His kingdom, they shall be no longer governed by His Holy Spirit, they shall be put from the grace and benefits that they had, and ever might have enjoyed through Christ,

<sup>p</sup> Part ii. p. 77.

<sup>q</sup> Ibid. p. 78.

they shall be deprived of the heavenly light which they had in Christ whiles they abode in him, they shall be, as they once were, as men without God in the world, or rather in worse taking." And the Homilist goes on to apply the warning to all still more particularly by saying, "Let us beware, therefore, good Christian people, lest that we, rejecting or casting away God's word, by the which we obtain and retain true faith in God, be not at length cast off so far that we become as the children of unbelief." And there are no less than six other places, which it would be long to quote<sup>s</sup>, in which equally strong language is used; language in fact such as I should say was according to any ordinary principles of interpretation completely unmistakable. I am speaking, you will please to remember, of ordinary cases, of men of whom all that could be said would be that they had enjoyed the ordinary blessings of the Christian covenant. The exceptional case of those who are predestinated to life,—whether it be owing to any foresight of perseverance, or any special love of God, we need not again discuss—was considered in the last Lecture; and some suggestions were given with a view to our applying the "most sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort of a godly consideration of predestination" to our own individual

<sup>s</sup> The First Part of the Information of certain Places of Scripture, p. 332-3. The Sermon of the Resurrection, p. 390 ad fin. and 391. Ibid. p. 393. The First Part of the Sermon of Repentance, p. 474. The Third Part of ditto, p. 488. See also The Sermon of the Nativity, p. 365, and The Second Sermon of the Passion, p. 383.

cases without the danger of self-deceit. But setting these aside, it appears to be plain, if language means anything, that it is the ordinary view of the Church of England that a Christian may fall finally from grace. And it is I think worth noting as a mark of practical wisdom, that this doctrine, though only taught *incidentally* (in the sixteenth Article), yet precedes in order the loftier doctrine of perpetuity of faith in the Elect, as belonging to the case of ordinary Christians, not yet prepared to contemplate the deep secret of predestination, or gaze where, amid the chosen band of the true friends of God, the darksome standard is reared in awful majesty, whose letters none can read aright but those whose names are written in the Book of Life. With like wisdom the everlasting obligation of the moral commandments<sup>t</sup>, even under the Christian dispensation, precedes the bold commendation of a justifying<sup>u</sup> faith which, if indeed present in its perfection, would supersede the necessity of such obligation by a loftier and more living principle. And I will say in passing (as it may interest some in this place) that these qualifying statements occupy the same place in our Theology which the seventh book of the Ethics of Aristotle occupies in his system of morals. They meet practically the case of the many, who are not supposed to have attained, in the one case that perfect habit of virtue, in the other that perfect gift of faith, which if attained would absorb and render unnecessary the more preparatory and imperfect condition, in the one

<sup>t</sup> Art. VII.<sup>u</sup> Art. XI.

case of legal obligation, in the other of self-restraint and self-control. Not as if the two cases were entirely analogous—for the moralist knew nothing of that doctrine of free grace which alone can place the formation of virtuous habits on its right basis—but in respect of a wise recognition of a lower practical *rule* (though not of a lower *standard*) with a view to include the case of those who had not yet attained the willing service of the good, the heathen moralist and the Christian theologian take somewhat the same position.

The two points to which I shall now call your attention have reference to the Holy Communion. In what sense is that service called a *sacrifice* in the formularies of our Church? And, can it be said that the wicked therein receive any spiritual thing? On the first point the language of our Church seems very clear and definite. In the Articles the only mention of the term in connection with the Holy Communion<sup>x</sup> is that in which the “Sacrifices of Masses” are condemned as “blasphemous fables and dangerous deceits.” In the Homilies we are especially told that in the Holy Sacrament we need no “other sacrifice or oblation (than that of Christ<sup>y</sup>), no sacrificing Priest—” and we are warned to take care “lest of the memory it be made a sacri-

<sup>x</sup> Art. XXXI.

<sup>y</sup> The whole passage is as follows:—“Now it followeth to have with this knowledge a sure and constant faith not only that the death of Christ is available for the redemption of all the world, for the remission of sins, and reconciliation with God the Father; but also that he hath made upon his Cross a full and suffi-

fice<sup>z</sup>.” And in the Liturgy itself the term is only applied (besides its *proper* application to the one sacrifice of Christ) to the “sacrifice<sup>a</sup> of praise and thanksgiving” and the “offering and presenting unto the Lord of ourselves, our souls and bodies, as a reasonable, holy, and lively sacrifice unto” Him<sup>b</sup>. In the Catechism the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper is said to have been “ordained for the continual remembrance of the Sacrifice of the death of Christ.” From this usage it seems fair to infer—first, that the application of the term *sacrifice*, in the sense of a propitiatory offering, to anything but the actual sacrifice of Christ is expressly condemned. Secondly, that the application of the term in the sense of any offering made to God is allowed and adopted; and lastly, that its use in the sense of a representation (or bringing before the senses) of the one sacrifice of Christ, or of a presentation

cient sacrifice for thee, a perfect cleansing of thy sins, so that thou acknowledgest no other Saviour, redeemer, mediator, advocate, intercessor, but Christ only: and that thou mayest say with the apostle that *he loved thee, and gave himself for thee*. For this is to stick fast to Christ’s promise made in His Institution, to make Christ thine own, and to apply His merits unto thyself. Herein thou needest no other man’s help, no other sacrifice or oblation, no sacrificing priest, no mass, no means established by man’s invention.” Hom. p. 399. <sup>z</sup> Ibid. p. 396.

<sup>a</sup> First Prayer in the Post-Communion.

<sup>b</sup> Ibid. The word occurs again in this prayer, thus:—“Though we be unworthy through our manifold sins to offer unto Thee any *sacrifice*, yet we beseech Thee to accept this our bounden duty and service.” But can there be a reasonable doubt that “*this*” refers to the “sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving” and of “our souls and bodies” spoken of before? or to the whole service, as a *devotional act*?



of that sacrifice to God, is not indeed forbidden, but, at the same time, is not used. The statement therefore of Hooker<sup>c</sup>, that the Gospel has “properly now no sacrifice,” is eminently correct, and I feel no doubt that he meant by *proper*, not, as Waterland supposes, *propitiatory*, but *whatever is not metaphorical*. That

<sup>c</sup> Eccl. Polit. B. V. ch. lxxviii. 2. “The Fathers of the Church of Christ with like security of speech call usually the ministry of the Gospel *Priesthood* in regard of that which the Gospel hath *proportionable* to ancient sacrifices, namely, the Communion of the blessed Body and Blood of Christ, although it have properly now no sacrifice.”

<sup>d</sup> Waterland’s note which is quoted by Mr. Keble in his edition of Hooker, and by Mr. Wilberforce in his “Doctrine of the Incarnation,” is as follows:—“Mr. Hooker feared not to say that ‘sacrifice is now no part of the Church ministry,’ and that we have ‘properly now no sacrifice.’ I presume he meant by *proper* sacrifice *propitiatory*, according to the sense of the Trent Council (Sess. xxii. Can. 1. 3) or of the new definitions. In such a sense as that he might justly say that sacrifice is no part of the Church ministry, or that the Christian Church has no sacrifice. But I commend not the use of such new language, be the meaning ever so right: the Fathers never used it.” Charge 1738; Works viii. 168, Oxf. 1823. Now what Hooker meant is best seen from his own words in a parallel passage in the fourth book of the same work, which ought not, I think, to have been left without notice by his editor when quoting Waterland’s criticism. “That very Law therefore which our Saviour was to abolish did not *so soon* become unlawful to be observed as some imagine; nor was it afterwards unlawful *so far*, that the very name of altar, of priest, of sacrifice itself, should be banished out of the world. For though God do now hate sacrifice, whether it be heathenish or Jewish, so that we cannot have the same things which they had but with impiety; yet unless there be some greater let than the only evacuation of the Law of Moses, the names themselves may (I hope) be retained without sin, in respect of that proportion which things established by our Saviour have unto them which

portion of our spiritual service in the Holy Communion which is especially connected with the piercing of the body of Christ, and the shedding of His blood upon the Cross, is the *commemoration of a sacrifice*. It is perfectly true that even Burnet<sup>b</sup> does not scruple to call the Eucharist a *commemorative sacrifice*, and it may be argued with some force that if the sacrifices of the Law which were prospective and not actually propitiatory (in respect I mean of *spiritual* pain or guilt) were and are nevertheless called sacrifices, our retrospective commemoration of the one sacrifice on the Cross may be so called also. But the simple truth appears to be that the ordinary notion of a sacrifice, and that to which the mind commonly recurs, involves the notion of death or shedding of blood, and in this point the typical sacrifices of the Law, regarded as outward acts, resembled the Sacrifice of the Cross, which our commemorative sacrifice (to use the term for the moment) evidently does not. And for this reason it seems to me more reasonable, as well as

by Him are abrogated. And so throughout all the writings of the ancient Fathers we see that the words which were do continue; the only difference is, that whereas before they had a *literal* they have now a *metaphorical* use," (the Italics are mine,) "and are as so many notes of remembrance unto us that what they did signify in the letter is accomplished in the truth." Eccl. Pol. B. IV. ch. x. 10. p. 583. Ed. Keble. Can there be a doubt as to his having had the same meaning in the similar passage in the Fifth Book? The truth seems to me to be, that Hooker lived too near the Reformation to dally with the expressions perverted by Romish superstition. I mean when he is arguing calmly, for I will never answer for his rhetoric.

<sup>b</sup> On Art. XXXI.

more safe, to call our less close representation of that which they *acted* in prospect *the commemoration of a sacrifice*. And it is obvious to any one who has studied the Communion-office as it stands<sup>c</sup>, both that there is no mention of a sacrifice *in connection with the act of Consecration*, and that where the spiritual end is not most prominent, the commemorative nature of the service is alone insisted on. And as it is the plain duty of a faithful member of the Church of England to reject altogether the notion of a propitiatory sacrifice other than the one Sacrifice of Christ, so is it the duty of one who is humble and obedient, as well as of one who is prudent, to be satisfied with her use of so suggestive a term<sup>d</sup>, instead of persisting in an use which *cannot* be of real importance, (for “there remaineth no more sacrifice for sin<sup>e</sup>,” even for those who can look forward with hope to judgment,) and which, though harmless to himself, may not be so to others, and which is moreover in the minds of many, and those zealous for the Saviour’s honour, and for a spiritual view of His Holy Institution, identified with Romish superstition, its “blasphemous fables and

<sup>c</sup> By this I mean without investing its expressions with the additional strength of other expressions with which they may coincide, but which they do not really imply. Where such expressions have been deliberately excluded, to do this appears even more inexcusable.

<sup>d</sup> Wishing to speak of the use of the word *sacrifice* only, I have omitted any mention of the *oblation* of the bread and wine.

<sup>e</sup> Heb. x. 26. 27. “For if we sin wilfully after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries.”

dangerous deceits." The second point stands on much the same footing. "The wicked<sup>f</sup>," says the Article of our Church, "and they which be void of a lively faith, though they do carnally and visibly press with their teeth the Sacrament of the body and blood of Christ, yet in no wise are they partakers of Christ, but rather to their condemnation do eat the sign or Sacrament of so great a thing." "The unbelievers and faithless," says the Homily<sup>g</sup>, "cannot feed upon that precious body." And, as I have before noticed, objective language is always used of the wicked, even when subjective is evidently applied to the faithful. And this is in exact accordance with the language of Saint Paul, who says of the unworthy communicants that they "eat and drink their own damnation." For *damnation* evidently is a judicial word, and does not imply the immediate infliction of any internal spiritual evil. It is perfectly true that the notion of an internal evil thing being received in the Holy Communion by the evil is not explicitly condemned, provided that spiritual thing is allowed *not* to be the Body and Blood of Christ; but such a refinement is evidently quite at variance with the positive language used, and has, I think, a tendency to promote superstitious fears, and so to blunt the edge of true spiritual repentance. With these remarks I shall leave the details of the

<sup>f</sup> Art. XXIX. So Art. XXVIII. "The mean whereby the Body of Christ is received and eaten in the Supper is Faith."

<sup>g</sup> First Part of the Sermon concerning the Sacrament. Hom. p. 400. Faith is moreover distinctly said to be necessary in order to receive "not only the outward Sacrament, but the spiritual thing also." Ibid.

subject in which we have been so long engaged, not as having exhausted them, but as having specially, though I am well aware most imperfectly, considered those which I proposed in the first of these Lectures to discuss.

I shall not waste your time by confessions which I might well make, as to my consciousness of having failed to do justice to the many difficult and interesting questions to which I have invited your attention. But I will venture to say thus much, that the views which I have put forward are far more near those of the Church of England, as settled at the Reformation, than either the lofty views of ecclesiastical authority and ministerial functions and Sacramental grace, which about twenty years ago were dominant in this place, or, on the other hand, the extreme solifidian views which have from time to time appeared to find favour generally in this Church and country. Thus much I say confidently, and without fear of gainsaying. And now I propose to take a brief review of the ground which we have traversed, or rather the positions in which we have rested; and then to commend the whole subject, under God, to the after reflections of those among you who are not unwilling to reflect upon it.

In the first Lecture we considered the difficulties which the nature of the case presents to dogmatizing on the more difficult and controverted points of theology, a difficulty which we saw in the second Lecture is not removed, nay is sometimes even enhanced, by the language of Holy Scripture. Thus prepared we proceeded to consider in detail the manner in which these difficulties have been treated by those who

composed the formularies of the Church of England. We noticed in the third Lecture that our Church does not require of all her members the same explicit confession on that most difficult and mysterious subject—the essential nature of God. The learned and the Clergy are called upon to be prepared to defend the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity, the unlearned Laity to *worship* with them the Three Persons who are one God. This absence of precision as to rule and requirement was strenuously recommended. It was shewn also that there was no just ground of objection to the doctrinal statements of the Athanasian Creed, because they are not really expansions of the truth itself, not audacious subtleties engrafted on the great mystery, but merely defensive and explanatory. It was shewn also that in the opinion of some of our soundest divines the damnatory clauses were intended to apply only to those who rejected the main doctrine of the Trinity or that of the Incarnation, and not to those who were unable to understand the inadequate definitions (if they may be called definitions) of mysteries which in themselves no one understands. The like absence of precision both as to requirement, and as to actual explanation, (as distinguished from verbal exposition,) was observed (in the fourth Lecture) to exist in the treatment of the essential nature of man, both specially in the Person of Christ, and in each one of ourselves.

The reverent and humble shrinking from any attempt to define or even speculate how Christ Jesus could be “born of a woman,” and yet be “without sin,” was especially commended, and that eccentric view

was especially condemned, by which a learned writer who has left our Church, has been led to tamper with the doctrine of original sin, and to pave the way to the adoption of the erroneous and superstitious tenet of Transubstantiation, as something more satisfactory, and less absurdly metaphysical, than the ubiquitarian *entity* of his own fantastic creation. Again the common sense was held out to admiration, which led our Reformers to confine their consideration of human nature to a marked enunciation of the *existence* of the struggle between the flesh and the Spirit, and its continuance even in the regenerate, leaving the philosophy of this question to be discussed as men think best, and to the perfect revelations of another world.

The work of the Holy Spirit in our regeneration then came before us, and we regarded it as beginning, so far as man can affirm, at baptism, and only ending with life. Not laying stress upon the exact *mode* of this divine operation, the *fact* of its absolute necessity, in order that we may be renewed, was stated, and guarded, and magnified. And with a view to the prevention of formalism and unreality on the one hand, or presumption on the other, a freer use of the term *regenerate* was recommended, on the authority of the Homilies of our Church, and of some of our best divines. In the Sixth Lecture we considered the connection of grace with outward ordinances, and in the Seventh with inward sensations, shewing that in both cases all that was real and scriptural was secured in the Formularies of our Church, (beyond reasonable doubt or cavil,) while

the dangers of unreality and self-deceit were guarded against in the one case by that very absence of precision which is so often condemned, and in the other by express limitations, conceived in the very spirit of the sacred volume, and most suitable to our state of probation.

The supplementary subjects of the present Lecture need not to be recapitulated.

Let me now once more recommend to your attention and thought the main subject of our discussion, the propriety of such absence of precision as exists in the Church of England, as one the consideration of which is eminently calculated at once to allay the fervour of theological strife, and to deepen the intensity of religious conviction. I speak of course of considerations such as man can consciously originate for himself in his own mind. That the eternal Spirit must brood over the troubled waters to appease them, even as of old over the dark deep to vivify it, that He alone can give peace as well as life, is a truth which in this place and before this congregation may fairly be supposed to be assumed. But this once granted, and going on to the subordinate agency of man, there can, I think, be little doubt that a deep sense of the imperfection of human knowledge, in any high sense of the word, even with regard to the truths undoubtedly revealed in Scripture, would have a humbling and so a controlling effect on man's natural tendency to differ first and then to dogmatize, the value of which it is scarcely possible to overrate. And I will repeat the observation which I made in the First of these Lec-



tures, that the genius of the age we live in appears especially enlisted on the side of this natural tendency, and against such a reflective spirit as I am recommending. To be doing something palpable and visible, to have something at once to shew, (not only something to shew but something to shew at once,) to arrive rapidly at ends, and those ends eminently practical, in the common and narrow sense of that ill-used word, may, I suppose, be fairly said to be the object which most men, some consciously and others unconsciously but not the less certainly, place before their own minds. And the effect of this tendency as applied to matters of religion, and especially to matters of Theology, seems, as I mentioned in my first Lecture, to be to multiply special combinations with a view to immediate action ; and in order to facilitate, and, as it is thought, to strengthen these combinations, to bring out party differences and watchwords into bold relief, and invest them with undue importance. And so the temper of mind which would aim at balancing carefully the evidence, and also the character, of religious truth, by which latter expression I mean whether a point is essential or only arbitrary and conventional, whether it is a part of the truth itself, or only of our reflections upon the truth, a projection, if one may use the expression, of our own thought : the temper of mind which does not fear to recognize in error its element of truth, and in truth, as held by fallible men, its liability to be crusted over with error : which keeps moreover ever in remembrance the fact that the things which we

believe are matters not of *knowledge* but of *faith*, and that the things on which, for precaution's sake or to meet presumptuous error, we have been obliged and have done well to dogmatize, are nevertheless invested in some degree with the mists that veil from human eyes and human reason the invisible and incomprehensible God,—this temper of mind, my brethren, which is fain to acknowledge that, as in spiritual fruition, so in spiritual understanding, we are here in a state of progress and probation, living, not in a self-sufficient and independent province given over to us for ever by God, but on a temporary and fleeting stage, where we have a part assigned to us to play:—this temper of mind, which seems to be so remarkably suited to the condition of a human candidate for a divine inheritance, is in danger of being discouraged and despised. Is it not at least true that a very different character and temper is that which finds acceptance with the world? the theological world I mean, not merely the world of politics or commerce, the world in its usual acceptation. Decided opinions upon theological subjects, a decided adhesion to the views and the language of some particular school, a participation for instance only in one set of missionary exertions, only in one class of educational schemes,—these are the points which attract the greatest confidence, these are considered the symptoms of real and vital religion, these are regarded as necessary in order to do good. It is too often part of the idea of their ministerial duty which presents itself to the

zealous and the active that they *ought* to have settled opinions on the theological questions of the day, and that to be without them would be a token of indifference. And thus they too often anticipate the natural growth of their religious convictions, and are hurried into the adoption of technical and sectarian language, which acts as a bar of separation between them and others from whom, if they had spoken with them simply and naturally, they might have derived useful hints towards the formation of their opinions, and with whom they would have probably found themselves in all essential points at one. For from what school of opinion, nay even from what individual mind of an honest and conscientious man, is there not much knowledge to be learnt? Only let the school discard, or not obtrude, its special technical phraseology, only let the good man speak as he feels, not as he has been told he ought to feel, and the collision of one man's understanding with that of another, equally bent upon religious improvement, is sure to have a beneficial result. Again, how little must needs be the real difference which exists on matters of religion between those who "love the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity." Stripped of the veil of words with which it had been mechanically involved, freed from the peculiar handling of each man's idiosyncrasy, and thrown out again in its native scriptural simplicity before the sympathising and loving eyes of two earnest servants of God, the truth which seemed different will shew itself the same, and those who met as rivals will part

as friends, or rather go on together in amity, glad to find themselves “of one mind,” and satisfied henceforth that, though they may not always use the same exact words, they are nevertheless speaking “the same thing.”

Let us suppose for a moment that we had all agreed to cast off as much as possible anything like a party watchword or *shibboleth* (those causes as well as signs of difference); let us suppose that we all acted on the principle of waiting to express an opinion till we had thoroughly considered it, and were quite sure we really held it; let us suppose, lastly, that we steadily refrained from attaching to secondary points, on which there has been always a difference of opinion in our Church, the importance due only to primary doctrines, on which there has never been any doubt; let us suppose a quarter of a century passed in this self-restraint on matters of controversy, and at the same time in an energetic and practical carrying out of those points which all allow to be of the very essence of Christianity, and will any one doubt that true religion in this Church and country would be in an infinitely better position? But so long as into discussions on religious subjects favourite and exclusive expressions are introduced, which themselves involve the necessity of definitions and previous explanations; so long as without these expressions a fellow Christian is distrusted, perhaps hardly honoured with the name;—so long as the arrangement of particular forms, and, with this, questions as to the exact value of rubrics or traditionary

directions, surpllices or the absence of them, are taken from their proper subordinate position, and made to occupy a front rank which renders them ridiculous, being, on the one hand, invested with the sacredness which belongs only to the truth which they profess to embody, and, on the other hand, unfairly suspected and extravagantly opposed; so long, again, (to go a little deeper,) as it is thought a part of piety to be decided on many points on which it is rather a matter of duty to be undecided, or, if not undecided, at least fully sensible of the qualifications with which our decision should be guarded;—so long, my brethren, as this perversion of feeling and judgment continues, there does not seem to be much hope of reconciliation.

Let no one imagine that in making these remarks, and recommending a more liberal and truly catholic management of religious differences, I profess to be offering a new and infallible specific for removing all difficulties and allaying all suspicion. I believe indeed that by the adoption of such a course many earnest men, who now keep aloof from each other, might be brought to work together in the Lord's vineyard in perfect sympathy and without the slightest sacrifice of truth. But at the same time I am well aware that on the one hand there must be always some points of conscientious difference remaining, and on the other some impracticable natures upon whom no softening or enlightening influence would be exercised even by the most favourable opportunities of mutual explanation. Some, it is to be

feared, there will always be, so wedded to their own particular view of the truth, that they cannot imagine any one to be sincere, or, if sincere, commonly sensible, who differs from themselves. And these men unfortunately have too much influence with their neighbours. There is a natural cowardice in the human mind, that strange enigma, mingled with its equally natural conceit, which often induces men of really superior abilities and a wider grasp of mind to succumb to the flashy eloquence and the off-hand and shallow reasoning of persons of decided opinions. There is a feeling of false shame which leads the earnest to suspect their own thoughtfulness, and to hurry on their own convictions to keep pace with the apparent progress of these, as it would seem, more doughty champions of the truth. There is something moreover unattractive in common sense, especially when applied to Theology; and a charge of rationalism is often freely brought against those who are endeavouring to use the intellect and the grace which God has given them to investigate the question, What is religious truth, and what mere human reflections of it, and to oppose the tendency to formalism and unreality, which is an evil incidental to system. Was not, it is said, the Scripture given to us on purpose to acquaint us with God's truth, and can there be any doubt about the great truths of the Gospel, which concern our eternal salvation? and if not, can it be right or lawful to be undecided in matters of religion? Now to these objections I answer generally thus:—Let us be as decided

as possible as to the main truths of the Gospel ; as to the fundamental doctrines and the vital practical precepts which are revealed to us in God's Word.— Let us be decided worshippers of the Three Persons who are One God. Let us be decided believers in the “One Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus.” Let us be decided that “no man can say that Jesus is the Lord except by the Holy Ghost.” Let us be decided that “to fear God and keep his commandments is the whole duty of man.” Let us, lastly, as ministers of the Gospel, be decided that “to preach Jesus Christ and him crucified” is our great and unmistakable duty. Further, and more particularly, I will say that it has been the object of these Lectures to shew that all the great truths of Christianity are clearly and unequivocally affirmed in the formularies of the Church of England ; that whatever is plain and precise in Holy Scripture is plain there also, wherever the plainness and precision does not evidently belong to the especial circumstances of the individual agents in the events recorded in the Bible, so as to be inapplicable to our altered conditions. But with regard to the many points which are not distinctly laid down, with regard to the exact import of phrases nowhere definitely explained in Scripture, and freely applied by antiquity, and with regard to the many views of the same point of doctrine which are incidental to different circumstances of education, or of intellect, or even natural temperament—with regard to these, theological ra-

ther than religious, questions, it has been my object to shew that our Church allows her members a rational freedom, and recommends by her own example a thoughtful consideration, and a calm and cautious expression. And surely upon these points it is not too much to say that the best teacher ought to be himself a learner still, and that the wisest professor ought to be ever aiming at a fuller and more adequate understanding. And therefore to speak on these points with reserve and humility, to submit to be undecided, or at least undogmatic, so far from being, as it is often thought, a mark of weakness and want of zeal, ought rather to be held to be a mark of spiritual discretion, of a recognition of the position which man occupies in this world with respect to the eternal mysteries of God.

For let me in this concluding Lecture be permitted to recall to your minds the principle with which we started on our solemn inquiry,—The difference between the actual and exact state of the case and that which is made known to us even under the Gospel dispensation. Let us not be either too proud or too impatient to observe and dwell upon the grandeur, and the mystery, and the distance, and the incomprehensible nature of many of the truths presented to us, and in that case we shall, I am sure, be all willing to own generally that all contemplation thereon must needs be affected by these peculiarities of its objects. And if we could only determine not to be very dogmatic as to the correctness of *our own* view of theological questions till we were sure we had



fairly made the whole circle of the truth, and viewed it in all its different aspects, so as to see how far these modify its expression though they do not change its substance—if we were, I say, willing to do this, a large portion of the longest life would, I think, be spent in a calm and attentive observation of these things, and little would perhaps be left for decided enunciations of unquestioning and unmistakable convictions. For to meet the objection with the kindred exegetical principle which we also laid down at the beginning of our discussion, let us never forget that “these things” on which we are to “ponder” are revealed to us in language of which we have not always, or at least cannot be sure that we have, the inner key. And when we leave the very words of the sacred volume, we are met further with a most important consideration—that human language is necessarily very inadequate to the office of exactly expressing divine facts. And to treat the language of Scripture, which is often obscure, or that of theology, which is always inadequate, as if they were both thoroughly easy and familiar, and as if we were as sure to be correct in their use, as in that of language expressing things much more within our grasp, and therefore to condemn others to whom such language conveys, not in the main but in some particulars, a different impression, and to make it the ground of arbitrary deductions, and even of separate systems, and this without any misgiving as to the correctness of our own views, without ever bearing in mind the important and humbling fact that dogmatise as we

will we do only "know in part,"—this when plainly set before us as something which *others* ought not to do, seems (let me use the expression without offence) very objectionable and absurd. But to one who acted upon this conviction and thoroughly realized the difficulty of the words of Holy Scripture, and calmly and carefully tested the value of theological terms, the life-long task which the subject itself prescribed would seem to lengthen ever more and more, and the voice of hope, which promised its accomplishment at last, would have an unearthly sound, and seem to float across the ocean from an unknown land, awakening visions of eternity.

And all the while perhaps the mighty work of personal improvement, and of bringing others to Christ, would be progressing even more rapidly and successfully. All the while the resolute and decided religion of the undogmatic theologian would be bringing forth fruit to God. All the while the man of no party, but only on the Lord's side, recking not of Paul or Apollos or Cephas, would be making converts to Christ. All the while his life would be untying the Gordian knot which others cut. All the while his unconscious orthodoxy would be bearing witness to the truth.

And blessed, I will say in conclusion, are such servants of God. For it was not systematic theologians, but humble and earnest and holy Christians, that the Gospel was given to beget, as children of God in Christ, members of His new creation. It is not the readiest arguer or the most rigid dogmatist on God's essen-

tial nature, who adores the Blessed Trinity, his Creator his Redeemer his Sanctifier, with the purest and most grateful worship. It is not the most exact definer of the mode of Christ's Incarnation, in whom Christ is therefore most truly "formed" by the converse operation of the same divine Spirit. It is not the most precise upholder of baptismal regeneration who is always most sensible of the corruption of his nature which makes him need to be regenerate; it is not the most dogmatic assertor of a complete conversion who is always most careful to lead the new life of a convert; it is not the most technical supporter of the Sacramental system who always depends most on the invisible working of God; or the most undoubting champion of irreversible election who takes the greatest pains "to make his calling and election sure," either to his own reason, or in fact. And—to speak generally—it is not always the most rigid terminologist who imbibes through his exegetical researches most of the spirit of the Bible.

Theology in fact only keeps the door, but religion admits us into the temple. Theology is only valuable as the handmaid of religion. It is thus, as I have before observed, that she appears in the formularies of the Church of England. And it is in this point of view that I have endeavoured to hold out to your admiration the moderation and thoughtfulness of those formularies, and to justify their absence of precision on points which, though interesting, are not essential, and on which a man may be undecided, or even ignorant, without any peril, sometimes with

advantage, to his salvation. The handling of the doctrinal questions, so far as it is that of the Church of England, I commend to your rational acceptance ; so far as it is my own, to your candid consideration. Let it be regarded in this latter aspect, as suggestive rather than conclusive ; as calculated to produce a fitting temper of mind with regard to religious controversy, and to induce men to study the history and origin of the Formularies of our Church and their agreement with the sacred volume, rather than as designed to win over others to any thing that may be peculiar in my own views or in the expression of them.

“ I speak as unto wise men ; judge ye what I say.” Finally, let us all endeavour to gain by prayer and self-discipline, and calm and earnest reflection upon the difficulties of the subject itself, and of the inspired volume, something at all events of that charitable spirit which was inculcated by Him who said, “ Judge not, that ye be not judged,” something, if possible, of that patient and rational spirit which is content to refer some disputed questions to the decision of another world, rather than “ judge ” anything “ before the time,” or evoke for the sake of present contentment the ready but unauthorized solution either of ecclesiastical dictation or of enthusiastic assumption.

## APPENDIX.

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### LECTURE II.

THE following are the passages referred to in p. 52 :—

I. *Regeneration*] “Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of *regeneration* (διὰ λούτρου παλιγγενεσίας), and renewing of the Holy Ghost.” Tit. iii. 5. compared, 1st, with Matt. xix. 28. “And Jesus said unto them, Verily I say unto you, That ye which have followed me, *in the regeneration* (ἐν τῇ παλιγγενεσίᾳ) when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel:” 2nd, with Gal. iv. 19. “My little children, of whom I *travail in birth again* until Christ *be formed* in you:” τέκνιά μου οὓς πάλιν ὠδίνω ἕως Χριστοῦ μορφωθῆ ἐν ὑμῖν. The first comparison affects the whole subject, the imperfection of *any* new birth on earth when viewed in reference to that new birth which will admit us into the family of God in heaven. The second, in its reference to Baptismal Regeneration and Conversion, has been discussed at large in the fifth Lecture.

II. *Putting on Christ*] “For ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus. For as many of you as have been baptized into Christ *have put on Christ.*” πάντες γὰρ υἱοὶ Θεοῦ ἐστε διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ· ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς Χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε. Gal. iii.

26. 27. compared with "But *put ye* on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh, to fulfil the lusts thereof." ἀλλ' ἐνδύσασθε τὸν Κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, καὶ τῆς σαρκὸς πρόνοιαν μὴ ποιεῖσθε εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν. Rom. xiii.

14. It is obvious that there is a difference between this application of the general metaphor of *putting on Christ* to persons who have in some sense already done so, and the language of the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians in which those who *have* "put off the old man" and "put on the new" are exhorted to put on and put off certain particular virtues and vices characteristic of either. The latter may be readily explained by saying that these converts were urged to acquire those habits of virtue of which their Christian privileges made them capable, and to which their Christian profession obliged them, and eradicate those evil habits which belonged to their unrenewed condition, but *now* need not exist except as temptations. One person would dwell more upon the power and opportunity to do this, which was the gift of the Spirit, others on the intention and promise which preceded and accompanied their admission into the number of believers, but in any case the particular directions would be regarded as carrying out the general scheme. But here the practical direction is as general as the doctrinal statement. And if the same explanation is given, as I think it must be, at least this is established, that the general, and as it would seem initiatory, language is as suitable (for practical exhortation) to *progressive* improvement as to the first step which theoretically and virtually includes the rest. Nor can any one dogmatize and say, the first "putting on" is an *especial* spiritual connection with Christ, different in *character* from that which the second indicates, but we must be content with the freer use of the *term* which Scripture itself suggests.

III. *Adoption or sonship.*] Compare "For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but *ye have received the Spirit of adoption*, whereby we cry, Abba, Father. οὐ γὰρ ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα δουλείας πάλιν εἰς φόβον, ἀλλ' ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας, ἐν ᾧ κράζομεν, Ἀββὰ ὁ πατήρ. Rom.

viii. 15. (and “that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying, Abba, Father.” *ἵνα τὴν υἰοθεσίαν ἀπολάβωμεν. ὅτι δέ ἐστε υἱοὶ, ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν, κράζον, Ἀββᾶ ὁ πατήρ.* Gal. iv. part of 5 and 6.) with “We ourselves groan within ourselves, *waiting for the adoption*, to wit, the redemption of our body. *καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς στενάζομεν, υἰοθεσίαν ἀπεκδεχόμενοι, τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν.* Rom. viii. 23. On which latter words Tholuck (in loco) has this note:—“It was formerly said that Christians had already received the *υἰοθεσία*. It is the same with this however as with all the spiritual good things of believers; the *δικαίωμα*, the *ζωή*, the participation in the *βασιλεία τοῦ Χριστοῦ* are to them a present, and yet likewise a future something. It is offered objectively, the subjective realization is a gradual process. Chrysostom: *νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἀδελφῷ τὰ ἡμέτερα ἔστηκεν ἕως ἐσχάτης ἀναπνοῆς.*” I do not remember *observing* this passage till after I had organized in my own mind the view of the twofold words which I have given in the text. But I derived some assistance during the formation of it (by which I do not mean to represent it as anything very deep or recondite) from the Commentary on the Romans of Dr. John Taylor referred to in the notes of this Lecture. (See chap. xii. 273. vi. p. 96. third ed.) The word *regeneration* led me to the conclusion which the use of other terms confirmed. Having mentioned Taylor’s Commentary I may as well say that I am aware of its dangerous tendencies (being the work of an avowed Pelagian and an Arian also, or as I have seen it stated, an Unitarian). But to one who feels sure that he has no such leanings the learning and ability of the work may be of great service.

IV. *Redemption.*] Compare “Forasmuch as ye know that ye *were* not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, from your vain conversation received by tradition from your fathers; but with the precious blood of Christ,” &c. *εἰδότες ὅτι οὐ φθαρτοῖς, ἀργυρίῳ ἢ χρυσίῳ, ἐλυτρώθητε ἐκ τῆς*

*ματάλας ὑμῶν ἀναστροφῆς πατροπαράδοτου, ἀλλὰ, &c.* 1 Peter i. 18. 19. with Rom. viii. 23. (quoted above) and still more with “grieve not the holy Spirit of God, whereby ye are sealed *unto the day of redemption.*” καὶ μὴ λυπεῖτε τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἅγιον τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἐσφραγίσθητε εἰς ἡμέραν ἀπολυτρώσεως. Eph. iv. 30. It may be argued that, explaining the latter by the former passage, the glorification of the *body* by the last change is the point insisted on, but this would be to cramp the meaning of the second passage; though even if the limitation were allowed the principle would still be the same. Redemption would still be to man, as he is a compound being, future and not only past.

IV. *a. Saved.*] Compare “By grace *ye are saved,*” χάριτέ ἐστε σεσωσμένοι, Eph. ii. 5, (and other places) with “For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, we *shall be saved* by his life.” εἰ γὰρ ἐχθροὶ ὄντες κατηλλάγημεν τῷ Θεῷ διὰ τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, πολλῶ μᾶλλον καταλλαγέντες σωθησόμεθα ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτοῦ. Rom. v. 10; and still more with “But he that shall endure unto the end the same *shall be saved.*” ὁ δὲ ὑπομείνας εἰς τέλος οὗτος σωθήσεται. I say “still more” because this passage takes in the subjective qualification of “enduring unto the end.”

IV. *β. Justified.*] Compare “Therefore *being justified* by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ.” δικαιωθέντες οὖν ἐκ πίστεως, εἰρήνην ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν διὰ τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. Rom. v. 1, with “For not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law *shall be justified.*” οὐ γὰρ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τοῦ νόμου δίκαιοι παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ, ἀλλ’ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοῦ νόμου δικαιωθίσονται, Rom. ii. 13. And, again, “Seeing it is one God, which *shall justify* the circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith.” ἐπεὶ περ εἰς ὁ Θεὸς, ὃς δικαιώσει περιτομὴν ἐκ πίστεως, καὶ ἀκροβυστίαν διὰ τῆς πίστεως. Rom. iii. 30.

V. *Hope*] I shall not lay stress upon this word for the reason given in the Lecture.

VI. *Life*] Compare “Verily, verily, I say unto you, He



that heareth my word, and believeth on him that sent me, *hath everlasting life*, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death unto life.” Ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ὅτι ὁ τὸν λόγον μου ἀκούων, καὶ πιστεύων τῷ πέμψαντί με, ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον· καὶ εἰς κρίσιν οὐχ ἔρχεται, ἀλλὰ μεταβέβηκεν ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου εἰς τὴν ζωὴν, John v. 24. with “and these *shall go away* into everlasting punishment: but *the righteous into life eternal*. καὶ ἀπελεύσονται οὗτοι εἰς κόλασιν αἰώνιον· οἱ δὲ δίκαιοι εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον, Matt. xxv. 46. The mention of the eternal punishment of the wicked prevents the possibility of explaining *ζωή* here to mean only a continued existence. It must connote, even if it does not denote, everlasting *happiness*. And I suppose it would be said that this *is* its meaning, as distinguished (it might be added) from the spiritual principle spoken of in the passage from St. John. But it should be observed, that in the latter clause of this passage, *a life*, into which a man can *pass*, must mean a spiritual *state*, a state of having a new spiritual principle, and not the principle itself; and as it is not probable that the word *life* would be used in a different sense in the former clause, the expression “*hath everlasting life*,” must mean, I suppose, *Hath everlasting happiness* in his possession, inasmuch as he has that *which in itself is sure to lead to it*, or, *Hath it in prospect, and shall have it in reality*. And these qualifications, which appear necessary from a comparison of the two passages, (that which speaks of a *past* and that which speaks of a *future* entry into life,) at least allow, if they do not enforce, the question Is it a mere question of *time*, or one of *trial* also? and therefore, Is the faith which thus (instrumentally) transfers from a state of death to a state of life, an indefeasible possession? Our Church in her use of the metaphor certainly takes the humbler ground. Every baptized person (say for the moment every *elect* person who is baptized) is said to receive thereby the inward spiritual grace of “a death unto sin, and a new birth unto righteousness;” and yet at every grave we pray thus, “We

meekly beseech thee, O Father, to *raise us from the death of sin unto the life of righteousness*”—not from the state of newborn children to that of men, able to live a new life, a life of righteousness, but *from death to life*. And to me this language seems impressed with the freedom and depth of scriptural phraseology, which appears to aim rather at ensuring a result, than at systematizing the steps to it. For it must, I think, be owned that the two passages cannot be reconciled according to any strict and formal system which would say, *Once raised from death*, (which, I suppose, is equivalent to a new birth,) you cannot be raised again, or born again, though you may be strengthened and made able to live your new life. But they are capable of an easy and satisfactory adjustment, if we are willing to say that the Christian state into which we are admitted at Baptism consists in a perpetual death unto sin, and a perpetual birth unto righteousness, the consummation of both of which belongs to another world, to “the regeneration” at the last day. For we may notice that here, as in the case of the metaphor of “putting on Christ,” the generic word “death” is used for the actual spiritual elevation of those who technically *are* already *dead*, and not only the “continual mortifying of our corrupt affections” which would answer to the putting off particular vices, and putting on particular graces, spoken of in those passages from the Ephesians and Colossians to which I referred before, (Eph. iv. 25. compared with 22. 23. Col. iii. 8. compared with 9, and 10. compared with 12.) which stand as the particular to the universal to those (both in those epistles and in Gal. iii. 27.) which speak of the old man *being put off* and the new man (or Christ) *being put on*. [The passage in the Baptismal Office just quoted appears founded on Col. iii. 5 compared with 3.] There is another instance in our Book of Common Prayer of the same absence of technical agreement, suggesting the same comprehensive treatment. In the Absolution in Morning and Evening Prayer, the priest declares and pronounces that God “pardoneth and absolv-

eth all them that truly repent, and unfeignedly believe his holy Gospel," and, setting aside any notion of a conveyance of pardon by the priest's words to the penitent, we should all allow that if any one at that moment had the qualifications required he *would be absolved*. Still, further on in the very same service, he is instructed to speak of himself *as bound*, and to pray that God *will loose him*. 'The prayer is that entitled "A prayer that may be said after any of the former," and is inserted (as every one knows) just before the "General Thanksgiving." (It ought, we are told by Wheatly, to come before the Prayer for the Parliament.) And it runs thus:—"O God, whose nature and property is ever to have mercy and to forgive, receive our humble petitions; and though we be tied and bound with the chain of our sins, yet let the pitifulness of thy great mercy loose us; for the honour of Jesus Christ, our Mediator and Advocate." Now the title by which God is here addressed, or the ground of the prayer, His being ever ready to have mercy and forgive, precludes the objection that the freedom or *loosing* prayed for consists solely of an emancipation from the internal power of evil habits or inclinations, and not also of absolution from guilt, and so that it is a prayer for sanctification, not justification. No doubt the two ideas run into each other; the forgiven or "loosed" ought to "sin no more." Still, as a matter of fact, it is as a God of mercy and forgiveness, (both judicial expressions,) that God is here addressed, not in His capacity as the author of all good things, giver of all spiritual gifts. And according to this view of the prayer the simple explanation is that our pardon is in part past, and in part future,—past, inasmuch as the death of Christ, which was the meritorious cause of it, is a past fact, and because we have been brought into the number of His people, and have (on our present supposition) believed and repented; but future, insomuch as being still in the flesh we "offend in many things," and require a *perpetual* renewal of our pardon till the last day, when it will finally take effect.

VIII. The last passage referred to in the Lecture was

this: "But we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image *from glory to glory*, even as by the Spirit of the Lord. ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντες ἀνακεκαλυμμένῳ προσώπῳ τὴν δόξαν Κυρίου κατοπτριζόμενοι, τὴν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα μεταμορφούμεθα (are *being* changed) ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν, καθάπερ ἀπὸ Κυρίου πνεύματος, which contains its own assertion of gradual progress. One might compare the μεταμορφούμεθα, noting the tense, with Gal. iv. 19. ἕως Χριστὸς μορφωθῇ ἐν ὑμῖν.

## LECTURE VI.

I have thought it desirable to expand the few remarks which were made on Confirmation and Absolution in the Lecture as preached. And to speak first of Confirmation. In the twenty-fifth Article it is explicitly denied to be a "Sacrament of the Gospel," and referred to a class of ceremonies which "have grown out of a corrupt following of the Apostles." And further it is said "not to have like nature of Sacraments with Baptism, and the Lord's Supper, for that *it* has not any visible sign or ceremony ordained of God." This account is we see almost entirely negative, and we are left to *infer* that the *corruptions* which had been connected with this "following of the Apostles" are capable of being removed, and the rite continued as an useful imitation of an apostolic practice, though not of divine appointment. Not even so much as this is explicitly asserted in the Article, and we must therefore look elsewhere for the claims (if there be any) of Confirmation to a technical position in the system of our Church. These we find in the final exhortation to the sponsors in the Baptismal Office: "Ye are to take care that this child be brought to the Bishop to be confirmed by him, so soon as he can say the Creed, the Lord's Prayer, and the Ten Commandments, in the vulgar tongue, and be further instructed in the Church Catechism set forth for that purpose," which injunction appears in the "Baptism of such as are of riper years" in the modified form of the following rubric: "It is

expedient that every person, thus baptized, should be confirmed by the Bishop so soon after his Baptism as conveniently may be; that so he may be admitted to the holy Communion." I call this form *modified* because of the use of the word "expedient," but seeing that the "Sacrament of the Lord's Supper" is declared in the Catechism to be "generally *necessary* to salvation," and that the rubric at the end of the "Order of Confirmation" enacts that "there shall none be admitted to the holy Communion, until such time as he be confirmed, or be ready and desirous to be confirmed,"—the modification must belong rather to the *time* than the *fact* of Confirmation, which may be said to be thus made by an *ecclesiastical* enactment ordinarily necessary, in a secondary and indirect sense, to salvation, inasmuch as it is made by the Church necessary in order that we may do that which we believe to be ordained by Christ as "generally necessary" to salvation. Still its obligation is in this point of view commensurate with the power of the Church to exact any outward ordinance as a necessary condition before any one avails himself of the institutions of Christ. And Confirmation is no more a divine institution than before, but only an imitation of an apostolical practice. Hitherto we have spoken only of the *obligation* of Confirmation on members of the Church of England, which we see is very clearly asserted in the Book of Common Prayer, though utterly omitted in the more doctrinal statements of the Articles, as well as in those of the Second Part of the Catechism, which is to be learnt with a view to a due reception of it. Let us now turn to its *nature*. And we will look for this in the Order of Confirmation itself, where one might expect full justice to be done to it. And I do not see how any one can deny that the spiritual part of the ordinance is purely precatory. There is not a word to suggest the idea of a conveyance of grace by the imposition of the Bishop's hands. In the prayer which accompanies that act there is no assertion of *any* connection between it and the blessings prayed for. "Defend, O Lord, this thy child [or, this thy servant] with thy

heavenly grace, that he may continue thine for ever; and daily increase in thy holy Spirit more and more, until he come unto thy everlasting kingdom. Amen." And in the Collect which follows the Lord's Prayer, where the episcopal act *is* explicitly mentioned, it is only spoken of as a sign, to certify those confirmed of God's favour and gracious goodness. "We make our humble supplications unto thee for these thy servants, upon whom (after the example of thy holy Apostles) we have now laid our hands, to certify them (by this sign) of thy favour and gracious goodness towards them." Compare this with the prayer in the Baptismal Offices: "Sanctify this water to the mystical washing away of sin," and the assertion in the same, "Seeing then, dearly beloved brethren, that this child is regenerate," and the invitation to the congregation to join in "thanking God for these blessings" (just received by the child), and with the prayer of Consecration in the holy Communion, and the similar thanksgiving in the alternative prayer, after the Lord's Prayer in the Post-Communion. The absence first, of any prayer in connection with the outward act or sign, secondly, of any positive assertion of the blessings prayed for by the Bishop being received, and the *generality* of the statement of that of which the Bishop's act was to certify the confirmed, contrast remarkably with the consecratory prayer, the assertion and the specialty of the other forms, and bring out the difference between a sign, and an effectual sign or mean of grace. Not that there is any doubt implied of the Bishop's prayers being heard, or of the certainty of God's "favour and gracious goodness" towards those who renew their baptismal promise sincerely, which the episcopal act may bring vividly before their minds, but there is no suggestion of the blessings being connected with the act, except as a *mere* sign; arbitrarily therefore, or at least ecclesiastically, not by divine appointment: and though they *are* connected with the prayers, according to our Lord's general promise, still there is no further specialty than that which may attach to the prayers of one of the chief ministers of the Church, offered

on a very solemn occasion. I am speaking of course at present of the blessings, only in connection with the Church's ordinance, not with the profession of faith made by the individual; of his *being confirmed* by the Bishop, not of his *confirming* his baptismal promise. And in giving this *precatory* account of Confirmation in this point of view I feel sure I am speaking the mind of the Church of England at the time of the Reformation. For let us look now to the language of the Homilies. In the Homily "Of Common Prayer and Sacraments" it is thus mentioned:—"Confirmation of children, by examining them of their knowledge in the articles of the faith, and joining thereto the prayers of the Church for them;" and it is referred as a "rite and ceremony" to the class of "such ordinances as may make for the instruction, comfort, and edification of Christ's Church;" but at the same time it is said of it (with the others mentioned in Art. XXV) that "no man ought to take it for a *Sacrament* in such signification and meaning as the Sacrament of Baptism and the Lord's Supper are;" and this is the only mention of it in the Homilies. It may be noticed in passing that the *examination in the articles of the faith* is the most prominent point in this account. The other two documents that I shall cite are Nowell's Catechism and a paper of Cranmer's. And let us take the opinion of Cranmer first, as first in point of time, and also as throwing most light on the intention of the original framers of the Article. Here then is "the judgment of Cranmer, Archbishop of Canterbury<sup>a</sup>," on "Some queries concerning Confirmation," proposed to him with other Bishops and Doctors in 1540.

"Whether Confirmation be instituted by Christ?"

"*Respon.* There is no place in Scripture that declareth this Sacrament to be institute of Christ.

"First, for the places alledged for the same be no institutions, but acts and deeds of the Apostles.

"Second, these acts were done by a special gift given to

<sup>a</sup> Given in Burnet's Hist. of Reform. vol. i. part ii. p. 479, and in "Miscellaneous Writings and Letters of Thomas Cranmer," p. 80. Ed. Park. Soc.

the Apostles for the confirmation of God's word at that time.

"Thirdly, the said special gift doth not now remain with the successors of the Apostles.

"What is the external sign?

"The Church useth *chrisma* for the exterior sign, but the Scripture maketh no mention thereof.

"What is the efficacy of this sacrament?

"The Bishop, in the name of the Church, doth invoke the Holy Ghost to give strength and constancy, with other spiritual gifts, unto the person confirmed; so that the efficacy of this sacrament is of such value as is the prayer of the bishop, made in the name of the Church.

"*Hæc respondeo* (he adds) *salvo semper eruditiorum et ecclesiæ orthodoxæ judicio.*"

The date of this paper, and the continued use of the word "sacrament" in its larger sense, add to the force of this testimony in favour of the precatory view of the rite. And inasmuch as it exactly agrees in that respect with the account of the Homily, and the language of the Order of Confirmation itself, there is no room for arguing that this is merely Cranmer's private opinion, and so of no weight.

Later in time, but otherwise more technically authoritative, is the testimony of Nowell's Catechism, which, as I have noticed before, was approved by a Convocation (in 1562). I give the English from Norton's translation, edited, together with the original Latin, by the Parker Society, giving the Latin in a note.

"*M. (Master.)* But whereas thou didst say before, that children after they were grown more in years, ought to acknowledge the truth of their baptism, I would thou shouldest now speak somewhat more plainly thereof.

"*S. (Scholar.)* Parents and schoolmasters did in old time diligently instruct their children, as soon as by age they were able to perceive and understand, in the first principles of Christian religion, that they might suck in godliness almost together with the nurse's milk, and straightways after their cradle might be nourished with the tender food of virtue towards that blessed life. For the which



purpose also little short books, which we name Catechisms, were written, wherein the same or very like matters as we now are in hand with, were entreated upon. And after that the children seemed to be sufficiently trained in the principles of our religion, they brought and offered them unto the bishop.

“*M.* For what purpose did they so?

“*S.* That children might after baptism do the same which such as were older, who were also called *catechumeni*, that is, scholars of religion, did in old time before, or rather at, baptism itself. For the bishop did require and the children did render reason and account of their religion and faith: and such children as the bishop judged to have sufficiently profited in the understanding of religion he allowed, and laying his hands upon them, and blessing them, let them depart. This allowance and blessing of the bishop our men do call Confirmation.

“*M.* But there was another confirmation used of late?

“*S.* Instead of this most profitable and ancient confirmation, they conveyed a device of their own, that is, that the bishop should not examine children, whether they were skilled in the precepts of religion or no, but that they should anoint young infants, unable yet to speak, much less to give any account of their faith: adjoining also other ceremonies unknown unto the Holy Scripture and the primitive Church. *This invention of theirs they would needs have to be a sacrament, and accounted it in a manner equal in dignity with baptism; yea some of them preferred it also before baptism. By all means they would that this their confirmation should be taken for a certain supplying of baptism, that it should thereby be finished and brought to perfection, as though baptism else were imperfect, and as though children who in baptism had put upon them Christ with his benefits, without their confirmation were but half Christians<sup>b</sup>; than which injury no greater could be done against the divine sacrament, and against God himself, and Christ our Saviour the author and founder of the holy sacrament of baptism.*

<sup>b</sup> The Italics are mine.

"*M.* It were to be wished therefore that the ancient manner and usage of examining children were restored again.

"*S.* Very much to be wished, surely. For so should parents be brought to the satisfying of their duty in the godly bringing up of their children, which they now for the most part do leave undone, and quite reject from them<sup>b</sup>." &c. &c.

<sup>b</sup> P. 210, 211. The Latin is as follows :—

*M.* Ita est; verum quum antea parvulos, postquam adoleverint, Baptismi sui veritatem agnoscere debere dixeris, de eo te velim paulo explicatius nunc dicere.

*A.* Parentes et pædagogi pueros olim, cum primum per ætatem sapere et intelligere cœpissent, primis Christianæ religionis rudimentis diligenter instituebant, ut pietatem una pene cum lacte nutricis imbibere, et a primis statim cunis, virtutis incunabulis ad vitam illam beatam alerentur. Quem etiam ad usum breves libri, quos Catechismos nostri appellant, conscribebantur : in quibus eadem fere ista, de quibus nunc inter nos agitur, aut istis certe similia tractabantur. Postquam vero primis nostræ pietatis elementis pueri satis jam initiati videbantur, eos episcopo sistebant atque offerebant.

*M.* Quorsum nam istuc?

*A.* Ut idem hoc ipsum pueri post Baptismum præstarent, quod adulti olim, qui et Catechumeni appellabantur, ante Baptismum, vel in ipso potius baptismo, præstare sunt soliti. Episcopus enim rationem Religionis a pueris exquirebat; pueri Fidei suæ rationem episcopo reddebant: quos vero in Religionis scientia progressus jam satis magnos fecisse episcopus putabat, eos approbat: et, imposita illis manu, bene precatus dimittebat. Hanc episcopi approbationem benedictionemque, nostri Confirmationem appellant.

*M.* At alia nuper usitata erat Confirmationis ratio.

*A.* In locum hujus utilissimæ et antiquissimæ Confirmationis suum commentum supposuerant, ut episcopi videlicet non de pueris, an religionis præceptis imbuti essent, cognoscerent, sed ut infantes adhuc fari nescios, nedum ad rationem Fidei reddendum idoneos, oleo ungerent; additis aliis etiam cæremoniis Sacræ Scripturæ et veteri Ecclesiæ incognitis. Hoc suum inventum Sacramentum esse voluerunt, et dignitate cum Baptismo tantum non exæquabant, prætulerunt etiam illi eorum aliqui. Omnino voluerunt Confirmationem hanc suam Baptismi quasi supplementum quoddam esse, ut ea absolveretur atque ad exitum perduceretur: quasi alioqui imperfectus esset Baptismus, puerique, qui Christum cum suis donis in Baptismo jam induissent, sine ea semichristiani essent: qua injuria divino Sacramento, Deoque adeo

It will not be denied that there is a great unanimity here in favour of the precatory view, nor that Nowell strongly contends against the view of Confirmation being necessary in order to perfect the work begun in Baptism; and still more against that which would suspend "the gift of the Holy Ghost" till Confirmation, though claiming "spiritual regeneration" for Baptism. And his remarks appear to explain what the Article means by the "corrupt following of the Apostles." Nowell and the Homily bring out also the *subjective* view of Confirmation, (which Cranmer in his paper does not touch upon,) though not to the extent in which it appears in the Order of Confirmation itself, which we will now examine again with *this* object. Let it be granted then, first, that the statement in the "Preface" is comparative. It speaks of the best time for administering Confirmation, not of the necessity or propriety of that rite. This is assumed. And we may grant that the primary and most technical meaning of the word "Confirmation" is that of the bishop "Confirming," though from the "Order" itself this would only mean *certifying the confirmed of God's favour, and encouraging them by the episcopal benediction*. But, it should be observed also, that there is no mention whatever in the Preface of any spiritual grace to be received in and by Confirmation, and therefore that the only point which is made *prominent* is the act of the children "themselves, with their own mouth and consent, openly before the Church, ratifying and *confirming* what their godfathers and godmothers promised for them in Baptism; and also promising that by the grace of God they will evermore endeavour themselves faithfully to observe such things, as they, by their own confession,

ipsi, ac Christo Servatori sacri Baptismi auctori, nulla major fieri unquam potuit.

*M.* Optandum ergo, ut vetus ille inquirendi in pueros mos atque ratio revocaretur.

*A.* Maxime; sic enim parentes cogerentur ad satisfaciendum suo in liberis pie instituendis officio, quod hodie plerique plane prætermittunt atque repudiant, &c. &c. &c., pp. 88, 89.

have assented to." And the same appears in the bishop's question to those about to be confirmed. And we may observe that in the Church Catechism the allusion to Confirmation is solely subjective,—“Which promise, when they (infants) come to age, themselves are bound to perform<sup>d</sup>.” There is no hint in the Catechism of any reception of grace except by the purely spiritual means of “diligent prayer,” and by the two Sacraments of Christ. From all which I am inclined to infer, that the subjective view is treated as being the most *important*, although the *name* Confirmation belongs primarily to the episcopal act. And to me such an estimate appears more *primitive* as well as more practical. For the renewal of the baptismal promise by the person confirmed, if done with sincerity, seems to resemble the profession of the faith by an early convert much more closely than the act of the bishop does that of the Apostles ; for I do not believe that “by the laying on of the *bishop's* hand the Holy Ghost is given” as it *was* by the “laying on of the Apostles’ hands,” and I am quite sure that the Church of England does not assert this in anything which she says about Confirmation, but is content with saying, that as in primitive times the Apostles laid their hands on those who had been baptized with a view to the conferring of the Holy Ghost, so now the bishop lays his hands on those who have been baptized, when they come to years of discretion, in order to assure them that the assistance of the Spirit, which was first given to

<sup>d</sup> It is worth while to notice that this allusion is not explicit. And no one, I think, would wish it to be so. No one would wish to say that the “coming to age” spoken of is not till Confirmation. Such a view would be very destructive to early piety, and is indeed guarded against in the first part of the Catechism, where the child is required to say, “I verily think *I am* bound to believe and to do as my god-fathers and godmothers promised for me, and with God’s help so I will.” And practically any explicit mention of Confirmation in catechetical instruction is only then valuable or even desirable, when without it a reality cannot be given to Christian training. The obligation should, if possible, be so inculcated that the profession of it at Confirmation may be, so to speak, natural.

them at their Baptism, will be continued, and increased, (so as to enable them to contend with the temptations of life, which may now ordinarily be supposed to be thickening around them,) provided that they are sincere and earnest in making their Christian profession. And such a moderate view is quite compatible with a belief that the "laying on of hands" mentioned after baptism in Heb. x. 2 refers to Confirmation, and that this therefore is presented to us in such a collocation as to be *obligatory as a practice*. For a practice may be obligatory and yet the connection of this practice with any divine blessing may be a fair subject of discussion, and one incapable of any very precise decision.

Nor is it difficult to account for the more sacramental view of the rite. Once let it be granted that our "laying on of hands" is not only an imitation of an apostolical practice, but has the promise of a divine gift corresponding to that which first attended it, and the position of Confirmation is secured as perfecting Baptism, (which without it would not be complete,) and conferring a higher gift. For it is plain from Scripture that that which is called preeminently "the gift of the Holy Ghost" was at first connected not with Baptism, but with the "laying on of hands." "Regeneration," and "a birth of the Spirit," and "putting on Christ," belong to Baptism, but "the Holy Ghost" was given through "laying on of the Apostles' hands." Nor can it be demonstrated that by this was always meant the *extraordinary* gifts. The passage in Acts viii. is silent as to the nature of the gifts. That in xix. cannot therefore decide the universal practice. Then comes the point, Did this especial and superior gift continue? and we notice that the passages which speak of a "seal" and an "earnest" were interpreted by the old commentators of "laying on of hands," not of baptism. Therefore, (is the conclusion,) a gift superior to the elementary gift in Baptism is still given "by laying on of hands," i. e. in Confirmation. Now this argument from the less direct texts does not seem to be of much value, for when Confirmation immediately followed Baptism, as it did at first

there was no inducement to look upon them as separate, and analyse the exact value of each. And that this is not done in the passage from Tertullian (*de Baptism. c. 8*) which Hooker quotes<sup>e</sup>, is evident to any one who reads it. And Jerome's conclusion on the point, (which was elicited by the Luciferian controversy,) is that "the Holy Ghost is given in true baptism," and that confirmation is (to use the expression of Hooker<sup>f</sup>) "only a sacramental complement;" which appears to me to be *in effect* saying that it is only an outward rite. At least the expression of Jerome is contradictory on any other supposition, "*Si hoc loco quæris, quare in ecclesia baptizatus nisi per episcopi manus non accipiat Sp. Sanctum quem omnes asserimus in vero baptismo tribui, &c.*" for it distinctly asserts the gift of the Holy Ghost in baptism, and at the same time its being given "through the hands of the bishop."

But if we set these passages aside, the others still remain: and "why then," it may be asked, "do you not allow that baptism gives life, and confirmation strength?" My answer is simply this; Confirmation is not a positive ordinance either of Christ or his Apostles, and therefore I cannot venture to say it gives anythings. It *may* give, or be the means of our having, certain especial gifts, but I must decline affirming this. Any comparison of Confirmation and the Eucharist, as to the exact grace conferred, is consequently unnecessary. The refinement of a distinction between a *character*<sup>h</sup> of strength and fresh infusions of strength, which I find is made, appears to me somewhat alien to the simplicity both of Scripture and of the Church of England. Nor, I will add, is the notion of the "sevenfold gift" of the Spirit being especially connected with Confirmation at all countenanced in the

<sup>e</sup> Eccl. Pol. B. V. ch. lxvi. 4. ed. Keble.

<sup>f</sup> Ibid. 6.

<sup>g</sup> I mean (of course) sacramentally, not in respect of the Bishop's prayer.

<sup>h</sup> In this and one or two other remarks I have had in my eye a little book, entitled, "Laying on of hands," published by "Masters" as one of the "Churchman's Library."

“Order of Confirmation.” The prayer is, “Strengthen them, we beseech Thee, O Lord, with the Holy Ghost the Comforter, and *daily increase* in them Thy manifold gifts of grace, &c.” There is surely nothing here to imply that these gifts are then first imparted ; or that they were not till then needed. It may be argued indeed that “strength” is then *given*, but the other gifts are certainly only *increased*. And my reason for contending against these more precise views of the effect of Confirmation is, that I think they are likely to cause disappointment, and then a reaction, in the minds even of sincere persons, who, after being led to expect such great results, find but little internal evidence of difference. Of course if the fact of these special gifts being given were plainly taught in Scripture, they would be bound to believe it even without that evidence ; but there being no positive institution of Confirmation in Scripture there is no such duty ; and it seems more scriptural to connect these spiritual blessings with Christ’s positive institutions, than with an ordinance which, however edifying, may or may not be essential.

Absolution, like Confirmation, has no *status* in our Confession of faith. It appears in Art. XXV, under the name of its correlative *penance*, as having “grown out of the corrupt following of the Apostles,” and “not having like nature of sacraments with Baptism and the Lord’s Supper ; for that *it* has not any visible sign or ceremony ordained of God.” It is not therefore “a sacrament of the Gospel.” In the Homilies it is mentioned thus : “Although absolution hath the promise of forgiveness of sin ; yet by the express word of the New Testament it hath not this promise annexed and tied to the visible sign, which is imposition of hands. For this visible sign (I mean laying on of hands) is not expressly commanded in the New Testament to be used in absolution, as the visible signs in Baptism and the Lord’s Supper are : and therefore absolution is no such sacrament as baptism and the communion are.” Here it is, we see, said to have “the promise of forgiveness.” But forgiveness, though *grace* in one sense, is not grace in a subjective or internal sense, in which sacra-

ments are "means of grace." "Forgiveness" is a judicial term. Therefore there is no room for saying that absolution "repairs or restores Christian life when forfeited by sin," or that the words of absolution "do not only state a fact but impart a gift." This is going beyond *any* statement or usage of our Church. For if we leave the Homily and go to the Book of Common Prayer, and to the Office of "The Visitation of the Sick," there is not a word about a gift being imparted. "I absolve thee from all thy sins," is the expression, (which I wish was not there,) and strong as this is, it is, as I said, only judicial.

I am unable, as I stated in a sermon on this subject, (preached before the University in Dec. 1850,) to see how this absolution (in spite of the indicative form) *can* be other than declaratory in respect of *sin*, "for no one can forgive sins but God only," and therefore "remitting" by a man can only be *declaring* remission, or else removing some ecclesiastical censure or punishment. In the sermon alluded to, I suggested that the indicative form was intended to *represent* the forgiveness of God very vividly before the mind, but I think now that the idea of an ecclesiastical remission of penalties or disqualification was probably that of those who retained the form<sup>i</sup>. For if we look to the "Second Part of the Sermon for Whitsunday," (Hom. p. 413,) we find "the right use of ecclesiastical discipline" made one of the "three notes or marks" of the true Church. And this is described afterwards (p. 414) thus: "Christ ordained the authority of the keys to excommunicate notorious sinners, and to absolve them which are truly penitent." "Absolution" is here opposed to "*excommunication*," which has its *status* in our Church, (see Art. XXXIII.) But Excommunication at most debars a man from the use of the Church's ordinances, and therefore it seems to follow that Absolution restores him to them,—or, in the case of a sick man, removes any impediment to a free enjoyment of God's grace which *may* arise from any unpardoned offences by which the sick man may have caused scandal to the com-

<sup>i</sup> I still think the *representative* view most in accordance with the words of Absolution.



munity to which he belongs. I do not think such an (indirect) connection of Absolution with the reception of grace is inconsistent with the views of our Reformers. But I can see no trace whatever of any more direct connection. For if we look to the other passage in the Book of Common Prayer which enjoins, under certain exceptional circumstances, the use of Absolution, there is no mention of any gift of grace (in a subjective sense.) I allude of course to the first Exhortation in the "Holy Communion." "Because it is requisite, that no man should come to the holy Communion, but with a full trust in God's mercy, and with a quiet conscience; therefore if there be any of you, who by this means cannot quiet his own conscience herein, but requireth further comfort or counsel, let him come to me, or to some other discreet and learned minister of God's Word and open his grief; that by the ministry of God's holy Word he may receive the benefit of absolution, together with ghostly counsel and advice, to the quieting of his conscience, and avoiding of all scruple and doubtfulness." I will not argue as to this invitation being exceptional, because it speaks for itself. It is only those who *cannot* by "this means," i. e. self-examination and a comparison of their life with God's word, quiet *their own* conscience, who are invited to resort to the minister. But what are they to resort to him for? not an "inward spiritual grace," but "further comfort or counsel," and for the purpose evidently of "quieting their conscience," of receiving an assurance of pardon. And the promise answers to the need:—"that he may receive the benefit of absolution," the blessing evidently of feeling his conscience quieted; and how? by a special gift imparted? no: by "the ministry of God's holy Word." And what can this mean, but by having it shewn to him from the Word of God that he may hope for pardon? for the mention of "ghostly counsel and advice" does not interfere with this being the benefit of Absolution; for these would have reference to future conduct, and so be as separate according to this, as according to a more sacramental interpretation. This re-

jection of a Sacramental view of Absolution leads me further to reject a *technical* view of it (except in the case of an excommunicated person,) on these grounds. 1st, that the rubric in the first book of King Edward VI. which ordered the *indicative* form of Absolution "to be used in all private confessions" was omitted in the second book, and has never been replaced. 2nd, that the expression "by the ministry of God's holy Word" was added, "to shew" (as Wheatly supposes) "that *the benefit of absolution* (of absolution I presume from inward guilt) was not to be received by the pronouncing of any form, but by a due application and ministry of God's holy Word;" in favour of which view he refers to John xv. 3: "Now ye are clean through the word which I have spoken unto you;" and to 2 Cor. v. 19: "To wit, that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them; and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation." 3rd, From the similar language of the Homily on Repentance (second part, p. 481, Oxf. Ed. 1840), "that they may receive at their hand *the comfortable salve of God's word.*" It may of course be argued that this more general expression was adopted to suit the freedom of the permission in this passage, which allows any one who is "troubled in conscience" to "repair to their learned curate or pastor, or to some other godly learned man," because no one but an ordained minister could absolve; but though this should be allowed (which would, I think, be inconsistent with the extreme boldness of the whole of this Homily), still this would only account for the omission of the word "Absolution" here, and not for the insertion of the words "by the ministry of God's holy Word" in the former passage: which insertion, and the omission of the rubric ordering the use of the *indicative* form, seem to me conclusive on the point that absolution was not intended to be used in any technical sense in the Exhortation in the Communion Office. The permission in the Homily to resort not only to our "learned curate or pastor," but to "some other godly learned man," shews the *general* feeling of the Church

at the time as to this point. And the whole tenor of the Homily proves how extremely sophistical is that view of it which represents it as only denying the obligation of a man's "*numbering* his sins, as it hath been used heretofore in the time of blindness and ignorancce," and not also the obligation of *any* confession to any but God<sup>h</sup>, and, with this, the necessity of *any* absolution except His.

On the whole I should come to this conclusion, 1. that our Church nowhere recognizes Absolution as a means of grace, except perhaps in that indirect sense in which it may be called so when it removes Excommunication.

2nd. That it is probable that by absolution, in any case but this<sup>i</sup>, is intended merely an application to the penitent's conscience of the consolations and promises of the Gospel: and therefore that the *indicative* form should never be used except in the Office of Visitation of the Sick, and then only if the sick man "humbly and heartily desire it;" which desire, it may be added, the minister is not ordered to endeavour to excite in the mind of the penitent, as he is the willingness to confess in case of his "conscience being troubled with any weighty matter."

3rd. That our Church never positively enjoins private confession, and recommends it only in two exceptional cases, with a view to "quieting" a man's "conscience" before receiving the holy Communion, and if a sick man "feels his conscience troubled with any weighty matter."

4th. That our Church *permits* private confession in any case of a troubled conscience.

5th. That in these cases the confession may be made to any "godly learned man," whether a minister of the Gospel or not.

<sup>h</sup> The Homily indeed says, "besides this there is another confession which is needful and necessary," but it goes on to explain this to be a mutual acknowledgment of offences committed against each other, with a view, 1st, to reconciliation, 2nd, to common and mutual prayer.

<sup>i</sup> Even in this case the disuse of Excommunication renders the declaratory and untechnical view the only practical view, to one who in accordance with the language of our Formularies rejects the Sacramental view.



## ERRATA.

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- p. 37, last line, add marks of quotation after *infallible*  
p. 38, line 14, for *their* read *the*  
p. 91, line 17, for *ours*, read *ours*.  
p. 98, note t, for De Fid. Orth. 1. c. read lib. i. c. 4.  
p. 137, note, for *mirum* read *mirus*  
p. 146, line 6, add note-mark u, to the word *transposed*  
p. 156, note b, for *quam* read *quum*  
p. 162, note p, after *Tit. iii. 5*, add *and John iii. 5*.  
p. 164, note, for *dwells*, read *dwells*.  
p. 166, line 12, dele marks of quotation after *God*  
p. 169, note line 16, for *second* read *sacred*  
p. 171, line 9, for *words* read *word*  
p. 189, line 5, after *invalidate* add a comma  
p. 195, note e, after *originis* add a comma  
p. 204, note, dele marks of quotation after *then* and before *baptism*  
p. 205, for *spiritually* read *spiritual*  
p. 232, add commas after *that* and *predestination*  
p. 268, line 5, add comma after *regarded*











